Google Inc.

Darren David Krahn

William Alexander Drewry

Sumit Gwalani

Mattias Stefan Nissler

David Zeuthen

Balázs Csaba Engedy

Alejandro Martin Deymonnaz

Chiahsing Yu

Methods, systems, and apparatus, including computer-readable media, for verified boot and key rotation. In some implementations, a device extracts a public key from a secure data storage area of the device. The device extracts a first certificate for an intermediate key and a second certificate for a signing key, the first certificate and the second certificate being extracted from a system image. The device verifies a signature of the first certificate using the public key. After verifying the signature of the first certificate, the device verifies the second certificate using a public key in the first certificate. In response to verifying the second certificate, the device loads the system image during a boot process of the device.

Verified boot and key rotation

Aspects of the subject technology relate to systems and methods for remote storage security. An encryption key is generated based at least on data stored locally by a computing device. The encryption key is bound to a context of the computing device. Data is encrypted using the encryption key. The encrypted data and information associated with the binding of the encryption key are provided for transmission to another computing device.

Remote storage security

Techniques for peer to peer attestation are provided. An example method includes receiving, at a first device, a discovery message from a second device, based on the discovery message, establishing a communication channel between the first device and the second device, receiving, at the first device, identity information from the second device, the identity information including one or more of: a trusted platform module (TPM) endorsement key certificate, a public portion of an identity key, one or more platform control register (PCR) values or a quote of the PCR values with the identity key, verifying, at the first device, one or more of the PCR values, the quote or the endorsement key certificate and authenticating one or more of the communication channel or the identity information of the second device based on the verification of a signature received from the second device.

Peer to peer attestation

Techniques for security module endorsement are provided. An example method includes receiving a generalized endorsement key at a security module, wherein the security module is associated with a computing device and wherein the generalized endorsement key is independent of characteristics of the computing device, automatically extending integrity measurements stored in one or more registers of the security module with information characterizing the computing device, wherein the integrity measurements are based on one or more software processes at the computing device, digitally signing the extended integrity measurements with a digital signature, and generating a specialized endorsement credential as a combination of the digitally signed extended integrity measurements, the digital signature and the generalized endorsement key, wherein the specialized endorsement credential is used to validate authenticity of the security module.

Security module endorsement

Aspects of the subject technology relate to systems and methods for providing temporally adjusted identifiers. A first identifier is received. A second identifier is determined based on time parameters and the first identifier. The time parameters include at least a period, where the period is a minimum duration of time prior to providing a computing device with a new identifier. The second identifier is provided for transmission to at least one computing device.

Temporal adjustment of identifiers

Systems and methods for enterprise platform verification are provided. In some aspects, a computing device includes a trusted platform module (TPM). The TPM includes an endorsement key (EK) physically embedded in the TPM. The TPM includes an attestation identity key (AIK), the AIK being used to verify that at least one TPM-protected key different from the EK and different from the AIK is generated at the TPM and is non-migratable. The TPM includes an enterprise machine key (EMK), the EMK being certified by the AIK, the EMK being uniquely associated with the client computing device, and the EMK being generated during enrollment of the client computing device with an enterprise and remaining active until a factory reset of the client computing device.

Enterprise platform verification

Aspects of the subject technology relate to systems, methods, and machine-readable media for performing a cryptographic operation. A system can be configured to submit a request, to a security device, for a decrypted user encryption key, wherein the security device is configured to decrypt the user encryption key by unbinding the user encryption key using a user authorization key. The system can receive, in response to the submitted request, the decrypted user encryption key and decrypt authorization data for a cryptographic key using the decrypted user encryption key. The system can submit a request for the security device to load the cryptographic key, wherein authorization data is used to authorize the request, and submit a request for the security device to perform a cryptographic operation using the loaded cryptographic key.

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Saratoga, CA, United States of America

Darren David Krahn