International Business Machines Corporation

General Electric Company

Lenovo (singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Lenvo (singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Lenovo Limited

David R Safford

Paul Ashley Karger

Nevenko Zunic

Guerney D H Hunt

Dimitrios Pendarakis

William Eric Hall

Stephen Michael Matyas, Jr

Rosario Gennaro

Mark F Mergen

David Carroll Challener

Kenneth Alan Goldman

David Claude Toll

Shai Halevi

Charanjit Singh Jutla

Don Coppersmith

Mohammed Peyravian

George Conerly Wilson

Elaine Rivette Palmer

Patrick Joseph Callaghan

William David Smith, Ii

Leendert Peter Van Doorn

Brian D Valentine

Miriam Zohar

Randall Scott Springfield

Ashish Kundu

Richard Harold Boivie

Donald B Johnson

Marcel Mordechay Yung

Richard Paul Messmer

Luke James O'Connor

Suzanne K McIntosh

Howard J Locker

Daryl Carvis Cromer

Mohammad Peyravian

Andrew Gregory Kegel

Vaijayanthimala K Anand

Kattamuri Ekanadham

Peter Anthony Sandon

Steven A Bade

Sandra K Johnson

Bhushan Pradip Jain

Mohit Kapur

Arvind Rangarajan

Enriquillo Valdez

Kimberly DaShawn Simon

Linda Nancy Betz

John Joseph Freer

Sarbari Gupta

Charles William Kaufman, Jr

Coimbatore S Chandersekaran

Krzysztof Kepa

Hubertus Franke

Pratap Chandra Pattnaik

Robert William Wisniewski

Hui Lei

Stephen M Matyas

Pankaj Rohatgi

Steven Dale Goodman

Vijay Krishnarao Naik

Dhruv Manmohandas Desai

Francis Edward Noel, Jr

Shu Tao

Stefan Berger

Marcel Catalin Rosu

Wesley Michael Skeffington

Guerney Douglass Holloway Hunt

Jayaram Kallapalayam Radhakrishnan

Simon J Kofkin-Hansen

Joseph Czechowski, Iii

Atul Chandrakant Kshirsagar

Yurij Andrij Baransky

Safayet Nizam Uddin Ahmed

Garry Michael Kump

Willard Monten Wiseman

Guerney Dh Hunt

Guerney D Hunt

David C Challener

Douglas L Schales

Joseph Iii Czechowski

William David Smith

Garry M Kump

Francis E Noel

Leendert P Van Doorn

Douglas L c/o Ibm Uk Ltd Ip Law Schales

An apparatus, system and method for protecting the confidentiality and integrity of a secure object running on a computer system by protecting the memory pages owned by the secure object, including assigning a secure object an ID, labeling the memory pages owned by a secure object with the ID of the secure object, maintaining an Access Control Monitor (ACM) table for the memory pages on the system, controlling access to memory pages by monitoring load and store instructions and comparing information in the ACM table with the ID of the software that is executing these instructions; and limiting access to a memory page to the owner of the memory page.

System and method for supporting secure objects using a memory access control monitor

A service processor is provided that includes a processor, a memory coupled to the processor and having instructions for executing an operating system kernel having an integrity management subsystem, secure boot firmware, and a tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor. The secure boot firmware performs a secure boot operation to boot the operating system kernel of the service processor. The secure boot firmware records first measurements of code executed by the secure boot firmware when performing the boot operation, in one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor. The operating system kernel enables the integrity management subsystem. The integrity management subsystem records second measurements of software executed by the operating system kernel, in the one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor.

Service processor and system with secure booting and monitoring of service processor integrity

A secure communication path device includes a first secure communication validator providing a one-way communication path from a security domain by implementing a secure protocol parser, a second secure communication validator providing a one-way communication path from a second security domain by implementing a secure second protocol parser. Each validator including respective serial/de-serializer units providing a unidirectional communication path from their respective security domain. The device hardware segregating respective communications of the security domains within the secure communication path device.

Provably secure application-specific cross-domain solutions

Mechanisms for booting a service processor are provided. With these mechanisms, the service processor executes a secure boot operation of secure boot firmware to boot an operating system kernel of the service processor. The secure boot firmware records first measurements of code executed by the secure boot firmware when performing the boot operation, in one or more registers of a tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor of the service processor. The operating system kernel executing in the service processor enables an integrity management subsystem of the operating system kernel which records second measurements of software executed by the operating system kernel, in the one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor.

