Mcafee, Inc.

Intel Corporation

Debra Cablao

Paritosh Saxena

Nicholas D Triantafillou

David M Durham

Balaji Vembu

Prashant Dewan

John Douglas Teddy

Michael S Hughes

Jason M Surprise

Adrian M M T Dunbar

Daniel Nemiroff

Purushottam Goel

Andrew H Gafken

Paul J Thadikaran

Computing platform security methods and apparatus are disclosed. An example apparatus includes a graphics processor; and a graphics driver to facilitate access to the graphics processor, the graphics driver including: an authenticator to establish a trusted channel between the graphics driver and an application driver via mutual authentication of the graphics driver and the application driver; an offloader to offload a computing task to the graphics processor via the trusted channel, the computing task associated with the application driver; and a hypervisor to monitor memory associated with the offloaded computing task for an unauthorized access attempt.

Computing platform security methods and apparatus

Computing platform security methods and apparatus are disclosed. An example apparatus includes a security application to configure a security task, the security task to detect a malicious element on a computing platform, the computing platform including a central processing unit and a graphics processing unit; and an offloader to determine whether the central processing unit or the graphics processing unit is to execute the security task; and when the graphics processing unit is to execute the security task, offload the security task to the graphics processing unit for execution.

Embodiments of techniques and systems for out-of-band verification of host OS components are described. In embodiments, a out-of-band host OS boot sequence verification system ('BSVS') may access system memory without detection by a host OS process, or 'out of band.' The BSVS may access host OS components in the system memory and may generate signatures from memory footprints of the host OS components. These signatures may then be compared to trusted signatures to verify integrity of the host OS components. In embodiments, this verification may be performed during a boot of a host OS or on demand. In embodiments, the trusted signatures may be pre-stored by the BSVS before a boot; in some embodiments, the trusted signatures may be previously-computed and then stored by the BSVS. Other embodiments may be described and claimed.

Out-of-band host OS boot sequence verification

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Hillsboro, OR, United States of America

Debra Cablao