Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Other

David John Linsley

Scott Daniel Anderson

Stefan Thom

Robert Karl Spiger

Hari R Pulapaka

Alastair Wolman

Arun Upadhyaya Kishan

Mark Fishel Novak

Stefan Saroiu

Himanshu Raj

James A Schwartz, Jr

Nicholas Stephen Judge

Kinshumann Kinshumann

David Michael Robinson

Magnus Nystrom

Niraj Majmudar

Jeremiah J Cox

Rob Spiger

Scott Field

Anil Francis Thomas

Nathan Jeffrey Ide

Magnus Bo Gustaf Nyström

Kinshumann

Douglas M MacIver

JianMing M Zhou

Benjamin M Schultz

Scott Randall Shell

Frederick Justus Smith

Innokentiy Basmov

Emily Nicole Wilson

Nir Ben-Zvi

David Bradley Probert, Jr

Alain Franck Gefflaut

Magnus Nyström

Alex Mark Semenko

Ping Xie

Giridhar Viswanathan

Richard Allen Pletcher

Charles Glenn Jeffries

James Anthony Schwartz, Jr

Margarit Simeonov Chenchev

Aaron Payne Goldsmid

Md Nazmus Sakib

Malcolm James Smith

Kinshuman Kinshumann

Daryn Elliot Robbins

Michael J Grass

Karan Singh Dhillon

Alex Bendetov

James Aaron Holmes

Andrey Shedel

Ian James McCarty

Dale R Rolf

Sekhar Poornananda Chintalapati

Aaron M Farmer

Troy E Shaw

Ian Mccarty

- Kinshumann

Jianming M Zhou

Jianming Zhou

Nicholas S Judge

Niraj V Majmudar

Douglas M Maciver

Embodiments are directed to managing software components loaded on a device by identifying a platform manifest having a valid certificate, confirming that the platform manifest is bound to the device, identifying components listed on the platform manifest, confirming that the listed components have a valid certificate, and loading listed components with valid certificates on the device. The components may be binaries and packages for an operating system. The components may be signed in an embedded manner or with detached signatures. The platform manifest may be bound to the device in a manner that allows for identification of unauthorized platform manifests.

Securely defining operating system composition without multiple authoring

Facilities are provided to secure guest runtime environments (GREs). Security policy specifications may be associated with GREs. A GRE's security policy may be specific to the GRE and may also include security policy inherited from higher levels such as a host operating environment. The security policy of a GRE specifies restrictions and/or permissions for activities that may be performed within the scope of execution of the GRE. A GRE's security policy may limit what the GRE's guest software may do within the GRE. Restrictions/permissions may be applied to objects such as files, configuration data, and the like. Security specifications may be applied to execution initiated within a GRE. A GRE's security specification may restrict/permit executable objects from loading and executing within the GRE. The executability or accessibility of objects may be conditioned on factors such as the health/integrity of the GRE, the host system, requested files, and others.

Securing virtual execution environments

Anti-malware process protection techniques are described. In one or more implementations, an anti-malware process is launched. The anti-malware process is verified based at least in part on an anti-malware driver that contains certificate pairs which contain an identity that is signed with the trusted certificate from a verified source. After the anti-malware process is verified, the anti-malware process may be assigned a protection level, and an administrative user may be prevented from altering the anti-malware process.

Protecting anti-malware processes

Embodiments of the disclosure provide access to data in a compressed container through dynamic redirection, without storing decompressed data in persistent memory. The compressed container is stored in a first portion of memory. User data and reference files, with redirect pointers, for accessing corresponding files in the compressed container are stored in a second portion of memory. A command to access data is detected by a computing device. The redirect pointer in the reference file associated with the command redirects access to the corresponding compressed version of data stored in the compressed container. The corresponding accessed compressed version of data is decompressed on the fly and provided in response to the command without storing the decompressed data in persistent memory. Some embodiments provide integrity protection to validate the data coming from the compressed container.

