Mcafee, Inc.

Networks Associates Technology, Inc.

Craig D Schmugar

Cedric Cochin

Joel Robert Spurlock

John Douglas Teddy

Igor G Muttik

Michael S Hughes

Simon R Hunt

Jonathan Lewis Edwards

German Lancioni

Yury Bulygin

Christiaan Beek

Zheng Zhang

Jyothi Mehandale

Carl D Woodward

Aditya Kapoor

Fraser Peter Howard

Andrew A Furtak

Oleksander Bazhaniuk

Vladimir Konobeev

Gregory Michael Heitzmann

Ronald Gallella

Adam James Carrivick

Robert Leong

Kunal Mehta

Erdem Aktas

Vincent Paul Gullotto

Priyadarshini Rao Rajan

Clint R Merrill

Arpit Pradhan

John J Loucaides

Arun Chundiriyil Pullat

Bidan Sinha

Vincent P Gulletten

Michael Hughes

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to allow for the mitigation of ransomware. For example, the system can determine that an application begins to execute, determine that the application attempts to modify a file, determine a file type for the file, and create a security event if the application is not authorized to modify the file type. In another example, the system determines an entropy value between the file and the attempted modification of the file, and create a security event if the entropy value satisfies a threshold or determine a system entropy value that includes a rate at which other files on the system are being modified by the application, and create a security event if the system entropy value satisfies a threshold.

Mitigation of ransomware

A technique for detecting malware involves loading known malware information, finding a string in the known malware information, saving the string in a first database, identifying a first contiguous string block from the known malware information, assigning a confidence indicator to the first contiguous string block, attempting to find the first contiguous string block in a second database containing one or more contiguous string blocks extracted from known malware, and responsive to a determination the first contiguous string block meets a predetermined threshold of similarity with a second contiguous string block contained in the second database, labelling the first contiguous string block.

System and method for malware signature generation

Methods, apparatus, systems and articles of manufacture are disclosed for defending against exploitation of vulnerable software. An example apparatus comprises an inventory controller to identify a vulnerable application corresponding to one or more files including a security defect, an origination identifying generator to identify an origination source of incoming data, the origination source tagged as suspicious, a workload analyzing controller to query, in response to the suspicious origination source, an inventory datastore to determine if the incoming data is to be accessed by the vulnerable application, and a policy application executor to, in response to determining the incoming data is to be accessed by the vulnerable application, apply a policy action to the vulnerable application to protect the vulnerable application from exposing the security defect to malicious data in the incoming data.

Methods and apparatus for defending against exploitation of vulnerable software

Methods, systems, and media for protecting computer systems from user-created objects are provided. In some embodiments, the method comprises: detecting, at a second user device, that an object has been accessed on the second user device; determining whether an exception has occurred by scanning the object on the second user device; in response to determining that the exception has occurred, transmitting, from the second user device to a server, a request for a security policy to be applied by the second user device in connection with the object, wherein the request includes an identifier of the object; receiving, from the server, the security policy; determining, based on the security policy, that the object was created by a first user device associated with an organization the second user device is also associated with; determining whether to allow the object to be accessed by the second user device based on the security policy; and in response to determining that the object is allowed to be accessed, allowing the object to be accessed on the second user device.

Methods, systems, and media for protecting computer systems from user-created objects

There is disclosed in one example a computing apparatus, including: a processor and a memory; a network interface to communicatively couple to a backup client; a storage to receive backup data from the client, including a plurality of versions and an associated reputation for each version, the associated reputation to indicate a probability that the version is valid; and instructions encoded within the memory to instruct the processor to: receive from the backup client a request to store a new version of the backup data; determine that the client has exceeded a backup threshold; identify a backup version having a lowest reputation for validity; and expunge the backup version having the lowest reputation for validity.

Intelligent backup and versioning

Methods, apparatus, systems, and articles of manufacture are disclosed to defend against dynamic-link library (DLL) side-loading attacks. An example apparatus includes a fingerprint generator to determine a first DLL fingerprint of a first DLL stored at a first OS path referenced by an operating system (OS) event generated by a computing device, and, in response to determining that a second DLL having the same name as the first DLL is stored at a second OS path superseding the first OS path, determine a second DLL fingerprint of the second DLL, a fingerprint comparator to determine whether at least one of the first or the second DLL fingerprint satisfies a deviation threshold based on a comparison of the first and the second DLL fingerprint to a reference DLL fingerprint, and a security action enforcer to execute a security action to protect a computing device from an attack.

Methods and apparatus to defend against DLL side-loading attacks

There is disclosed in one example a computing apparatus, including: a network interface; a hardware platform, including at least a processor and a memory; and instructions encoded in the memory to instruct the processor to: identify an executable object to be run on the apparatus, the executable object to provision a plurality of local files or objects with unknown local reputations; query via the network interface a remote service with an identification of the executable object; responsive to the query, receive from the remote service a reputation batch for the local files or object; and selectively permit installation of the executable object and/or the plurality of local files or objects based at least in part on individual reputations within the reputation batch.

Cached file reputations

A technique for detecting malware looks at startup hooks that may be created by malware to assist in ensuring that the malware is started upon a reboot of a programmable device. After enumerating startup hooks in the system, startup hooks associated with untrusted executables are deleted. If the startup hook is restored, that is an indication that the untrusted executable may be malware. An indication may then be passed to an anti-malware software to analyze the executable further.

Persistence probing to detect malware

There is disclosed in one example a computing apparatus, including: an interface to a backup source in a current state; a backup storage having stored thereon a first backup version of a previous state of the source; and a backup engine to: compute a delta between the current state and the previous state; save via the backup storage a second backup version sufficient to reconstruct the current state; and assign the second backup version a reputation relative to one or more previous backup versions.

There is disclosed in an example a computing apparatus, including: a process deprivilging engine operable for: recognizing that a process has an undetermined reputation; intercepting a first access request directed to a first resource; determining that the first resource is not owned by the process; and at least partially blocking access to the first resource. There is further disclosed a method of providing the process deprivileging engine, and one or more computer-readable mediums having stored thereon executable instructions for providing the process deprivileging engine.

Temporary process deprivileging

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to determine a string sample of data, determine a hash of the string sample of data, automatically cluster the hash with other hashes from other string samples of data, and automatically create a signature hash string for the string sample of data.

Discovery of malicious strings

Technologies for securing an electronic device include trapping an attempt to access a secured system resource of the electronic device, determining a module associated with the attempt, determining a subsection of the module associated with the attempt, the subsection including a memory location associated with the attempt, accessing a security rule to determine whether to allow the attempted access based on the determination of the module and the determination of the subsection, and handling the attempt based on the security rule. The module includes a plurality of distinct subsections.

Growing community of inventors

Hillsboro, OR, United States of America

Craig D Schmugar