Cisco Technology, Inc.

Chirag Shroff

Anthony H Grieco

David A McGrew

Dylan Thomas Walker

Dennis Briddell

Srirajkumar Sundararaman

Larus Maxwell

Chandan Singh

Gregory James Waldschmidt

Samir Valjibhai Rajgor

Robert T Bell

Harshad Bhaskar Nakil

Aviran Kadosh

Rakesh Chopra

William F Sulzen

Kannan Varadhan

Sachin Agarwal

Srinivas Vundru

Chandrashekar Sodankoor

Gregory Michael Schnorr

Kevin Shyh-Kang Chang

Ofer Licht

Tatiana Serguei Dorofeeva

A method for monitoring an Integrated Circuit (IC). The method includes a Root-Of-Trust (ROT) module to actuate a monitoring process to monitor at least one feature being performed in ongoing operations of the IC in accordance with a policy. The ROT module receives data that defines the policy that includes at least one feature being performed. A validating process is applied by the ROT module to data by using firmware and by using at least one built-in key of a plurality of built-in keys retrieved from a secure storage. The ROT module determines whether at least one feature is being performed in the ongoing operations of the IC in compliance with the policy. The ROT module applies an impairing process to impair at least one feature of the plurality of features being performed to attempt to place the performance of the ongoing operations of the IC in compliance with the policy.

Using root-of-trust (ROT) to continuously monitor device operation for impairment

A method of operating a system-on-chip (SOC) including decrypting, by isolated Root of Trust (RoT) code, a Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) license code from a host during bootup of a device. Then validating, by the isolated RoT code, the SKU license code with firmware and at least one built-in key of a plurality of built-in keys from secure storage. Finally, enabling or disabling, by the isolated RoT code, at least one feature set of a plurality of feature sets comprising resources configured at the SOC based on at least one SKU license code which has been decrypted by isolated RoT code using at least one built-in key and authenticated by firmware.

On-demand and secure hardware license-based SKU creation for ASICs

Disclosed are systems, apparatuses, methods, and computer-readable media for configuring network groups without software-based processing and management. A method includes: validating veracity of a secure enclave based on a secure identify of the secure enclave using the instructions of a secure enclave predriver stored in a memory integral to a processor; establishing a secure connection with the secure enclave; retrieving at least one authentication key from the secure enclave; retrieving at least a portion of a bootstrapper from a secure storage based on the instructions of the secure enclave predriver; validating a veracity of the bootstrapper based on the at least one authentication key; initializing an external memory using the instructions of the bootstrapper; copying a bootloader from the secure storage into the external memory; validating a veracity of the bootloader based on the at least one authentication key; and executing the bootloader.

System method for fractional secure boot by validating secure enclave using instructions of pre-drivers stored in memory by manufacturer

According to certain embodiments, a method comprises performing a posture assessment at a trust anchor in order to determine whether a hardware component is authorized to run on a product. Performing the posture assessment comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with the hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and receiving, from the hardware component, a message encrypted using the random value (K). The message comprises an identifier associated with the hardware component. Performing the posture assessment further comprises determining whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product based at least in part on the identifier associated with the hardware component. The method further comprises performing an action that depends on whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Using a trust anchor to verify an identity of an ASIC

In one embodiment, a method to authenticate a hardware component, by a system, includes performing a verification process to determine whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the system. The hardware component comprises an electronic fuse storing a hash of a data package and a memory storing the data package, wherein the electronic fuse is configured to provide the hash to the memory. The verification process comprises transmitting a random value (K) to the hardware component to prompt the hardware component to sign a response. The verification process further comprises receiving a signed response containing the random value (K) and the data package, wherein the data package comprises a first serial number associated with the hardware component and a first system number associated with the system. The verification process further comprises decrypting the signed response to verify a value of the random value (K).

ASIC identity auto-provisioning

According to certain embodiments, a method performed by a trust anchor comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with a hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and receiving a response encrypted using the random value (K). The response is received from the hardware component. The method further comprise encrypting a schema using the random value (K) and sending the encrypted schema to the hardware component. The schema indicates functionality that the hardware component is authorized to enable.