Accessing data in a compressed container through dynamic redirection

A 'Firmware-Based TPM' or 'fTPM' ensures that secure code execution is isolated to prevent a wide variety of potential security breaches. Unlike a conventional hardware based Trusted Platform Module (TPM), isolation is achieved without the use of dedicated security processor hardware or silicon. In general, the fTPM is first instantiated in a pre-OS boot environment by reading the fTPM from system firmware or firmware accessible memory or storage and placed into read-only protected memory of the device. Once instantiated, the fTPM enables execution isolation for ensuring secure code execution. More specifically, the fTPM is placed into protected read-only memory to enable the device to use hardware such as the ARM&#xae; architecture's TrustZone&#x2122; extensions and security primitives (or similar processor architectures), and thus the devices based on such architectures, to provide secure execution isolation within a &#x201c;firmware-based TPM&#x201d; without requiring hardware modifications to existing devices.

Trustzone-based integrity measurements and verification using a software-based trusted platform module

Anti-malware process protection techniques are described. In one or more implementations, an anti-malware process is launched. The anti-malware process is verified based at least in part on an anti-malware driver that contains certificates which contain an identity that is signed with the trusted certificate from a verified source. After the anti-malware process is verified, the anti-malware process may be assigned a protection level, and an administrative user may be prevented from altering the anti-malware process.

In a pre-operating system environment on a device prior to loading and running an operating system on the device, a policy identifying configuration settings for the operating system is obtained. The operating system itself is prevented from changing this policy, but the policy can be changed under certain circumstances by components of the pre-operating system environment. The policy is compared to configuration values used by the operating system, and the operating system is allowed to boot with the configuration values if the configuration values satisfy the policy. However, if the configuration values do not satisfy the policy, then a responsive action is taken.

Protecting operating system configuration values using a policy identifying operating system configuration settings

Anti-malware process protection techniques are described. In one or more implementations, an anti-malware driver is signed using a hash that identifies a manufacturer of the anti-malware driver. The anti-malware driver is then provided to a computing device. The anti-malware driver may be assigned a protection level based on an agreement between the anti-malware manufacturer and an operating system manufacturer, and this protection level effects the operation of the anti-malware program on the computing device.

Software-based trusted platform module

Booting a computing device includes executing one or more firmware components followed by a boot loader component. A protection component for the computing device, such as an anti-malware program, is identified and executed as an initial component after executing the boot loader component. One or more boot components are also executed, these one or more boot components including only boot components that have been approved by the protection component. A list of boot components that have been previously approved by the protection component can also be maintained in a tamper-proof manner.

Device booting with an initial protection component

Techniques for providing access rights to different portions of a software application to one or more authorized users are described herein. An issuance license may be inserted into the software application that divides the software application into one or more portions and identifies, for each portion, one or more users that are authorized access to the portion. Each portion of the software application may then be encrypted using, for example, a different cryptographic key. When the software is executed, an end user license may then be requested that corresponds to a particular user and that entitles the particular user access to each portion of the software application that the issuance license identifies the particular user as being authorized to access. The end user license may then be used to decrypt each portion of the software application that the issuance license identifies the particular end user as being authorized to access.

Providing access rights to portions of a software application

An event log can comprise, not only entries associated with components instantiated since a most recent power on of a computing device, but also entries of components instantiated prior to that power on, such as components that were instantiated, and represent, a state of the computing device prior to hibernation that has now been resumed. Upon hibernation, the current values of the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) of a Trusted Platform Module (trusted execution environment), as well as a quote of those current values, and a current value of a monotonic counter of the trusted execution environment can be logged. The monotonic counter can be incremented at each power on to track successive generations of the computing device and to guard against an intervening, not-logged generation. A subsequent parsing of the event log can verify the prior generational entries with reference to the PCR values in the log that are associated with those generations.

Globally valid measured operating system launch with hibernation support

Firmware-based trusted platform module for arm processor architectures and trustzone security extensions

Growing community of inventors

Seattle, WA, United States of America

David John Linsley