Motorola Solutions, Inc.

Motorola Corporation

Brian W Pruss

Kenneth C Fuchs

Thomas S Messerges

Timothy M Langham

Gary W Schluckbier

Ellis Arthur Pinder

Adam Cory Lewis

Chris A Kruegel

Gary P Hunsberger

Pawel Fafara

Amalendu Roy

Brent A Veltkamp

Jakub Trojanek

A system for securely managing a plurality of hardware security modules (HSMs). One example provides a host device, a first HSM, and a second HSM. The host device is configured to designate the first HSM as a primary HSM, and activate a security association mode in the primary HSM. The first HSM is configured to generate a multi-HSM exchange key ('MEK'), and encrypt the MEK using a temporary key generated with a key agreement protocol between the first HSM and the second HSM. The first HSM shares the encrypted MEK with the second HSM via the host device. The host device deactivates the security association mode, and the first HSM receives a traffic encryption key (“TEK”). The first HSM encrypts the TEK using the MEK, and shares the encrypted TEK with the second HSM via the host device. The second HSM decrypts the TEK using the MEK.

Multi-node expandable cryptographic processing system

A system and process for performing a touchless key provisioning operation for a communication device. In operation, a key management facility (KMF) imports a public key and a public key identifier uniquely identifying the public key of the communication device. The public key is associated with an asymmetric key pair generated at the communication device during its factory provisioning and configuration. The KMF registers the communication device and assigns a key encryption key (KEK) for the communication device. The KMF then provisions the communication device by deriving a symmetric touchless key provisioning (TKP) key based at least in part on the public key of the communication device, encrypting the KEK with the symmetric TKP key to generate a key wrapped KEK, and transmitting the key wrapped KEK to the communication device for decryption by the communication device.

Touchless key provisioning operation for communication devices

A device, system and method for installing encrypted data are provided. A device includes a processor comprising: immutable memory storing preconfigured trust anchor data; and a module storing preconfigured non-exportable data. The processor is configured to: receive an encrypted common protection key, encrypted using a manufacturing protection key, and an encrypted distribution private key, encrypted using a common protection key; obtain the manufacturing protection key using the preconfigured trust anchor data and the preconfigured non-exportable data; decrypt the encrypted common protection key using the manufacturing protection key to obtain the common protection key; decrypt the encrypted distribution private key using the common protection key to obtain a distribution private key; receive an encrypted data package including image-at-rest data encrypted with an image-at-rest key, the encrypted data package including encryption data for obtaining the image-at-rest key using the distribution private key; and install the encrypted data package at the memory.

Device, system and method for installing encrypted data

Provisioning device certificates for electronic processors. One example method includes receiving a flashloader at the electronic processor. The method also includes validating the flashloader with the electronic processor. After validating the flashloader, the method includes receiving an encrypted provisioned key bundle at the electronic processor. The method also includes decrypting the encrypted provisioned key bundle with the electronic processor using a provisioning key to create a decrypted provisioned key bundle. The method further includes executing a provisioning process on the electronic processor using the decrypted provisioned key bundle.

Method for provisioning device certificates for electronic processors in untrusted environments

A key variable loader receives a set of Rijndael parameters that were verified using a simulation computer, wherein the set of Rijndael parameters provide an input for implementing at least one step of the Rijndael block cipher and when used with a secret key allow a conversion between plain text and cipher text using the Rijndael block cipher. The key variable loader further stores the set of Rijndael parameters and subsequently provides the set of Rijndael parameters to a device having a customizable Rijndael block cipher, like a subscriber unit or a key management facility.

Methods for customizing a Rijndael block cipher

Systems and methods for vetting data include receiving a notification at a second processor that a first processor has written first output data to an output data buffer in an output device. A hardware-implemented buffer access flag controls a permission for the first processor to write data to the output data buffer. The second processor sets the hardware-implemented buffer access flag to a first setting that prevents the first processor from writing additional output data to the output data buffer while the first output data in the output data buffer is being inspected. The second processor has a read-write permission to the hardware-implemented buffer access flag. The first processor has a read-only permission to the hardware-implemented buffer access flag.

System and method of vetting data

A system and method of providing secure communications is provided. Messages are encrypted or decrypted in protected memory of a processor. Outbound messages from a secure network are prepared for encryption by adding a header outside of the protected memory and then encrypted in the protected memory. The encryption is performed by retrieving a key from a key cache as designated by rules in the header. The encrypted message is sent to the unsecure network. An inbound message from an unsecure network that is received in unprotected memory is sent to a decryption module in protected memory. The inbound message is decrypted using a key designated in its header and retrieved from the key cache. The decrypted message is returned to the unprotected memory, where it is stripped of the encryption header and then sent to its destination within the secure network.

Method to construct a high-assurance IPSec gateway using an unmodified commercial implementation

A single-chip integrated circuit comprising a first processor for executing a plurality of applications, a second processor for executing a plurality of applications, at least one of a) at least one embedded peripheral and b) at least one memory, and a bus monitor for allowing access to the at least one of a) the at least one embedded peripheral and b) the at least one memory, if the access is allowed, wherein the bus monitor comprises a mapping of access rights to the at least one of a) the at least one embedded peripheral and b) the at least one memory for the first processor and the second processor is disclosed.

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Streamwood, IL, United States of America

Brian W Pruss