Qualcomm Incorporated

Can Acar

Robert Paul Turner

Arvind Krishnaswamy

Billy Brumley

Philip Michael Hawkes

Erich Plondke

Alexander Gantman

Richard Senior

Nidish Ramachandra Kamath

Deepti Mani

Alexander W Dent

Bijan Ansari

Srilekha Krishnamurthy

Indranil Banerjee

Sundeep Kushwaha

Panagiotis Thomas

Ge Wang

Dmitry Beransky

Various embodiments include methods and devices for generating a memory map configured to map virtual addresses of pages to physical addresses, in which pages of a same size are grouped into regions. The embodiments may include adding a first entry for a first additional page to a first region in the memory map, shifting virtual addresses of the first region to accommodate a shift of virtual addresses of the first region allocated for code by a sub-page granular shift amount, mapping shifted virtual addresses of the first entry for the first additional page to physical address mapped to a first lowest shifted virtually addressed page of the first region, and shifting the virtual addresses of the first region allocated for code by a sub-page granular shift amount, in which the virtual addresses of the first region allocated for code partially shift into the first entry for the first additional page.

Increasing address space layout randomization entropy via page remapping and rotations

A method is provided for safely executing dynamically generated code to avoid the possibility of an attack in unprotected memory space. Upon ascertaining that dynamically generated code is to be executed, a processing circuit and/or operating system kernel restrict the dynamically generated code to use a first memory region within an unprotected memory space, where the first memory region is distinct (e.g., reserved) from other memory regions used by other processes executed by the processing circuit. A first processing stack is maintained for the dynamically generated code within the first memory region. This first processing stack is separate from a general processing stack used by other processes executed by the processing circuit. A stack pointer is switched/pointed to the first processing stack when the dynamically generated code is executed and the stack pointer is switched/pointed to the general processing stack when the dynamically generated code ends.

Dynamically generated code process sandboxing using authenticated pointers

A method of producing a control stack includes: writing a plurality of control information entries into a control stack buffer that is internal to a processor in response to one or more function calls; and in response to the control stack buffer being full and receiving a further function call, writing: the plurality of control information entries to an external memory that is external to the processor; and a further control information entry, corresponding to the further function call, to the control stack buffer.

Authenticated control stacks

Techniques for enforcing flow control of a software program in a processor are provided. An example method according to these techniques includes analyzing program code of the software program to identify a code pointer in the program code, generating an authentication tag based on the code pointer, and modifying the code pointer in the program code with the authentication tag to generate a tagged code pointer.

Code pointer authentication for hardware flow control

Techniques for protecting contents of a stack associated with a processor are provided. The techniques include a method including receiving a store instruction from a software program being executed by the processor, the store instruction including control information associated with a subroutine, altering the control information to generate secured control information responsive to receiving the store instruction from the software program, storing the secured control information on the stack, receiving a load instruction from the software program; and responsive to receiving the load instruction from the software program, loading the secured control information from the stack, altering the secured control information to recover the control information, and returning the control information to the software program.

Hardware-based stack control information protection

One feature pertains to a mechanism to secure a data structure by using a computationally efficient algorithm. A plurality of keys and/or masks may be pre-generated upon boot-up or initiation of a session. An authentication code may be computed for each data structure (e.g., memory block or header block) by selecting a subset of the plurality of pre-generated keys and/or a mask from the plurality of pre-generated masks. The authentication code may be stored within the data structure for future verification of the integrity of the data structure. The keys and/or masks used for all authentication codes (e.g., for other data structures) may be selected from the same plurality of keys and/or masks during the same cycle or session.

Method for protecting the integrity of a fixed-length data structure

Mesh communications aspects are disclosed in which multiple mobile devices located within a communication area perform direct communication to establish a mesh network. Each device node included in the mesh network provides power profile information to the other nodes on the network. As mesh messages are generated for transmission by the nodes onto the mesh network, an adaptive routing mechanism determines the transmission route based on the power profile of the proposed target node. The selective and adaptive routing determination allows for power to be efficiently conserved within the mesh network.

Power optimized behavior in mesh networks

A method, apparatus, and/or system are provided for establishing trust between an accessory device and a host device, using a global key known to both the host device and the accessory device, so that content protection for subscriber-based mobile broadcast services is provided. A secure link may be established between the accessory device and the host device so that when the accessory device receives encrypted content via a secured forward link only network, the accessory device may decrypt the content at the forward link only stack. The content is then re-encrypted/re-secured using one or more derived encryption keys and then sent to the host device where it may be decrypted and played back. A global key, unique to the particular device type of the host device, is employed to ultimately derive the session encryption keys used to re-encrypt/re-secure the content conveyed from the accessory device to the host device.

Growing community of inventors

San Diego, CA, United States of America

Can Acar