Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Brian Scott Lounsberry

Kahren Tevosyan

Ashok Chandrasekaran

Vyom P Munshi

Mark Eugene Russinovich

Chuang Wang

Chetan S Shankar

Chandan Rama Reddy

Pavel Zakharov

Abhishek Pratap Singh Chauhan

Saurav Sinha

Sandeep Kalarickal

Pavan Gopal Bandla

George Li

Cristian Stefan Salvan

Kamran Riaz Khan

Felix Kasza

Chuanxin Fang

Srinivas S Nidadavolu

Pawel Tomasz Lipiec

Marcelo J Birnbach

Daniel Carver

Various methods and systems are provided for autonomous orchestration of secrets renewal and distribution. A secrets management service ('SMS') can be utilized to store, renew and distribute secrets in a distributed computing environment. The secrets are initially deployed, after which, SMS can automatically renew the secrets according to a specified rollover policy, and polling agents can fetch updates from SMS. In various embodiments, SMS can autonomously rollover client certificates for authentication of users who access a security critical service, autonomously rollover storage account keys, track delivery of updated secrets to secrets recipients, deliver secrets using a secure blob, and/or facilitate autonomous rollover using secrets staging. In some embodiments, a service is pinned to the path where the service's secrets are stored. In this manner, secrets can be automatically renewed without any manual orchestration and/or the need to redeploy services.

Autonomous secrets renewal and distribution

Technology for risk-based access to secrets utilizes risk metadata tailored to secrets. Secrets include passwords, security tokens, digital certificates, and other items used for identity authentication, authorization, signing, validation, and other cybersecurity processes. A secret's risk metadata may indicate which controls protect the secret, the deployment scope of the secret or the asset it secures, known exposures of the secret, whether the secret secures other secrets, the impact if the secret is misused, the secret's strength, characteristics of the asset the secret secures, the secret's risk history, and other characteristics of secrets that set them apart. Unlike secrets, typical user-generated digital assets like web pages, documents, image files, and so on have value on their own. An enhanced system distinguishes between secrets and non-secrets when modulating access, making it possible to automatically provide consistent, efficient, and effective risk-based control over access to secrets.

Risk-based access to computing environment secrets

Various methods and systems are provided for providing on-demand emergency management. On-demand emergency management includes emergency management operations (e.g., certificate update operations or managed-secrets rollover operations) for accelerated deployment and expedited installation of certificates or secrets. In operation, a host secret manager on a host machine communicates with client secret managers on virtual machines running the host machine, to provide expedited installation of secrets on the virtual machines. During the certificate update operations, the host secret manager communicates the certificate update secret package having a new secret state to a client secret manager that installs the new certificate state on the virtual machine. And, during managed-secrets rollover operations, based on accessing a managed-secrets rollover secret package having a notification-based new secret state, the host secret manager polls a dSMS service, and communicates with a client secret manager, such that client secret manager installs the new secret on the virtual machine.

On-demand emergency management operations in a distributed computing system

Methods, systems, and computer storage media for providing identification of secrets as one-way secrets in a computing environment. In particular, a secret isolation manager of an access management in the computing environment can identify an entity as an owner of secrets in a secret storage structure. In operation, the secret isolation manager, can receive a request, associated with a requesting entity, to access a secret associated with an approving entity. The request can be for an application of the requesting entity to access a secret of the approving entity. The secret isolation manager accesses the secret storage structure that stores affinity identifiers, where an affinity identifier indicates that the requesting entity has a one-way affinity with the approving entity that owns the secret. The one-way affinity operates to allow the approving entity to share the secret with the requesting entity, so the requesting entity is granted access to the secret.

Access management system with a secret isolation manager

Various methods and systems are provided for autonomous orchestration of secrets renewal and distribution across scope boundaries. A cross-scope secrets management service ('SMS') can be utilized to store, renew and distribute secrets across boundaries in a distributed computing environment such as regional boundaries. In some embodiments, locally scoped secrets management services subscribe to receive updates from the cross-scope secrets management service. As secrets are renewed, they are automatically propagated to a subscribing local scope and distributed by the local secrets management service. In various embodiments, SMS can autonomously rollover storage account keys, track delivery of updated secrets to secrets recipients, deliver secrets using a secure blob, and/or facilitate autonomous rollover using secrets staging. In some embodiments, a service is pinned to the path where the service's secrets are stored. In this manner, secrets can be automatically renewed without any manual orchestration and/or the need to redeploy services.

Autonomous cross-scope secrets management

Various methods and systems are provided for autonomous secrets management for a key distribution service ('KDS'). A KDS server performs centralized management and distribution of keys for client devices in a distributed computing system, which obviates key management and distribution at the client devices. In operation, a key request is received at a KDS server from a KDS client device. The key request is generated using a data protector and a KDS client component of the KDS client device. The key request is associated with a caller and a security token of the caller. The caller is authenticated at a security token service (STS) based on a security token. An encryption key or decryption key associated with the key request is generated. The encryption key or the decryption key is generated based on an interval-based key derivation scheme. The encryption key or the decryption key is communicated to KDS client.

Autonomous secrets management for a key distribution service

Various methods and systems are provided for autonomous secrets management for a temporary shared access signature ('SAS') service. Input for a temporary access request for an account resource, is received from a client. The temporary access request is validated, based on communicating a validation request to the secrets management service ('SMS') that can be utilized to store, renew and distribute secrets in a distributed computing environment. Validating the temporary access request is based on determining a storage account location path for SAS keys that provide temporary access to account resources. An access policy associated with the temporary access request is accessed. An SAS key request, associated with temporary access request, is communicated to the SMS. The SAS key request includes at least a portion of the access policy. An SAS key is received from the SMS. The SAS key, for access to the account resource, is communicated to the client.

Autonomous secrets management for a temporary shared access signature service

Global object access auditing techniques are described. In an implementation, a global SACL for a resource and an object SACL are merged to form a merged SACL responsive to a request for access to an object. The merged SACL is checked to determine what activity is to generate an audit event.

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Kenmore, WA, United States of America

Brian Scott Lounsberry