Google Inc.

Dominic Rizzo

Peiter Charles Zatko

Mark Hayter

Scott David Johnson

Timothy Jay Chen

Eunchan Kim

Michael Stefano Fritz Schaffner

An IC chip can provide silicon root of trust (RoT) functionality. In described implementations, the IC chip includes a processor, an interconnect, and multiple peripheral devices. These comportable circuit components are designed to facilitate interoperability and consistent, expected communications for security circuitry. Each peripheral device includes an interface that adheres to a common framework for interacting with the processor and with other peripheral devices. The interface includes an interconnect interface coupling the peripheral device to the interconnect and an inter-device interface coupling the peripheral device to at least one other peripheral device. The peripheral device is realized based on a peripheral device design code that indicates inter-device signaling in accordance with an inter-device scheme of an interface specification. Manufacturers fabricate the peripheral device, based on the design code, to be physically and logically coupled to another peripheral device in a predictable manner. This fosters more-robust and reliable security circuitry.

Peripheral device comportability with security circuitry

A trusted computing device (TCD) includes an isolated environment, host interface, secure interface, and program instructions. The environment includes an isolated environment processor (IEP), memory (secure and non-secure partition), and an auxiliary processor (AP). Memory and AP are connected for data communication with the IEP, and communicate with a host only through the IEP. The host interface and each secure interface are connected for data communication with the IEP. The instructions provision TCD for cryptographic operations via a secure interface; present a first file system partition comprising a write file and a read file with file creation/deletion privileges allocated only to the IEP at the host interface via the IEP; present a non-secured file system partition with access to the non-secure partition via the host interface via the IEP; receive, via the write file, requests to perform trusted computing; perform requested computing using the IEP, secure memory, and AP; and write results to the read file.

Trusted computing

A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A user provides a communication to the trusted device via the secure interface. A processor of the isolated environment encrypts the communication and transmits the encrypted communication to a read file of the host interface. A host device connected to the trusted device via the host interface receives the encrypted communication. The host device transmits the encrypted communication to a second host device that is connected to a second trusted device via a second host interface. The second host device transmits the encrypted communication to a write file of the second host interface. A processor in an isolated environment of the second trusted device decrypts the communication and provides the decrypted communication to a second user via a secure interface of the second trusted device.

Secure host communications

An electronic device including an electronic assembly and an enclosure. The electronics assembly including a host interface and a direct user input interface. The direct user input interface remains exposed when the device is connected to a host via the host interface. The enclosure, substantially in the form factor of a microSD device, forms the outer boundary of the electronic device, overmolded on the electronics assembly.

Microelectronics device with exposed user interfaces

A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A trusted source provisions the trusted device via the secure interface to include private information, such as private user information and cryptographic data. When the trusted device is connected to an untrusted host device via the host interface, the untrusted host device transmits a request regarding the private information to a write file of the host interface. A processor of the isolated environment retrieves the request and generates an output, such as an encrypted output, that is responsive to the request from the untrusted host device. The trusted device transmits the output to a read file of the host interface, thus making the output available to the untrusted host device via the host interface. The untrusted host device then receives the output via the host interface.

Secure host interactions

A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A write file of the host interface receives an entry from an untrusted host device connected to the trusted device. A processor of the isolated environment retrieves the entry and determines log data associated with the entry, such as the date and time of the entry. Using the log data, the processor records an event log entry in a secure storage of the isolated environment. Once recorded, the entry cannot be deleted or altered. An authorized user, however, can then access the event log entry from the secure storage, such as by providing a request for the event log entry via the secure interface of the trusted device and/or the host interface of the trusted device.

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Mountain View, CA, United States of America

Dominic Rizzo