Hewlett-packard Development Company, L.P.

Hewlett-packard Company

David Chan

Liqun Chen

Graeme John Proudler

Boris Balacheff

Siani Lynne Pearson

Dipankar Gupta

Bruno Edgard Van Wilder

Roelf Du Toit

Hoi-Kwong Lo

A computer platform () uses a tamper-proof component (), or 'trusted module', of a computer platform in conjunction with software, preferably running within the tamper-proof component, that controls the uploading and usage of data on the platform as a generic dongle for that platform. Licensing checks can occur within a trusted environment (in other words, an environment which can be trusted to behave as the user expects); this can be enforced by integrity checking of the uploading and license-checking software. Metering records can be stored in the tamper-proof device and reported back to administrators as required. There can be an associated clearinghouse mechanism to enable registration and payment for data.

Computer platforms and their methods of operation

The preferred embodiment of the invention comprises a computer system which employs a trusted display processor (), which has a trusted processor () and trusted memory () physically and functionally distinct from the processor and memory of the computer system. The trusted display processor () is immune to unauthorised modification or inspection of internal data. It is physical to prevent forgery, tamper-resistant to prevent counterfeiting, and has crypto functions () to securely communicate at a distance. The trusted display processor () interacts with a user's smartcard () in order to extract and display a trusted image, or seal (), generate a digital signature of the bitmap of a document image and control the video memory () so that other processes of the computer system cannot subvert the image during the signing process. The user interacts with the trusted display processor via a trusted switch ().

System for providing a trustworthy user interface

In a computing platform, a trusted hardware device () is added to the motherboard (). The trusted hardware device () is configured to acquire an integrity metric, for example a hash of the BIOS memory (), of the computing platform. The trusted hardware device () is tamper-resistant, difficult to forge and inaccessible to other functions of the platform. The hash can be used to convince users that that the operation of the platform (hardware or software) has not been subverted in some way, and is safe to interact with in local or remote applications. In more detail, the main processing unit () of the computing platform is directed to address the trusted hardware device (), in advance of the BIOS memory, after release from 'reset'. The trusted hardware device () is configured to receive memory read signals from the main processing unit () and, in response, return instructions, in the native language of the main processing unit (), that instruct the main processing unit to establish the hash and return the value to be stored by the trusted hardware device (). Since the hash is calculated in advance of any other system operations, this is a relatively strong method of verifying the integrity of the system. Once the hash has been returned, the final instruction calls the BIOS program and the system boot procedure continues as normal. Whenever a user wishes to interact with the computing platform, he first requests the integrity metric, which he compares with an authentic integrity metric that was measured by a trusted party. If the metrics are the same, the platform is verified and interactions can continue. Otherwise, interaction halts on the basis that the operation of the platform may have been subverted.

Trusted computing platform

A method of protecting from modification computer apparatus comprising a plurality of functional modules by monitoring the configuration of functional modules within the computer apparatus. The method comprises: storing a module configuration of the computer apparatus; and checking the actual module configuration against the stored module configuration, and inhibiting function of the computer apparatus if the actual module configuration does not satisfactorily match the stored module configuration. Advantageously, the module configuration is stored on a security token, such as a smart card.

Protection of the configuration of modules in computing apparatus

A computing entity comprises a trusted monitoring component having a first processing means and a first memory means, the trusted monitoring component being a self-contained autonomous data processing unit, and a computer platform having a main processing means and a main memory area, along with a plurality of associated physical and logical resources such as peripheral devices including printers, modems, application programs, operating systems and the like. The computer platform is capable of entering a plurality of different states of operation, each state of operation having a different level of security and trustworthiness. Selected ones of the states comprise trusted states in which a user can enter sensitive confidential information with a high degree of certainty that the computer platform has not been compromised by external influences such as viruses, hackers or hostile attacks. To enter a trusted state, references made automatically to the trusted component, and to exit a trusted state reference must be made to the trusted component. On exiting the trusted state, all references to the trusted state are deleted from the computer platform. On entering the trusted state, the state is entered in a reproducible and known manner, having a reproducible and known configuration which is confirmed by the trusted component.

Operation of trusted state in computing platform

A computing apparatus comprises a plurality of hardware modules () and a shared communication infrastructure () by which the modules can communicate with each other in the usual way. In order to increase the level of trust and security in the apparatus, a trusted hardware module () is also provided and is connected to the other modules by respective communication paths (), distinct from the communication infrastructure, by which each of those modules can communicate directly with the trusted module but cannot communicate directly with any other of the modules. The trusted module can therefore have secure communications, for example of 'unsafe' data, with each of the other modules without any of the remaining modules eavesdropping, and the trusted module can route unsafe data between any pair of the other modules, or decline to provide such routing, for example in dependence on policy stored in the trusted module.

Communications between modules of a computing apparatus

There is disclosed a computer entity having a trusted component which compiles an event log for events occurring on a computer platform. The event log contains event data of types which are pre-specified by a user by inputting details through a dialogue display generated by the trusted component. Items which can be monitored include data files, applications drivers and the like. The trusted component operates through a monitoring agent which may be launched onto the computer platform. The monitoring agent may be periodically interrogated to make sure that it is operating correctly and responding to interrogations by the trusted component.

Data event logging in computing platform

A method of brokering a transaction between a consumer and a vendor by a broker, wherein the consumer, the broker and the vendor are all attached to a public network, the consumer having a secure token containing a true consumer identity. The method comprising the steps of: the consumer obtaining a temporary identity from the broker by using the true consumer identity from the secure token; the consumer selecting a purchase to be made from the vendor; the consumer requesting the purchase from the vendor and providing the temporary identity to the vendor; the vendor requesting transaction authorisation from the broker by forwarding the request and the temporary identity to the broker; the broker matching the temporary identity to a current list of temporary identities, and obtaining the true consumer identity; the broker providing authorisation for the transaction based on transaction details and true consumer identity.

Electronic commerce system

Computing apparatus comprises a memory means storing the instructions of a secure process and an authentication process; a processing means arranged to control the operation of the computing apparatus including by executing the secure process and the authentication process; a user interface means arranged to receive user input and return to the user input; and an interface means for receiving a removable primary token and communication with the token. The token comprises a body supporting a token interface for communicating with the interface means, a token processor; and a token memory adapted to store token data including information for identifying the token and auxiliary token information identifying one or more authorized auxiliary tokens. The processing means is arranged to receive the identity information and the auxiliary token information from the primary token, to authenticate the toke using the authentication process and, if the token is successfully authenticated, permit a user to interact with the secure process via the user interface means. The processing means is arranged to repeatedly authenticate the primary toke and cause the computing platform to suspend interaction between the secure process and the user if authentication is not possible as a result of the removal of the primary token unless the primary token is replaced by an authorized auxiliary token.

Growing community of inventors

Monte Sereno, CA, United States of America

David Chan