Sun Microsystems, Inc.

Network Appliance, Inc.

Freegate Corporation

Charles E McManis

Jean-Marc Frailong

Joseph John Tardo

Frank N Yellin

Jean A Gastinel

Charles A Price

Mark James Herbert

A network-accessible memory (NAM) element comprises a substrate, a memory mounted to the substrate, network interface circuitry and logic circuitry. The network interface circuitry implements a network physical layer and is mounted to the substrate. The logic circuitry is mounted to the substrate and is coupled to the network interface circuitry and the memory, and is configured to operate as a memory controller to control access to the memory by a host processor which is external to the NAM element through the network interface circuitry. The NAM element can be interconnected with other NAM elements to form a larger NAM storage device.

Network-accessible memory

A computer system has a program module verifier and at least first and second program modules. Each program module includes a digital signature and an executable procedure. The first program module furthermore includes a procedure call to the second procedure module, a procedure call to the program module verifier that is logically positioned in the first program module so as to be executed prior to execution of the procedure call to the second program module, and instructions preventing execution of the procedure call to the second program module when the procedure call to the program module verifier results in a verification denial being returned by the program module verifier. The second program module includes an executable procedure to be performed in response to the procedure call by the first program module to the second program module, a procedure call to the program module verifier that is logically positioned in the second program module so as to be executed prior to completion of execution of the second program module's executable procedure, and instructions preventing completion of execution of that executable procedure when the program module verifier returns a verification denial with respect to the first program module. The program module verifier responds to procedure calls by verifying the authenticity of any specified program module and by returning a verification confirmation or denial. When the program module verifier fails to verify the authenticity of a program module, the calling program module throws an exception and aborts its execution.

System and method for protecting use of dynamically linked executable modules

A computer system includes a program executer that executes verifiable architecture neutral programs and a class loader that prohibits the loading and execution of non-verifiable programs unless (A) the non-verifiable program resides in a trusted repository of such programs, or (B) the non-verifiable program is indirectly verifiable by way of a digital signature on the non-verifiable program that proves the program was produced by a trusted source. In the preferred embodiment, verifiable architecture neutral programs are Java bytecode programs whose integrity is verified using a Java bytecode program verifier. The non-verifiable programs are generally architecture specific compiled programs generated with the assistance of a compiler. Each architecture specific program typically includes two signatures, including one by the compiling party and one by the compiler. Each digital signature includes a signing party identifier and an encrypted message. The encrypted message includes a message generated by a predefined procedure, and is encrypted using a private encryption key associated with the signing party. A digital signature verifier used by the class loader includes logic for processing each digital signature by obtaining a public key associated with the signing party, decrypting the encrypted message of the digital signature with that public key so as generate a decrypted message, generating a test message by executing the predefined procedure on the architecture specific program associated with the digital signature, comparing the test message with the decrypted message, and issuing a failure signal if the decrypted message digest and test message digest do not match.

System and method for executing verifiable programs with facility for

A distributed computer system has a program compiling computer and a program executing computer. The program compiling computer is operated by a compiling party and includes a compiler that, when the digital signature of the originating party of an architecture neutral program has been verified, (A) compiles the architecture neutral program code of the architecture neutral program into architecture specific program code in the architecture specific language identified by the compile to information in the architecture neutral program, and (B) appends to the architecture specific program code a digital signature of the compiling party to generate an architecture specific program. The program executing computer is operated by an executing party and includes an architecture specific program executer that executes the architecture specific program code of the architecture specific program when the digital signature of the originating party of the architecture neutral program has been verified, the digital signature of the compiling party of the architecture specific program has been verified, and the compiling party has been determined to be a member of a defined set of trusted compiling parties.

System and method for generating trusted, architecture specific,

The present invention discloses a network interface device for connecting a client computer system to an external network. The network interface device is configured for the client system by automated procedures and protocols initiated from a remote server. Software programs within the network interface device provide transparent communication between the client computer system and services available on the external network. Similar software programs and a configuration database within the network interface device provide transparent communication between the client computer system and the remote server.

System and method of configuring a remotely managed secure network

System and method for protecting use of dynamically linked executable

A computer network having first and second network entities. The first network entity includes a packet object generator that generates a packet object including an executable source method, an executable destination method, and data associated with each of the methods. The first network entity also includes a communications interface to transmit the packet object. The second network entity includes a communications interface to receive the packet object and an incoming packet object handler to handle the received packet object. The incoming packet object handler includes a source and destination verifier to execute the source and destination methods with their associated data so as to verify the source and destination of the received object packet.

Secure network protocol system and method

A computer system has a program module verifier and at least first and second program modules. Each program module includes a digital signature and an executable procedure The first program module furthermore includes a procedure call to the second procedure module, a procedure call to the program module verifier that is logically positioned in the first program module so as to be executed prior to execution of the procedure call to the second program module, and instructions preventing execution of the procedure call to the second program module when the procedure call to the program module verifier results in a verification denial being returned by the program module verifier. The second program module includes an executable procedure to be performed in response to the procedure call by the first program module to the second program module, a procedure call to the program module verifier that is logically positioned in the second program module so as to be executed prior to completion of execution of the second program module's executable procedure, and instructions preventing completion of execution of that executable procedure when the program module verifier returns a verification denial with respect to the first program module. The program module verifier responds to procedure calls by verifying the authenticity of any specified program module and by returning a verification confirmation or denial. When the program module verifier fails to verify the authenticity of a program module, the calling program module throws an exception and aborts its execution.

A system and method for substantially reducing accidental disclosure of confidential information by interleaving video data frames with video flash frames. These video flash frames preclude an unauthorized person not wearing an appropriate shutter device from intelligibly reading video data frames by influencing the unauthorized person's eye prior to transmission of the video data frame.

Growing community of inventors

Sunnyvale, CA, United States of America

Charles E McManis