Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Dave M McPherson

Paul England

Paul J Leach

Mark Fishel Novak

Praerit Garg

Niels Thomas Ferguson

Muthukrishnan Paramasivam

Cliff Van Dyke

Everett McKay

Arun Upadhyaya Kishan

Cristian Marius Ilac

Tanmoy Dutta

Liqiang Zhu

Ravindra Pandya

Vishal Agarwal

Gopinathan Kannan

Kinshuman Kinshumann

Raja Pazhanivel Perumal

Giridharan Sridharan

Sunil P Gottumukkala

Salahuddin Khan

Jonathan M Andes

Satyajit Nath

Adam Damiano

Charles F Rose, Iii

A keying infrastructure may generate and/or manage cryptographic keys. The cryptographic keys may include identity keys, encryption keys, and a variety of other types of keys. The cryptographic keys may be derived or created with a key derivation function (KDF) or other one-way function. The cryptographic keys may include keys that are accessible to a boot loader, keys that are accessible to particular components of a Trusted Execution Environment (TrEE), and so on. In some examples, a key may be derived from a preceding key in a sequence of keys. The preceding key may be deleted when the key is derived.

Keying infrastructure

The techniques and systems described herein present various implementations of a model for authenticating processes for execution and specifying and enforcing permission restrictions on system resources for processes and users. In some implementations, a binary file for an application, program, or process may be augmented to include a digital signature encrypted with a key such that an operating system may subsequently authenticate the digital signature. Once the binary file has been authenticated, the operating system may create a process and tag the process with metadata indicating the type of permissions that are allowed for the process. The metadata may correspond to a particular access level for specifying resource permissions.

Process authentication and resource permissions

This disclosure describes methods, systems and application programming interfaces for creating an advanced security negotiation package. This disclosure describes creating an advanced security negotiation protocol under a Simple and Protected Negotiation Mechanism (SPNEGO) protocol to negotiate an authentication scheme. The protocol describes defining a Windows Security Type (WST) Library message to protect negotiation data during the advanced security negotiation protocol. The protocol sends an initial message that carries multiple authentication messages to reduce redundant roundtrips and implements key exchanges by a mini Security Support Provider (SSP).

Advanced security negotiation protocol

A role-based authorization management system maintains an authorization policy store that represents user authorizations to perform operations associated with an application. When a user attempts to perform a function associated with an application, the authorization management system verifies that the user is authorized to perform the requested function. The authorization management system also provides an interface for an application administrator to update role-based user authorization policies associated with one or more applications.

Role-based authorization management framework

Translation of role-based authoring models for managing RBAC 'roles' to resource authorization policy (RAP), such as ACL-based applications, is provided. A generic RBAC system is defined from which mappings to other authorization enforcement mechanism make possible the translation of RBAC 'roles' to resource authorization policies applied to resources managed by a resource manager, e.g., a file system resource manager. An implementation is described that uses Windows Authorization Manager as a storage mechanism and object model to manage object types and relationships translated from an RBAC system.

Translating role-based access control policy to resource authorization policy

Abstracting access control policy from access check mechanisms allows for richer expression of policy, using a declarative model with semantics, than what is permitted by the access check mechanisms. Further, abstracting access control policy allows for uniform expression of policy across multiple access check mechanisms. Proof-like reasons for any access query are provided, such as who has access to what resource, built from the policy statements themselves, independent of the access check mechanism that provide access. Access is audited and policy-based reasons for access are provided based on the access control policy.

Abstracting security policy from, and transforming to, native representations of access check mechanisms

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Bothell, WA, United States of America

Dave M McPherson