Certicom Corporation

Blackberry Corporation

Malikie Innovations Limited

Daniel Richard L Brown

Scott Alexander Vanstone

Matthew John Campagna

Gregory Marc Zaverucha

Robert John Lambert

Nevine Maurice Nassif Ebeid

David W Kravitz

Robert Philip Gallant

Herbert Anthony Little

Marinus Struik

Alfred John Menezes

Atsushi Yamada

Ashok Vadekar

Adrian Antipa

Neil Patrick Adams

Michael Peter Montemurro

Ravi Singh

Christopher Labrador

Dinah Lea Marie Davis

Roger Paul Bowman

Johnathan George White

Thomas Rudolf Stiemerling

Catalin Visinescu

Ming Chee Tsang

A method for providing Cheon-resistance security for a static elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem (ECDH), the method including providing a system for message communication between a pair of correspondents, a message being exchanged in accordance with ECDH instructions executable on computer processors of the respective correspondents, the ECDH instructions using a curve selected from a plurality of curves, the selecting including choosing a range of curves; selecting, from the range of curves, curves matching a threshold efficiency; excluding, within the selected curves, curves which may include intentional vulnerabilities; and electing, from non-excluded selected curves, a curve with Cheon resistance, the electing comprising a curve from an additive group of order q, wherein q is prime, such that q−1=cr and q+1=ds, where r and s are primes and c and d are integer Cheon cofactors of the group, such that cd≤48.

Method and system for Cheon resistant static Diffie-Hellman security

An elliptic curve random number generator avoids escrow keys by choosing a point Q on the elliptic curve as verifiably random. An arbitrary string is chosen and a hash of that string computed. The hash is then converted to a field element of the desired field, the field element regarded as the x-coordinate of a point Q on the elliptic curve and the x-coordinate is tested for validity on the desired elliptic curve. If valid, the x-coordinate is decompressed to the point Q, wherein the choice of which is the two points is also derived from the hash value. Intentional use of escrow keys can provide for back up functionality. The relationship between P and Q is used as an escrow key and stored by for a security domain. The administrator logs the output of the generator to reconstruct the random number with the escrow key.

Elliptic curve random number generation

A method for verification at a computing device of a signed message received from a first party over a public communications channel, the method including extracting a message digest 'a' belonging to a semigroup from the signed message; obtaining a public key [c,e] for the first party, including a fixed value checker “c” and an endpoint “e”, checker “c” and endpoint “e” belonging to the semigroup and the endpoint comprising a multiplication of a private key “b” for the first party and the checker “c”, multiplying the message digest “a” and the endpoint “e” to create an endmatter “ae”; extracting a signature “d” from the signed message, the signature “d” belonging to the semigroup and being a multiplication of message digest “a” and private key “b”; multiplying the signature “d” and the checker “c” to create a signcheck “dc”; and verifying that the endmatter “ae” matches the signcheck “dc”.

Method and system for digital signatures utilizing multiplicative semigroups

Systems, methods, and software can be used to improve security of an authentication process in a cargo shipping system. In some aspect, an authentication request message is received at a sensor from a cargo tracking device. The authentication request message includes a key that the sensor will use to decrypt its encrypted public key/private key pair. In response to the authentication request message, the sensor sends an authentication response message to the cargo tracking device that is encrypted using a derived symmetric key. The cargo tracking device sends an authentication confirmation message to the sensor in response to the authentication response message.

Secure communication with an authentication process

A method for key agreement between a first party and a second party over a public communications channel, the method including selecting, by the first party, from a semigroup, a first value 'a'; multiplying the first value “a” by a second value “b” to create a third value “d”, the second value “b” being selected from the semigroup; sending the third value “d” to the second party; receiving, from the second party, a fourth value “e”, the fourth value comprising the second value “b” multiplied by a fifth value “c” selected by the second party from the semigroup; and creating a shared secret by multiplying the first value “a” with the fourth value “e”, wherein the shared secret matches the third value “d” multiplied by the fifth value “c”.

Method and system for key agreement utilizing semigroups

A method for key agreement between a first party and a second party over a public communications channel, the method including selecting, by the first party, a first value 'a'; multiplying the first value “a” by a second value “b” using Knuth multiplication to create a third value “d”, the third value “d” being a semistandard tableau; sending the third value “d” to the second party; receiving, from the second party, a fourth value “e”, the fourth value being a second semistandard tableau comprising the second value “b” multiplied by a fifth value “c” selected by the second party; and creating a shared secret by multiplying the first value “a” with the fourth value “e” using Knuth multiplication, wherein the shared secret matches the third value “d” multiplied by the fifth value “c” using Knuth multiplication.

Method and system for key agreement utilizing plactic monoids

A method for key agreement between a first party and a second party over a public communications channel, the method including selecting, by the first party, from a semigroup, a first value 'a'; multiplying the first value 'a' by a second value &#x201c;b&#x201d; to create a third value &#x201c;d&#x201d;, the second value &#x201c;b&#x201d; being selected from the semigroup; sending the third value &#x201c;d&#x201d; to the second party; receiving, from the second party, a fourth value &#x201c;e&#x201d;, the fourth value comprising the second value &#x201c;b&#x201d; multiplied by a fifth value &#x201c;c&#x201d; selected by the second party from the semigroup; and creating a shared secret by multiplying the first value &#x201c;a&#x201d; with the fourth value &#x201c;e&#x201d;, wherein the shared secret matches the third value &#x201c;d&#x201d; multiplied by the fifth value &#x201c;c&#x201d;.

A method for providing Cheon-resistance security for a static elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem (ECDH), the method including providing a system for message communication between a pair of correspondents, a message being exchanged in accordance with ECDH instructions executable on computer processors of the respective correspondents, the ECDH instructions using a curve selected from a plurality of curves, the selecting including choosing a range of curves; selecting, from the range of curves, curves matching a threshold efficiency; excluding, within the selected curves, curves which may include intentional vulnerabilities; and electing, from non-excluded selected curves, a curve with Cheon resistance, the electing comprising a curve from an additive group of order q, wherein q is prime, such that q&#x2212;1=cr and q+1=ds, where r and s are primes and c and d are integer Cheon cofactors of the group, such that cd&#x2264;48.

A method for key agreement between a first party and a second party over a public communications channel, the method including selecting, by the first party, a first value 'a'; multiplying the first value 'a' by a second value &#x201c;b&#x201d; using Knuth multiplication to create a third value &#x201c;d&#x201d;, the third value &#x201c;d&#x201d; being a semistandard tableau; sending the third value &#x201c;d&#x201d; to the second party; receiving, from the second party, a fourth value &#x201c;e&#x201d;, the fourth value being a second semistandard tableau comprising the second value &#x201c;b&#x201d; multiplied by a fifth value &#x201c;c&#x201d; selected by the second party; and creating a shared secret by multiplying the first value &#x201c;a&#x201d; with the fourth value &#x201c;e&#x201d; using Knuth multiplication, wherein the shared secret matches the third value &#x201c;d&#x201d; multiplied by the fifth value &#x201c;c&#x201d; using Knuth multiplication.

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Mississauga, Canada

Daniel Richard L Brown