Other

Polar Spring Corporation

Chung Nan Chang

Chuan K Yuan

Feng Q Hao

Feng Qi Hao

One aspect of the present invention establishes a session key by a receiving unit R transmitting a plurality of quantities for storage in a public repository. A sending unit S: Another aspect provides a digital signature. Before transmitting a signed message, the unit S stores a plurality of quantities in the public-repository. A unit R, that receives the message and the digital signature, verifies their authenticity by:

Secure cryptographic key exchange and verifiable digital signature

One aspect of the present invention establishes a session key by a receiving unit R transmitting a plurality of quantities for storage in a public repository. A sending unit S: Another aspect provides a digital signature. Before transmitting a signed message, the unit S stores a plurality of quantities in the public repository. A unit R, that receives the message and the digital signature, verifies their authenticity by:

Simplified secure, swift cryptographic key exchange

A first of two cryptographic units establish a cryptographic key 'K' by initially selecting a first quantity 'A', and computes second and third quantities 'B'=.PHI..sub.1 (A) and 'C'=.PHI..sub.2 (A). It must be mathematically impossible to compute A from B and the function .PHI..sub.1. The first unit then transmits B to the other cryptographic unit, and retains C. The second unit selects a fourth quantity 'D' and computes fifth and sixth quantities 'E'=.PHI..sub.3 (D) and 'F'=.PHI..sub.4 (D). It must be mathematically impossible to compute D from E and the function .PHI..sub.3. Upon receiving B, the second unit uses a fifth mathematical function '.PSI..sub.2 ' to compute the key 'K'=.PSI..sub.2 (F, B)=.PSI..sub.2 (.PHI..sub.4 {D}, .PHI..sub.1 {A}). Analogously, upon receiving E the first unit uses a sixth mathematical function .PSI..sub.1 to compute the key 'K'=.PSI..sub.1 (C, E)=.PSI..sub.1 (.PHI..sub.2 {A},.PHI..sub.3 {D})=.PSI..sub.2 (.PHI..sub.4 {D},.PHI..sub.1 {A}).

Simiplified secure swift cryptographic key exchange

Using the present cryptographic key exchange protocol, a first of two cryptographic units selects quantities 'A' and 'B.' That same unit then applies a mathematical function '.PHI..sub.1 ' to A and B to compute a third quantity 'C.'. A and B and the function .PHI..sub.1 posses the property that knowing A or B, and C, and the function .PHI..sub.1, it is mathematically impossible to compute the unknown quantity B or A. The first unit then transmits A together C to the second unit while retaining B. The second unit selects a fourth quantity 'D' and then applies a second mathematical function .PHI..sub.2 to A and D to compute a quantity 'E' which the second unit transmits to the first unit while retaining D. The quantities A and D and the function .PHI..sub.2 must posses the property that knowing D and E, and the function .PHI..sub.2, it is mathematically impossible to compute the unknown quantity D. Then the second unit applies a third mathematical function '.PSI..sub.2 ' to D and C to compute the key 'K.' The first unit upon receiving the quantity E then applies a fourth mathematical function .PSI..sub.1 to B and E to also compute the key K.

Secure, swift cryptographic key exchange

Using the present cryptographic key exchange protocol, a first of two cryptographic units selects quantities 'A' and 'B.' That same unit then applies a mathematical function '.PHI..sub.1 ' to A and B to compute a third quantity 'C.'. A and B and the function .PHI..sub.1 posses the property that knowing A or B, and C, and the function .PHI..sub.1, it is mathematically impossible to compute the unknown quantity B or A. The first unit then transmits A together C to the second unit while retaining B. The second unit selects a fourth quantity 'D' and then applies a second mathematical function .PHI..sub.2 to A and D to compute a quantity 'E' which the second unit transmits to the first unit while retaining D. The quantities A and D and the function .PHI..sub.2 must posses the property that knowing D and E, and the function .PHI..sub.2, it is mathematically impossible to compute the unknown quantity D. Then the second unit applies a third mathematical function '.PSI..sub.2 ' to D and C to compute the secure key 'K.' The first unit upon receiving the quantity E then applies a fourth mathematical function .PSI..sub.1 to B and E to also compute the secure key K.

A water purification method and system, employing at least a first chamber and a second chamber to freeze a portion of a volume of impure water in the first chamber while melting ice in the second chamber. The unfrozen liquid, which has a high impurity concentration, is drained from the first chamber. The melted ice, from which up to 95% of the original impurities have been rejected during the freezing operation, is drained from the second chamber. Then, a new volume of impure water is supplied to the second chamber, and the process continues with the roles of the chambers reversed. The system includes at least one heat transfer fluid coil portion wrapped around (or disposed within) each chamber. The system requires no scraping or transporting of frozen ice, requires no chemical or cartridge replacement, and can be embodied in a small housing suitable for use as a home or restaurant appliance. The chamber dimensions and the duration of each freezing operation are optimized to maximize the rejection of impurities, given the freezing chamber temperature attainable by the heat transfer fluid coil and the desired system throughput rate.

Growing community of inventors

Los Altos, CA, United States of America

Chung Nan Chang