Gen Digital Inc.

Nortonlifelock Inc.

Symantec Corporation

Ca, Inc.

David Luz Silva

Johann Roturier

Iskander Sanchez Rola

Petros Efstathopoulos

Yun Shen

Daniel Kats

Daniel Marino

Leylya Yumer

Pratyush Banerjee

Bahaa Naamneh

Kevin Alejandro Roundy

Qing Li

Michael Andrew Hart

Sandeep B Bhatkar

Christopher Gates

Pierre-Antoine Vervier

Sharada Sundaram

Matteo Dell'Amico

Slawomir Grzonkowski

Iskander Sanchez

Leyla Bilge

Brian Varner

Stanley Kiefer

The disclosed computer-implemented method for dynamic data protection may include intercepting a submit request for sensitive data to a destination, inserting dummy data into the intercepted submit request. The method may also include determining whether the destination is a trusted destination and when the destination is determined to be the trusted destination, replacing the dummy data with real data to complete the submit request to the destination, wherein the real data was previously collected isolated from the submit request. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Systems and methods for dynamic formjacking protection

Preserving web page functionality through dynamic analysis of host web pages. Web pages accessed by a user device may be monitored. The web browser may apply a blocking policy that blocks an external domain from loading functional content into the web page, which results in a breakage in the web page. The breakage in the web page may be identified through a dynamic analysis of the web page and correlated with the functional content from the blocked external domain. Once identified and correlated, the blocking policy may be modified to allow the external domain to load the functional content and reloading the web page.

Preserving web page functionality through dynamic analysis of host web pages

The disclosed computer-implemented method for managing privacy policy violations may include obtaining, by the computing device, an intermediate representation of a privacy policy, wherein the intermediate representation denotes a formal policy and is generated by extracting the privacy policy in natural language from a website and parsing the privacy policy. The method may also include comparing, by the computing device, behavior of the website against the intermediate representation, thereby detecting at least one violation of the formal policy. The method may further include enforcing, by the computing device, the formal policy at least in part by taking a security action in response to the violation. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Systems and methods for managing privacy policy violations

The disclosed computer-implemented method for identifying security threats in smart contract-based services to protect against malicious attacks utilizing off-blockchain resources may include (i) identifying a reference associated with a transaction on a smart contract-based platform, (ii) detecting content describing one or more smart contracts associated with the reference on the platform, (iii) extracting an identifier from the content to locate off-blockchain resources utilized by the smart contracts, (iv) determining potential security threats associated with the off-blockchain resources, and (v) performing a security action that protects against the potential security threats. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Systems and methods for identifying security threats in smart contract-based services to protect against malicious attacks utilizing off-blockchain resources

The disclosed computer-implemented method for enforcing strict network connectivity and storage access during online payments may include (i) determining that a webpage in a tab of a browser application executing on the computing device includes a payment page for an e-commerce website, (ii) based on determining that the webpage includes a payment page, providing formjacking attack protection by monitoring network connectivity and storage access by the browser tab, (iii) based on the formjacking attack protection, identifying a potentially malicious attempt to hijack information entered into at least one web form included in the payment page, and (iv) in response to identifying the potentially malicious attempt, preventing the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Systems and methods for enforcing strict network connectivity and storage access during online payments

Distinguishing between functional tracking domains and nonfunctional tracking domains on a host web page. In particular, a list of known tracking domains that load content into host web pages may be received. This list of tracking domains may include tracking domains that are functional and tracking domains that are nonfunctional. The tracking domains that are functional may be determined by evaluating various behaviors and characteristics of the tracking domains. Once functional tracking domains have been determined, these functional tracking domains may be allowed, and other tracking domains may be blocked from loading content onto host web pages thereby preserving the functionality of the web pages.

Distinguishing between functional tracking domains and nonfunctional tracking domains on a host web page

The disclosed computer-implemented method for protecting user data privacy by detecting the extension of tracker coverage of website browsing sessions through indirect data disclosure may include (i) navigating to an origin website during a new web browsing session, (ii) analyzing the origin website to detect clickable elements and tracking domains, (iii) identifying webpage navigation information for destination websites and resources loaded by the tracking domains, (iv) grouping the webpage navigation information for the destination websites by a common destination tracking domain, (v) determining web trackers extending a tracker coverage from the origin website to the destination websites, and (vi) performing a security action that protects against a potential invasion of user data privacy by providing a notification of the extended tracker coverage during a browsing session in the origin website. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Systems and methods for protecting user data privacy by detecting the extension of tracker coverage of website browsing sessions through indirect data disclosure

Protecting against a tracking parameter in a web link. In one embodiment, a method may include receiving an input URL during a browser navigation session on a user device, the input URL including parameters, determining that the parameters include a tracking parameter, pausing the browser navigation session on the user device, launching the input URL in a headless browser that operates in an isolated environment that simulates one or more features of the user device, landing on a destination web page in the isolated environment, identifying a URL of the destination web page as a destination URL, and resuming the browser navigation session on the user device by replacing the input URL, which includes the tracking parameter, with the destination URL, which does not include the tracking parameter, in order to protect the user device from the tracking parameter.

Protecting against a tracking parameter in a web link

The disclosed computer-implemented method for dynamic formjacking protection may include identifying a sensitive data input field element on a webform loaded in a browser, creating a secure isolated container overlaid on the identified sensitive data input field element, and collecting, via the secure isolated container, real input data intended for the sensitive data input field element. The method may also include inserting dummy data into the sensitive data input field element and intercepting a form submit request from the webform to a destination. The method may further include determining whether the destination is a trusted destination, and when the destination is determined to be the trusted destination, modifying the form submit request to allow the real input data to be sent to the trusted destination. The method may also include sending the form submit request to the destination. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

The disclosed computer-implemented method for preventing social engineering attacks using distributed fact checking may include (i) capturing one or more words or tones received by a party to a communication, (ii) extracting speech features associated with the words or tones to identify one or more alleged facts in the communication, (iii) generating one or more queries to verify the alleged facts in the communication, (iv) determining, utilizing distributed fact checking, whether the alleged facts are true based on the queries, and (v) performing a security action that generates an alert to protect against a potential social engineering attack on the receiving party when at least one of the alleged facts are determined to be false. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Systems and methods for preventing social engineering attacks using distributed fact checking

Systems and methods for identifying and removing a tracking capability from an external domain that performs a tracking activity on a host web page. Tracking capabilities of an external domain may be removed by altering web requests and/or responses to API calls. Once these tracking capabilities of the external domain have been removed, the altered web requests and/or altered responses to API calls may be transmitted to a web browser and/or entity making the API call thereby protecting user privacy while allowing the external domain to interact with the host web page.

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Dublin, Ireland

David Luz Silva