Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Brian Clifford Telfer

Stefan Thom

David Garfield Thaler, Iii

Torsten Stein

Paul England

Marcus Peinado

Robert Karl Spiger

Deepu Chandy Thomas

Daniel Stelian Mihai

Sangho Lee

Christopher G Kaler

Dennis James Mattoon

Robert Solomon

Trusted execution of a workload payload is brokered among multiple trusted execution platforms. The workload payload is received from a source computing system and includes input data, trusted execution code, and one or more trusted execution policies. At least one of the multiple trusted execution platforms is selected based on the one or more trusted execution policies. A brokered payload is generated to include executable trusted execution code and the input data. The brokered payload is communicated to the selected at least one trusted execution platform. A brokered result generated from the brokered payload by the selected at least one trusted execution platform is received. A workload result based on the brokered result is returned to the source computing platform.

Trusted execution broker

A brownfield security gateway is configured to support a trusted execution environment (TEE) that employs cryptographic and physical security—which forms a trusted cyber physical system—to protect sensitive transmissions on route to a controllable device. The gateway may be implemented with a System on Chip (SoC) that utilizes an application layer gateway to filter content within a transmission. When the application layer gateway authorizes the transmission, the transmission is forwarded to a trusted peripheral device that is configured with communication transport protocols, and the trusted peripheral device transfers the transmission to the controllable device. The trusted peripheral device and the controllable device are physically protected by, for example, protected distribution systems. Accordingly, the trusted peripheral device functions as a gateway between the SoC and the controllable device.

Trusted cyber physical system

A storage device for booting a host computing device includes a first storage memory region having a first storage memory controller, a second storage memory region having a second storage memory controller, and a resilient boot controller. The resilient boot controller is configured to store boot code in the first storage memory region, prevent write access by the host computing device through the first storage memory controller to the first storage memory region, detect a reset of the host computing device through the input/output interface, copy at least a portion of the boot code from the first storage memory region to the second storage memory region, responsive to detection of the reset of the host computing device, and enable read access of the copied boot code by the host computing device through the second storage memory controller of the second storage memory region, responsive to the copy operation.

Selective boot sequence controller that cryptographically validating code package for resilient storage memory

Selective boot sequence controller for resilient storage memory

A brownfield security gateway is configured to support a trusted execution environment (TEE) that employs cryptographic and physical security&#x2014;which forms a trusted cyber physical system&#x2014;to protect sensitive transmissions on route to a controllable device. The gateway may be implemented with a System on Chip (SoC) that utilizes an application layer gateway to filter content within a transmission. When the application layer gateway authorizes the transmission, the transmission is forwarded to a trusted peripheral device that is configured with communication transport protocols, and the trusted peripheral device transfers the transmission to the controllable device. The trusted peripheral device and the controllable device are physically protected by, for example, protected distribution systems. Accordingly, the trusted peripheral device functions as a gateway between the SoC and the controllable device.

Trusted agents operating within a trusted execution environment (TEE) of a client computing device are configured with complex computational puzzles (e.g., hash functions or other proof of work puzzles) for a remote service to solve before the trusted agent executes an operation. The trusted agent may have a policy that the puzzle is associated with, in which the policy defines a statistically defined time period over which puzzles are solved. The statistically defined time period is effectuated through parameters which control a complexity of the puzzle. Malware or bad actors that attempt to misuse the trusted agent are throttled until the remote service solves the puzzle, which is configured with a level of complexity that takes the statistically defined time period.

Measured execution of trusted agents in a resource constrained environment with proof of work

A computing device's trusted platform module (TPM) is configured with a cryptographic watchdog timer which forces a device reset if the TPM fails to solve a cryptographic challenge before the expiration of the timer. The computing device's TPM is configured to generate the cryptographic challenge, to which the computing device does not possess the cryptographic token for resolution. While the watchdog timer counts down, the computing device requests a cryptographic token from a remote service to solve the challenge. The remote service transmits the cryptographic token to the computing device so long as the remote service identifies no reason to withhold the token, such as the computing device being infected with malware. The interoperability of the computing device and remote service enables the remote service to exercise control and reset capabilities over the computing device.

Cryptographic hardware watchdog

A provisioning service operating on a remote server is configured to handle provisioning of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, in which IoT devices are configured to execute policies provided by the provisioning service to self-regulate access to an IoT portal. The provisioning service generates an access token and policy which are unique to a trusted platform module (TPM) for a respective IoT device. The TPM executes the policy upon each instance in which the IoT device requires authorization to perform an operation or access the IoT portal. The policy may be configured according to a prepaid or postpaid model. In both models a local counter within the TPM of the IoT device may increment upon each instance of authorization. Under the prepaid model the IoT device may acquire a set number of uses, and under the postpaid model a statement may be generated based on prior usage.

Trusted platform module-based prepaid access token for commercial IoT online services

Before a composition is ingested into a runtime environment at a runtime device, the composition may be verified at an authoring trusted execution environment (TEE) operating on an authoring device. A user can operate an untrusted computing platform (e.g., a personal computer, laptop computer, tablet computer, etc.) to write code, generate data, or create some other composition. Since this composition is created on an untrusted device, the authoring TEE may output the composition on a trusted peripheral device to a user for review and approval. Responsive to receiving approval at the trusted peripheral device, the authoring TEE can sign the composition with a local key and forward the composition for execution by the runtime device. The signature can be utilized by the runtime device to prove that it was reviewed and verified by an authorized user operating the authoring device.

Secure policy ingestion into trusted execution environments

A secure terminal configured to support a trusted execution environment that utilizes policy enforcement to filter and authorize transmissions received from a host device and destined for a remote device. Upon receiving a transmission from the host device, the secure terminal verifies that the instruction, message, or request contained within the transmission satisfy parameters set by a policy. If the transmission satisfies the parameters, then the secure terminal signs the transmission with a key unique to the trusted platform module associated with the secure terminal and forwards the signed transmission to the remote device. If the transmission fails one or more parameters within the policy, a message that details the instruction or operation contained within the transmission is exposed to a user at an output device, in which the user can authorize or reject the transmission using an input device.

Growing community of inventors

Seattle, WA, United States of America

Brian Clifford Telfer