Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

David Guy Weston

Hari R Pulapaka

Benjamin M Schultz

Giridhar Viswanathan

Ling Tony Chen

Frederick Justus Smith

Bryan David Kelly

Peter David Waxman

Balaji Balasubramanyan

Ronald Aigner

Charles Glenn Jeffries

Margarit Simeonov Chenchev

Ankit Srivastava

Md Nazmus Sakib

Yanan Zhang

Maxwell Christopher Renke

Andrea Allievi

Charles G Jeffries

Enforcing attestation of read-only protected memory during attestation validity period. A client computer system identifies a change in a read-only protected memory protection status for a software component loaded at the client computer system. The client computer system then determines that a validity time period of an attestation report is unexpired. The attestation report comprises one or more attested properties, including one or more read-only memory protection (ROMP) attested properties for the software component. The client computer system also determines that at least one ROMP attested property for the software component is no longer valid due to the change in the read-only protected memory protection status for a software component. Based on the at least one ROMP attested property for the software component being no longer valid, the client computer system initiates a remedial action to prevent interaction of the software component with a relying party computer system.

Enforcement of attestation of read-only protected memory during attestation validity period

Methods, systems, apparatuses, and computer-readable storage mediums described herein enable executable code of a hardware security platform (HSP) circuit to communicate with a hypervisor in a separate processor. The hypervisor generates and manages virtual machines. The HSP code comprises trusted platform module (TPM) logic, that processes TPM commands received via the hypervisor, and in response to the processing, communicates security information (e.g., measurements, keys, authorization data) with the virtual machines via the hypervisor. The TPM logic receives security information related to a virtual machine from the hypervisor and stores the security information in non-volatile memory of the HSP circuit, where security information from a particular VM is distinguishable from security information from another VM in the HSP memory. The hypervisor (and VMs) communicate via a network fabric with the HSP circuit within an SOC, or the HSP may reside on a discrete chip and communicate via a secure encrypted channel.

Hardware virtualized TPM into virtual machines

Technologies are described for selective persistence of data utilized by software containers. A configuration policy is defined that includes data that specifies one or more data stores for which data is not to be persisted following accesses to a software container and one or more data stores for which data is to be persisted following accesses to the software container. When the software container is first accessed, the data stores identified in the configuration policy are attached to the software container. Upon a subsequent access to the container, such as at the conclusion of a user session or upon destruction of the container, the data in the attached data stores is persisted or deleted based upon the configuration policy. When the software container is once again accessed, the data store containing the persisted data can be re-attached to the software container.

Selective persistence of data utilized by software containers

A host operating system running on a computing device monitors resource access by an application running in a container that is isolated from the host operating system. In response to detecting resource access by the application, a security event is generated describing malicious activity that occurs from the accessing the resource. This security event is analyzed to determine a threat level of the malicious activity. If the threat level does not satisfy a threat level threshold, the host operating system allows the application to continue accessing resources and continues to monitor resource access. When the threat level satisfies the threat level threshold, the operating system takes corrective action to prevent the malicious activity from spreading beyond the isolated container. Through the use of security events, the host operating system is protected from even kernel-level attacks without using resources required to run anti-virus software in the isolated container.

Isolated container event monitoring

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David Guy Weston