Harris Corporation

Harris Global Communications, Inc.

Christopher David Mackey

Clifford Hessel

Scott E Bartholomew

Michael E Kreeger

Duncan G Harris

John Robert McIntyre

John Paul Shoots

Kevin Dell

John E Gorton

James Anthony Norris

Michael Thomas Kurdziel

Myung K Lee

Scott Ensign Marks

Richard J Buckley

Alfred W Pietzold, Iii

Louis M Orsini

Brian Boorman

Paul Edward Voglewede

Malcolm J Packer

Bryce Tennant

Anthony R A Keane

Michael D Stevens

Shane B Eisenman

Thomas Daniel O Brien

Douglas C Crawford

Douglas Wayne Walker

Mark Padrnos

Anthony Ra Keane

John Robert Mcintyre

Anthony RA Keane

A radio frequency (RF) communications system may include an RF transmitter having multicarrier transmitter circuitry that transmits frequency bands over a frequency range. A controller may selectively transmit real information over at least one of the frequency bands and selectively transmits fake information within the frequency range. The controller's operation is based on embedded machine learning model and real-time effectiveness feedback from built-in spectral analyzer. An RF receiver receives the real information from the RF transmitter.

Communications system having multiple carriers with selectively transmitted real information and fake information and associated methods

A communications system may include a transmitter having spreading stages configured to spread a common modulated baseband input data stream based upon respective coefficient sequences; a plurality of upconverters, each having a different frequency; and an RF output stage that generates an RF output signal. A receiver may include an RF input stage that receives an RF input signal, a plurality of downconverters, a plurality of despreading stages, and a demodulator coupled to the despreading stages.

Communications system having multiple spread carriers and associated methods

An RF communications device may include a circuit board having a dielectric layer and conductive traces, one of the conductive traces defining a transmission line. The RF communications device may also include an RF transmitter carried by the circuit board and coupled to the transmission line, and RF switching circuits, each RF switching circuit including a substrate having a tapered proximal end coupled to the transmission line, and a distal end extending outwardly on the convex side of the transmission line. Each RF switching circuit may include a series diode, and a shunt diode coupled to the series diode, the series diode extending from the tapered proximal end and across an interior of the substrate.

RF communications device with conductive trace and related switching circuits and methods

A monolithic integrated circuit (IC) secure hashing device may include a memory, and a processor integrated with the memory. The processor may be configured to receive a message, and to process the message using a given secure hash algorithm (SHA) variant from among different SHA variants. The different SHA variants may be based upon corresponding different block sizes of bits.

Secure hashing device using multiple different SHA variants and related methods

Control for a portable communication device () includes a control knob () which has an outer shell () at least partially formed of a dielectric material. The control knob is sized and shaped to facilitate fingertip control of the portable communication device, and has an integrated antenna () disposed within the outer shell. An axial member () is provided on which the outer dielectric shell and the antenna are mounted to facilitate rotation of the control knob. A control device () is provided which is configured to control at least one electronic circuit () of a portable communication device responsive to a user rotation of the outer dielectric shell. The integrated antenna () is arranged to interface to at least one radio frequency communication circuit of a portable communication device.

Rotary knob with integrated antenna

A monitoring system for connector pins exposed to conductive/corrosive fluids and/or corrosive environments includes a first sensing portion having a pin monitoring section configured to measure a pin current flow of at least one conductor pin, and transfer a first signal. A second sensing portion produces a second signal indicating by a contactless determination the presence of a fastener providing physical connection between an interface member and a component. A decision logic device receives the first and second signals, compares the pin current flow to a predetermined range of values, and isolates electrical power to the conductor pin when the first signal indicates the pin current flow is outside the predetermined range of values. A sensor body created of a non-ferrous material and connected to the component includes a first insert member having the conductor pin and a second insert member defining a sensor sensing proximal presence of the fastener.

Protection of unsealed electrical connectors

Modern electronic devices are becoming smaller while the need to critically locate acoustic sensors or transducers, e.g., microphones, is increasing in order to provide improved intelligibility in adverse environments. The acoustic transducers can be used in arrays with their outputs processed in beam forming and noise cancellation algorithms. The use and creation of features on the surface of a small package to deal with the problem of achieving high performance solutions in a limited space are disclosed herein. For example, embodiments of electronic communication devices () include acoustic transducers () integrated with other features such as a volume control (), an antenna (), an adapter () which can be coupled to an input/output jack () and an accessory connector, or a projection ().

Electronic communication devices with integrated microphones

A secure processing device may include an external memory storing encrypted data, and a processor cooperating with the external memory. The processor is configured to generate address requests for the encrypted data in the external memory, cache keystreams based upon an encryption key, and generate decrypted plaintext based upon the cached keystreams and the encrypted data requested from the external memory. For example, the processor may be further configured to predict a future address request, and the future address request may be associated with a cached keystream.

Secure processing device with keystream cache and related methods

A pass-through adapter includes an adapter body having at least two connector pin interfaces, with one configured for coupling to an external device such as a communications device. Each connector pin interface includes a plurality of connector pins, including a plurality of pass-through connector pins operative with each other for in-line, pass-through signaling when the pass-through adapter is coupled to the external device. A crypto ignition key (CIK) circuit is contained within the adapter body and connected to at least one of the connector pins to provide a secure mode of operation for the external device.

Pass-through adapter with crypto ignition key (CIK) functionality

A scalable packet analyzer receives data packets from a data packet source for packet analysis and includes a plurality of policy engine arrays, each having a plurality of packet analysis microengines. A policy algorithm loader module is operative with each packet analysis microengine for loading a policy algorithm to each packet analysis microengine such that each packet analysis microengine analyzes specific sections of the data packet in parallel within each policy engine array based on the applied policy algorithm to obtain data about the data packet for further data packet processing.

Scalable packet analyzer and related method

A method is provided for protecting embedded cryptographic processing circuits (), software and data, contained within electronic equipment. The method involves monitoring with a first processing device () embedded in the electronic equipment parameter values generated by sensors () provided in the electronic equipment. The method also involves evaluating with the first processing device each of the parameter values to determine if it falls within a predetermined range of acceptable values. The method further involves using a modified operating profile in the first processing device to perform the monitoring or evaluating step if one or more of the parameter values is determined not to be within the predetermined range. The method also involves selecting the operating profile to include defined variables selected from the group consisting of the predetermined ranges of acceptable values, the parameter values that are evaluated, and a rate at which the parameter values are evaluated.

Adaptable microcontroller based security monitor

A scalable internet protocol (IP) encryption system includes a cryptographic unit that processes sensitive data for packet encryption/decryption and data authentication. A first processing unit with an optional IP Layer hardware accelerator includes a data processing subsystem that processes sensitive data and forwards the data to the cryptographic unit for encryption and data authentication. A management subsystem is operative with the cryptographic unit for configuring IP networking functions and distributing network configuration information to the data processing subsystem through the cryptographic unit. Data processing is separated from management and control functions at the data processing and management subsystems. A second processing unit with an optional IP Layer hardware accelerator receives the encrypted data from the cryptographic unit and processes the encrypted data for IP packet routing, fragmentation and reassembly and receives network configuration information from the management subsystem via the cryptographic unit.

Growing community of inventors

Spencerport, NY, United States of America

Christopher David Mackey