International Business Machines Corporation

Kyndryl, Inc.

Charanjit Singh Jutla

Shai Halevi

Rosario Gennaro

Don Coppersmith

Nevenko Zunic

William Eric Hall

David R Safford

Stephen Michael Matyas, Jr

Mohammed Peyravian

Ghavam G Shahidi

Daniel Joseph Friedman

Richard Harold Boivie

Vijay A Kumar

Pradeep Kumar Dubey

Devendra K Sadana

Chung H Lam

Vijay Narayanan

Dirk Pfeiffer

Ramachandran Muralidhar

Eduard Albert Cartier

Frank Robert Libsch

Robert L Wisnieff

Seiji Munetoh

Kohji Hosokawa

Hugo M Krawczyk

Wanki Kim

Marcel Catalin Rosu

Michael Steiner

Chandrasekara Kothandaraman

Luke James O'Connor

Juan Alberto Garay

Charles D Cash

Stanislaw Jarecki

Vugranam Chakravarthy Sreedhar

Sreekrishnan Venkateswaran

Tal D Rabin

Charles Ray Johns

Dakshi Agrawal

Chai Wah Wu

Charles Philippe Tresser

Marcel Mordechay Yung

Florian Alexander Auernhammer

Pankaj Rohatgi

Guerney D H Hunt

Mihir M Bellare

Josyula R Rao

Marco Martens

Craig B Gentry

Pooja Aggarwal

Alok Aggarwal

Michael I Shub

Atri Rudra

Ravindran Sai Anand

Prasanna Ganesan

Krishnendu Chatterjee

Arnab Roy

An example operation may include one or more of capturing a current version of sensitive data by a data processor node, hashing, by the data processor node, the current version of the sensitive data, storing, by the data processor node, a hash of the current version of the sensitive data on a first blockchain, encrypting, by the data processor node, the current version of the sensitive data using a secret key, and storing the encrypted current version of the sensitive data on a second blockchain.

Protecting sensitive data

A processor receives, from a requestor, a first request containing a virtual address. Based on the first request, the processor determines a real address corresponding to the virtual address, encrypts at least a portion of the real address to obtain a cryptographic secure real address, and returns the cryptographic secure real address to the requestor. Based on receiving a second request specifying a request address, the processor decrypts the request address to validate the request address as the cryptographic secure real address. Based on validating the request address as the cryptographic secure real address, the processor allows access to a resource of the data processing system identified by the real address.

Security for address translation services

A method (and structure) includes receiving a challenge for an authentication, in a chip having stored in a memory device therein a secret to be used in an authentication attempt of the chip by an external agent. The chip includes a hardware processing circuit to sequentially perform a processing related to the secret. The secret is retrieved from the memory device and processed in the hardware processing circuit in accordance with information included in the received challenge. The result of the processing in the hardware processing circuit is transmitted as a response to the challenge. The hardware processing circuit executes in a parallel manner, thereby reducing a signal that can be detected by an adversary attempting a side channel attack to secure the secret.

Cryptographic side channel resistance using permutation networks

A private key of a public-private key pair with a corresponding identity is written to an integrated circuit including a processor, a non-volatile memory, and a cryptographic engine coupled to the processor and the non-volatile memory. The private key is written to the non-volatile memory. The integrated circuit is implemented in complementary metal-oxide semiconductor 14 nm or smaller technology. The integrated circuit is permanently modified, subsequent to the writing, such that further writing to the non-volatile memory is disabled and such that the private key can be read only by the cryptographic engine and not off-chip. Corresponding integrated circuits and wafers are also disclosed.

Encryption engine with an undetectable/tamper-proof private key in late node CMOS technology

Encryption engine with an undetectable/tamper proof private key in late node CMOS technology

A method for compiling a matrix-product program into an obfuscated-matrix-product program includes receiving a plurality of matrices that form the matrix-product program, randomly generating a set of independent and invertible tensor-product matrices, randomly generating a set of independent and invertible linear-transform matrices, and generating a dynamic-fence-generation gadget by processing at least one of the plurality of matrices, the set of tensor-product matrices and the set of linear-transform matrices. The dynamic-fence-generation gadget is an obfuscated version of computer program represented by the plurality of matrices.

Obfuscating programs using matrix tensor products

First and second computer systems exchange randomness and the first computer system derives a uniformly random key from the randomness. The first computer system encrypts a multitude of blocks of plaintext using the uniformly random key to create a corresponding multitude of blocks of ciphertexts. The exchanging, deriving, and encrypting each uses a public random permutation. The first computer system transmits the multitude of blocks of ciphertexts to the second computer system. Another example includes the first computer system exchanging randomness and deriving the uniformly random key. The first computer system generates an authentication tag on a multitude of blocks of plaintexts. The exchanging, deriving, and generating each uses a public random permutation. The first computer system sends the authentication tag and the multitude of blocks of plaintext to the second computer system for authentication of the plaintext by the second computer system. Systems, methods, and program products are disclosed.

Parallelizable encryption using keyless random permutations and authentication using same

A method for searching in an encrypted database includes the following steps. A search is formulated as a conjunct of two or more atomic search queries. One of the conjuncts is selected as a primary atomic search query. Search capabilities are generated for a secondary atomic search query using the primary atomic search query and the secondary atomic search query.

Masking query data access pattern in encrypted data

A method comprises receiving a first cryptographic token for one search term and a second cryptographic token is generated using the one search term and at least another search term. A first search is conducted using the first cryptographic token to generate a first result set, and the second cryptographic token is used for computing a subset of results of the first result set.

Conjunctive search in encrypted data

A method for encrypting a database includes the following step. Keywords in the database are encrypted to obtain encrypted search tags for the keywords. A table of reverse indices is generated for the encrypted search tags. A table of cross keyword indices is generated. A method for searching in an encrypted database includes the following steps. A search is formulated as a conjunct of two or more atomic search queries. One of the conjuncts is selected as a primary atomic search query. Search capabilities are generated for a secondary atomic search query using the primary atomic search query and the secondary atomic search query. Such methods mask query data and the actual composition of the database to reduce computation complexity and privacy leakage.

A method for initializing encrypted communications using a common reference string and a shared password, includes determining a secret key of a peer using a first message, a second message and the common reference string, wherein the first message and the second message each comprise a tuple of elements of a cyclic group G of prime order p, a blinding encryption of the shared password, and a hash projection key.

Single-round password-based key exchange protocols

A system and method for data processing for coding. The method may include providing a first plurality of bytes of data, non-linearly transforming the first plurality of bytes into a second plurality of bytes, multiplying each of the second plurality of bytes of data by a predetermined constant of a plurality of constants to generate a third plurality of bytes, and organizing in use the third plurality of bytes as a plurality of output bytes. Systems to practice the foregoing methods are also described.

Data processing for coding

A system and method for coding data to help resist differential attacks. Data in m columns may be initialized to an initialized value. One new column of data may be mixed with a new input word and input to an advanced mixer. The advanced mixer may include linear mixing having indexed bytes and performing of exclusive-OR operation and transposing. An output of the advanced mixer may be a new m column state. A value of m could be 0 through 30. The value of m may have a preferred range of 27 through 36. Systems to implement the foregoing method are also described.

Hash function with provable resistance to differential attacks

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Elmsford, NY, United States of America

Charanjit Singh Jutla