Using a trust anchor to control functionality of an ASIC

According to certain embodiments, a method comprises performing a posture assessment at a trust anchor in order to determine whether a hardware component is authorized to run on a product. Performing the posture assessment comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with the hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and determining whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product based at least in part on whether the trust anchor receives, from the hardware component, a response encrypted using the random value (K). The method further comprises allowing or preventing the hardware component from running on the product based on whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Binding a trust anchor and an ASIC

According to certain embodiments, a method comprises receiving an encrypted value from a trust anchor. The encrypted value is received by a hardware component, and the encrypted value is associated with a posture assessment in which the trust anchor determines whether the hardware component is authorized to run on a product. The method further comprises obtaining a random value (K) based on decrypting the encrypted value. The decrypting uses a long-term key associated with the hardware component. The method further comprises communicating an encrypted response to the trust anchor. The encrypted response is encrypted using the random value (K). The encrypted response enables the trust anchor to determine whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Binding an ASIC to a trust anchor

A firmware protection module implements a hybrid firmware protection scheme on a computing device. The firmware protection module intercepts a message from a processor to a memory of the computing device. The message includes a command and an address in the memory corresponding to a firmware module stored in the module. The firmware protection module determines whether the command in the message is prohibited and whether the address in the message is protected. Responsive to a determination that the command is prohibited and the address is protected, the firmware protection module prevents at least a portion of the message from reaching the memory.

Hybrid firmware code protection

Presented herein are methodologies for securing BIOS/bootloader function including booting a computer system from a BIOS image stored in a first boot flash device, detecting an indication of a pending BIOS upgrade, in response to detecting the indication of a pending BIOS upgrade, accessing an upgraded BIOS image stored on a second boot flash device, validating a version of the upgraded BIOS image, authenticating the upgraded BIOS image using a signature stored in a first region of the second boot flash device, when the version of the upgraded BIOS image is validated, and the upgraded BIOS image is authenticated, writing the signature to a second region of the second boot flash device that is different from the first region, locking the second region of the second boot flash device, and rebooting the computer system from the second boot flash device.

Bios/bootloader protection

A method includes modifying a product with a first configuration such that the product is configured in accordance with a second configuration, generating data representative of the second configuration, obtaining a signed version of the data representative of the second configuration, and storing the signed version of the data representative of the second configuration in a wireless read/write accessory that is affixed to the product, wherein the wireless read/write accessory includes a prior signed version of data representative of the first configuration.

Supply chain life cycle validation

Techniques are provided for monitoring power consumption for individual systems or devices as a way to detect illicit or rogue hardware, e.g., addition of an unauthorized integrated circuit (IC), which may have been added to an existing system. Techniques include monitoring a power on sequence of a system, the power on sequence including one or more distinct stages, determining for each stage of the one or more distinct stages of the power on sequence, whether an observed power load of any distinct stage has deviated from an expected power load according to a power profile for the system, and when the observed power load of a given distinct stage has deviated from the expected power load, performing an action indicating that a deviation from the expected power load has occurred. The power profile specifies expected power characteristics of the system for each stage of a power on sequence.

Rogue hardware detection through power monitoring

In one embodiment, a computing device receives an image that has been signed with a first key, wherein the image includes a first computational value associated with it. A second computational value associated with the image is determined and the image is signed with a second key to produce a signed image that includes both the first and second computational values. Prior to loading the dual-signed image, the computing device attempts to authenticate the dual-signed image using both the first and second computational values, and, if successful, loads and installs the dual-signed image.

Dual-signed executable images for customer-provided integrity

A trusted guard module stores one or more identifiers, each identifier uniquely identifying a respective electronic component of one or more electronic components in a circuit, wherein each electronic component is previously programmed with its respective identifier. In one embodiment, the one or more electronic components are in communication with the guard module via a test data channel. A query is sent from the guard module to one of the components via the test data channel, requesting that the queried component provide its respective identifier to the guard module. The guard module then receives a response from the queried component via the test data channel. The guard module compares the response to the stored identifier for the queried component. If the response fails to correspond to the stored identifier for the queried component, the guard module asserts an alarm condition.

Growing community of inventors

Cary, NC, United States of America

Chirag Shroff