Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Amazon Technologies, Inc.

Daniel Ron Simon

Josh D Benaloh

Paul England

Marcus Peinado

Paul J Leach

Brian D Swander

Yi-Min Wang

Pascal Francis Menezes

Jonathan D Pincus

David R Mowers

Wilfred G Russell

John A Banes

Qixiang Sun

Nicholas Alexander Allen

Arun Ayyagari

Sharad Agarwal

Mark H Lucovsky

Venkata N Padmanabhan

Richard Bruce Ward

David A Maltz

Shaun Douglas Pierce

George M Moore

Gabriel E Montenegro

Arthur Zwiegincew

Michael Burner

Robert M Hyman

Paramvir Bahl

Christian F Huitema

Timothy Mark Moore

Ling Tony Chen

John Peter Shewchuk

Vinay Deo

Lili Qiu

Ashwin Palekar

Matthew W Thomlinson

Alexander Thomas Weinert

Bernard D Aboba

Dinarte R Morais

Paul G Mayfield

Harry S Pyle

Guillaume Simonnet

Helen Jiahe Wang

Bruce Louis Lieberman

Jon T Lange

Sara Bitan

William Dollar

Andrew Hopkins

Christopher G Kaler

Michael Burrows

Jason Garms

Gregory Carl Hitchcock

Michael Todd Kramer

Kim Cameron

Pradeep Bahl

John David Dunagan

Jiahe Helen Wang

Bradford H Lovering

Mark Steven Manasse

Martin Abadi

Arun K Nanda

Edward Pearce Wobber

Chuanxiong Guo

Yuhang Zhu

Khaja Ehteshamuddin Ahmed

Trevor William Freeman

Gregory D Hartrell

Jeffrey F Spelman

Nathan Fink

Robert B Seidensticker

David Charles Tuniman

Krishna Ganugapati

Xiaofeng Fan

D Chase Franklin

Terence R Spies

Michael Howard

Lee M Butler

David M Meltzer

Daniel Rosen

Bradley M Hammond

Vivek Gundotra

Terrence R Spies

Paul Roberts

Dean Justus

Anthony Goodrich Jones

Jeffrey J Westhead

Frank Ronneburg

Guillaume Bailey

Josh R Cohen

Donald D Chinn

Bennet Yee

Shyam Seshadri

Valentin Nikolaev Razmov

Alf Peter Zugenmaier

Adam Stubblefield

Dirk Balfanz

Matthew Stephen Bullock

Vamshi Krishna Kancharla

Andrew Bortz

Alf Zugenmaier

Chuanxiong c/o Microsoft Corporation Guo

Described implementations obtain a proof of valid attestation data. The attestation data may include configuration data of a host computing system. A prover service may receive the attestation data. The prover service may generate a proof to prove that the attestation data includes valid configuration data of the host computer system, without revealing sensitive or private information of the host computing system. The proof may be a zero-knowledge proof.

Privacy preserving attestation

Described implementations obtain credential information including an encrypted digital identity (ID). The encrypted digital ID may include a public component of a credential and identity data. Furthermore, the credential information may include cryptographically obfuscated data based on the identity data and a private component of the credential. A proof is obtained that includes proof data. The proof data may confirm that the credential information was correctly generated. Verification of the proof data, and confirmation that the cryptographically obfuscated data is not associated in a collection of cryptographically obfuscated data, cause a computer-implemented service to issue a pseudonym. The pseudonym is usable to generate a relationship associated with a computer-implemented service.

Privacy preserving account generation

This disclosure pertains generally to client authentication. One aspect of the disclosure relates to a first server for presenting evidence to a Domain Controller (DC) of a first authentication context being submitted from a client to the first server to obtain a delegable credential, wherein the credential can be used to request a second authentication context from that client to a second server. Another aspect relates to the first server providing a pass-thru with evidence to a DC. The evidence relates to a first authentication context being submitted from a client to the first server that it obtained a delegable credential. The pass-thru is used in combination with the credential to request a second authentication context from the client to a second server.

Pass-thru for client authentication

A hierarchical key generation and distribution mechanism for a computer system in which devices are organized into secure enclaves. The mechanism enables network access to be tailored to approximate minimum needed privileges for each device. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, keys are used to form security associations between devices. Keys at each level of the hierarchy are generated from keys at a higher level of the hierarchy and key derivation information. Key derivation information is readily ascertainable, either from identifiers for devices or from within messages, supporting hardware offload of cryptographic functions. Because keys may be generated based on the enclaves in which the hosts participating in a security association are located, the system includes a mechanism by which devices can discover the enclave in which they are located.

Key management in secure network enclaves

In one kind of DoS attack, malicious customers may try to send a large number of filter requests against an innocent customer. In one implementation, a Filter Request Server (FRS) may allow a customer against who a filter request is made to dispute the implicit accusation of the filter request or stop sending malicious traffic. If the customer claims innocence, the FRS may log destination addresses of data packets sent by the customer and identify and ignore false filter requests if these filter requests come from customers who do not correspond to one or more of the destination addresses that have previously been logged by the FRS.

Network accountability among autonomous systems

Discovery of secure network enclaves

Multiple peer domain name system (DNS) servers are included in a multi-master DNS environment. One of the multiple peer DNS servers is a key master peer DNS server that generates one or more keys for a DNS zone serviced by the multiple peer DNS servers. The key master peer DNS server can also generate a signing key descriptor that identifies the set of one or more keys for the DNS zone, and communicate the signing key descriptor to the other ones of the multiple peer DNS servers.

Supporting DNS security in a multi-master environment

PassThru for client authentication

Systems and methodologies for implementing automation-resistant interactive computing services are provided herein. Function invocation mechanisms can be utilized as described herein to facilitate invocation and/or activation of one or more functions of an interactive service upon performance of an interaction falling within a predefined class of interaction with selected multimedia content. The described functionality invocation mechanisms can operate similarly to a traditional captcha image by requiring interaction that is easily understandable and performable by a human user but is prohibitively difficult for an automated program to carry out. Techniques such as masking relationships between user interaction and function invocation and varying elements of the selected multimedia content for respective accesses can be utilized to provide additional resistance to automation. Described invocation mechanisms can additionally be merged with advertising, which can optionally be targeted to a particular user(s).

Automation-resistant, advertising-merged interactive services

A strategy is described for assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities within a data processing environment. The strategy collects access data that reflects actual log-in behavior exhibited by users in the environment. The strategy also collects rights data that reflects the rights possessed by one or more administrators within the environment. Based on the access data and rights data, the strategy identifies how a user or other entity that gains access to one part of the environment can potentially compromise additional parts of the environment. The strategy can recommend and implement steps aimed at reducing any identified vulnerabilities.

Strategies for investigating and mitigating vulnerabilities caused by the acquisition of credentials

A process for establishing secure mutual trust includes generating a one-time-password. The one-time-password is transferred between the devices in a communication occurring off of the network. Each device generates a set of authenticators by hashing a plurality of sub-strings of the password and the device's authentication certificate with a respective set of nonces. The devices exchange the respective sets of authenticators. Each device then alternates revealing its respective set of nonces and its authentication certificate in a multi-stage process. The devices re-calculate the authenticators based upon the respective set of nonces and authentication certificate revealed by the other device along with the one-time-password sub-strings that it posses. If each device determines that the authenticators re-calculated by the given device matches the authenticators previously received from the other device, secure mutual trust is established.

Establishing secure mutual trust using an insecure password

Growing community of inventors

Redmond, WA, United States of America

Daniel Ron Simon