Securely booting a service processor and monitoring service processor integrity

An exemplary additive manufacturing method includes receiving a build file comprising instructions for controlling the manufacturing hardware to generate an object, receiving a material identifier indicating a particular lot of manufacturing media, validating the build file and the material identifier via a distributed ledger to verify both an author of the build file and an origin of the particular lot of manufacturing media, causing manufacturing hardware to generate the object using the build file and the particular lot of manufacturing media, generating an object manufactured transaction to the distributed ledger indicating a result of the validation of the origin of the at least one of the build file or the material identifier, and certifying the object in response to verifying the author of the build file and the origin of the particular lot of manufacturing media, and wherein the object manufactured transaction indicates that the object is certified.

Methods and systems for implementing distributed ledger manufacturing history

A method alters a computer resource in response to the computer resource moving from a first geolocation to a second geolocation. One or more processors receive a message indicating that a computer resource has moved from a first geolocation to a new geolocation. In response to receiving the message that the computer resource has moved from the first geolocation to the new geolocation, the processor(s) encrypt data that is stored on the computer resource, and apply decryption information to the encrypted data from the new geolocation, where the decryption information is specifically for decrypting encrypted data at the new geolocation. In response to the decryption information failing to decrypt the encrypted data at the new geolocation, the processor(s) and/or a user alter the computer resource.

Verification of geolocation of devices in a cloud data center

Hardware mechanisms are provided for performing hardware based access control of instructions to data. These hardware mechanisms associate an instruction access policy label with an instruction to be processed by a processor and associate an operand access policy label with data to be processed by the processor. The instruction access policy label is passed along with the instruction through one or more hardware functional units of the processor. The operand access policy label is passed along with the data through the one or more hardware functional units of the processor. One or more hardware implemented policy engines associated with the one or more hardware functional units of the processor are utilized to control access by the instruction to the data based on the instruction access policy label and the operand access policy label.

Hardware based mandatory access control

Some aspects are directed to additive manufacturing systems. An example additive manufacturing system controller is configured to receive a build file comprising instructions for controlling the manufacturing hardware to generate the object, receive a material identifier indicating a particular lot of manufacturing media, validate the build file and the material identifier via a distributed ledger to verify at least one of an author of the build file or an origin of the particular lot of manufacturing media, control the manufacturing hardware using the build file to generate the object using the particular lot of manufacturing media, and in response to completion of the generation of the object, generate an object manufactured transaction to the distributed ledger indicating a result of the validation of the origin of the at least one of the build file or the material identifier.

The example embodiments are directed to a system and method for secure provisioning of secrets into MPSoC devices using untrusted third-party systems. In one example, the method includes generating a random number sequence from a true random number generator to produce secret information, storing the secret information in an on-chip secure storage, encrypting, in a device and using public key encryption, the secret information to generate an encrypted message, and transmitting the encrypted message to a third-party system.

Secure provisioning of secrets into MPSoC devices using untrusted third-party systems

A processor in a computer system, the processor including a mechanism supporting a Secure Object that comprises information that is protected so that other software on said computer system cannot access or undetectably tamper with said information, thereby protecting both a confidentiality and an integrity of the Secure Object information while making the Secure Object information available to the Secure Object itself during execution of the Secure Object. The mechanism includes a crypto mechanism that decrypts and integrity-checks Secure Object information as said Secure Object information moves into the computer system from an external storage system, and encrypts and updates an integrity value for Secure Object information as said Secure Object information moves out of the computer system to the external storage system, and a memory protection mechanism that protects the confidentiality and integrity of Secure Object information when that information is in the memory of the computer system.

A method, system, and/or computer program product modify a computer resource that has been moved to a new geolocation. One or more processors detect that a geolocation of a software resource has changed to a new geolocation. In response to detecting that the geolocation of the software resource has changed to the new geolocation, the processor(s) apply a geolocation based resource policy to alter the software resource.

Mitigation of geolocation based data remanence problems

A processor-implemented method alters a computer resource based on its new geolocation. One or more processors receive a message that a computer resource has moved from a first geolocation to a new geolocation. The processor(s) receive an identifier of the new geolocation for the computer resource. In response to receiving the identifier of the new geolocation for the computer resource, the processor(s) request and receive encrypted data from the new geolocation. The processor(s) apply decryption information to the encrypted data from the new geolocation, where the decryption information is specifically for decrypting encrypted data from the new geolocation. In response to the decryption information failing to decrypt the encrypted data from the new geolocation, the processor(s) determine that the identifier of the new geolocation is false and apply a geolocation based resource policy to alter the computer resource at the new geolocation.

According to some embodiments, a system may include a communication port to exchange information with a client device associated with an industrial control system. A network security server coupled to the communication port may include a computer processor adapted to provide a network security service for the client device. The computer processor may further be adapted to record security information about the client device via a blockchain verification process (e.g., by registering a validation result within a distributed ledger). The network security service might comprise, for example, an integrity attestation service providing software verification for the client device.

Blockchain verification of network security service

Growing community of inventors

Brewster, NY, United States of America

David R Safford