Vmware, Inc.

Intel Corporation

David Ott

Ye Li

Andrei Warkentin

Daniel James Beveridge

Cyprien Laplace

Mark Benson

Marc Wayne Brotherson

Akeem Lamar Jenkins

Sean James Huntley

Srikathyayani Srikanteswara

Alexander Fainkichen

Eve M Schooler

Rath Vannithamby

Ren Wang

Christian Maciocco

James P Elwell

Hassnaa Moustafa

Vallabhajosyula S Somayazulu

Jeffrey Sedayao

Sung Ho Lee

David E Cohen

David John Zage

Andrew Stephen Brown

Anoop Jaishankar

Lei Xu

Dennis R Moreau

John Wagner

Diane Ott

Trent Quick

Paul Thomas Adair

Rajat Prakash

Peerapol Tinnakornsrisuphap

Fatih Ulupinar

Jesse R Walker

David W Grawrock

Regis Duchesne

Vijay Ganti

Shruthi Muralidhara Hiriyuru

Ruimin Sun

Corey Malone

Matthew Lentz

The disclosure provides an approach for certificate management for cryptographic agility. Embodiments include receiving, by a cryptographic agility system, a cryptographic request related to an application. Embodiments include selecting, by the cryptographic agility system, a cryptographic technique based on contextual information associated with the cryptographic request. Embodiments include determining, by the cryptographic agility system, based on the cryptographic request, a certificate for authenticating a key related to the cryptographic technique. Embodiments include providing, by the cryptographic agility system, the certificate to an endpoint related to the cryptographic request for use in authenticating the key.

Dynamic certificate management in cryptographic agility frameworks

The disclosure herein describes deploying a Virtual Secure Enclave (VSE) using a universal enclave binary and a Trusted Runtime (TR). A universal enclave binary is generated that includes a set of binaries of Instruction Set Architectures (ISAs) associated with Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) hardware backends. A TEE hardware backend is identified in association with a VSE-compatible device. A VSE that is compatible with the identified TEE hardware backend is generated on the VSE-compatible device and an ISA binary that matches the TEE hardware backend is selected from the universal enclave binary. The selected binary is linked to a runtime library of the TR and loads the linked binary into memory of the generated VSE. The execution of a trusted application is initiated in the generated VSE using a set of interfaces of the TR. The trusted application depends on the TR interfaces rather than the selected ISA binary.

Deploying enclaves on different tee backends using a universal enclave binary

The disclosure provides an approach for cryptographic agility. Embodiments include receiving a request from an application for a cryptographic operation, wherein the request is associated with a computing device. Embodiments include determining one or more resource constraints related to the computing device. Embodiments include selecting, based on the one or more resource constraints, a cryptographic technique from a plurality of cryptographic techniques associated with indications of resource requirements. Embodiments include performing the cryptographic operation using the cryptographic technique. Embodiments include providing a response to the application based on performing the cryptographic operation.

Dynamic selection and calibration of ciphers based on network and resource constraints

System and method for creating and managing trusted execution environments (TEEs) using different underlying hardware TEE mechanisms use a virtual secure enclave device which runs in a virtualized environment in a computer system. The device enables an enclave command transmitted to the virtual secure enclave device to be retrieved and parsed to extract an enclave operation to be executed. A TEE backend module is used to interact with a particular hardware TEE mechanism among those available in the computer system. The module ensures the enclave operation for the software process is executed by the particular hardware TEE mechanism, or the TEE scheme based on a particular hardware TEE mechanism.

Unifying hardware trusted execution environment technologies using virtual secure enclave device

The disclosure provides an approach for cryptographic agility. Embodiments include establishing, by a proxy component associated with a cryptographic agility system, a first secure connection with an application. Embodiments include receiving, by the proxy component, via the first secure connection, a communication from the application directed to an endpoint. Embodiments include selecting, by the cryptographic agility system, a cryptographic technique based on contextual information related to the communication. Embodiments include establishing, by the proxy component, a second secure connection with the endpoint based on the cryptographic technique. Embodiments include transmitting, by the proxy component, a secure communication to the endpoint via the second secure connection based on the communication.

Mechanism for enabling cryptographic agility in legacy applications and services

System and method for managing migration of trusted execution environments (TEEs) based on migration policies utilizes a source migration agent in the source host computer and a destination migration agent in a destination host computer to migrate a source TEE in the source host computer to the destination host computer. A migration policy data of the source TEE is first transmitted to the destination migration agent from the source migration agent to determine whether the destination host computer satisfies migration policies specified in the migration policy data. In response to a determination that the destination host computer satisfies the migration policies specified in the migration policy data, a destination TEE is created in the destination host computer and memory pages of the source TEE are transmitted to the destination TEE. The memory pages are then restored at the destination TEE for execution.

System and method for cross-architecture trusted execution environment migration

System and method for providing secure execution environments in a computer system uses an enclave virtual computing instance to create a secure execution environment, which is deployed in response to a request for such a secure execution environment for content from a software process running in the computer system.

System and method for providing secure execution environments using virtualization technology

System and method for providing trusted execution environments uses a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) device of a computer system to receive and process commands to create and manage a trusted execution environment for a software process running in the computer system. The trusted execution environment created in the PCI device is then used to execute operations for the software process.

System and method for implementing trusted execution environment on PCI device

System and method for performing a remote attestation for creation of a trusted execution environment (TEE) using a virtual secure enclave device running in a virtualized environment utilizes a trusted bootloader appliance in a TEE virtual computing instance, which is created in response to a request for a TEE from a software process running in the system. The trusted bootloader appliance manages the provisioning of a TEE in the TEE virtual computing instance for the software process. The remote attestation includes performing a first stage attestation on the trusted bootloader appliance by a hardware platform of the computer system and performing a second stage attestation on the provisioned TEE by the trusted bootloader appliance.

System and method for remote attestation in trusted execution environment creation using virtualization technology

A computer-implemented method and system for protecting a host computer in a computer network from security threats uses local security-relevant data for the host computer, as well as global security-relevant data for other components in the computer network downloaded from a security information plane system to the host computer, to determine a security threat to the host computer. When a security threat is determined to be a legitimate threat, a security alert is issued, and then an action is initiated in response to the security alert.

Security protection for a host computer in a computer network using cross-domain security-relevant information

System and method for managing security-relevant information in a computer network uses a security information plane (SIP) manager to which different types of security-relevant data are uploaded from components in the computer network and from which networkwide aggregated security information produced from the security-relevant data is download to a global security controller. The downloaded networkwide aggregated security information is used by the global security controller to control security applications running in the computer network.

System and method for managing security-relevant information in a computer network

Generally discussed herein are systems, devices, and methods for managing content of an information centric network (ICN). A component of an ICN can include a memory including an extended content store that includes content from at least one other component of the ICN, and first attributes of the content, the first attributes including a content popularity value that indicates a number of requests for the content, and processing circuitry to increment the content popularity value in response to a transmission of a first content packet that includes the content, the first content packet transmitted in response to receiving an interest packet.

Data management in an information-centric network

System and techniques for radio spectrum sharing are described herein. A free radio spectrum block may be identified. An identification packet of the free radio spectrum block may be published. Here, the identification packet may include at least one of available spectrum, time, or area corresponding to the free radio spectrum block. An acknowledgement to the identification packet may be received. A provider of the free radio spectrum block may then be caused to cease radio communication on the available spectrum for the time and area specified in the identification packet.

Radio spectrum sharing

Growing community of inventors

Chandler, AZ, United States of America

David Ott