Fisher-rosemount Systems, Inc

Dan Halver Ussing

Lee Allen Neitzel

Cindy Alsup Scott

James Randall Balentine

Bryan Michael Jones

Molly Marie Firkins

Robert Kent Huba

A process control system software security architecture, that is more effective at preventing zero-day or other types of malware attacks, implements the use of 'least privileges' when executing the applications and services run within a computer device. The least privileges based architecture separates “service” processes from desktop applications that run on behalf of a logged-on user by partitioning the global namespace of the software system into service namespaces and logged-on user namespaces, and by strictly controlling communications between the applications and services in these different namespaces using interprocess communications. Moreover, the security architecture uses custom accounts to assure that each service process has the least set of privileges that are needed for implementing its function regardless of the privileges associated with the calling application or user.

Process control software security architecture based on least privileges

Methods and apparatus to provide a role-based user interface are disclosed herein. An example system disclosed includes a display device to depict a user interface. The example system also includes a processor. The example processor is to receive object information for an object in a process control system during a session, determine a user role based on the session, determine whether the object information is qualifying information based on the user role, and display the object information via the user interface when the object information is qualifying information.

Methods and apparatus to provide a role-based user interface

A process control system software security architecture, that is more effective at preventing zero-day or other types of malware attacks, implements the use of 'least privileges' when executing the applications and services run within a computer device. The least privileges based architecture separates 'service' processes from desktop applications that run on behalf of a logged-on user by partitioning the global namespace of the software system into service namespaces and logged-on user namespaces, and by strictly controlling communications between the applications and services in these different namespaces using interprocess communications. Moreover, the security architecture uses custom accounts to assure that each service process has the least set of privileges that are needed for implementing its function regardless of the privileges associated with the calling application or user.

A process control system having an external data server that provides process control data to external networks via one or more firewalls implements a cost-effective security mechanism that reduces or eliminates the ability of the external data server to be compromised by viruses or other security attacks. The security mechanism includes a DMZ gateway disposed outside of the process control network that connects to an external data server located within the process control network. A configuration engine is located within the process control network and configures the external data server to publish one or more preset or pre-established data views to the DMZ gateway, which then receives the data/events/alarms as defined by the data views from the control system automatically, without performing read and write requests to the external data server. The DMZ gateway then republishes the data within the data views on an external network to make the process control data within the published data views available to one or more client applications connected to the external network. Because this security mechanism does not support client read, write, or configuration access to the external data server within the control system, this security mechanism limits the opportunity of viruses to use the structure in the DMZ gateway device to access the process control network.

Process plant network with secured external access

Example methods and apparatus to provide layered security for interface access control are disclosed. A disclosed example method includes receiving a connect message in a first server from a client application to access at least one server endpoint, in response to receiving the connect message, opening a session between the at least one server endpoint and the client application if the session is authorized to be opened, receiving a request from the client application to open an endpoint that provides at least one of read access, write access, or subscribe access to at least one resource, opening the endpoint within the open session after determining that the client application is authorized to access the at least one resource via the endpoint, receiving a request from the client application to assign a selection of the at least one authorized resource to the endpoint, assigning the at least one selected resource to the endpoint, and granting the client application access to the at least one resource via the endpoint.

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Georgetown, TX, United States of America

Dan Halver Ussing