Northern Arizona University

Crocus Technology Inc.

Motorola Corporation

Crocus-Technology Sa

Other

USA as Represented by Secretary of the Navy

Université Grenoble Alpes

Institut Polytechnique De Grenoble

Bertrand Francis Cambou

Douglas J Lee

Ken Mackay

Barry Alan Hoberman

Yaron Oren-Pines

Paul G Flikkema

Donald A Telesca, Jr

Christopher Robert Philabaum

Fatemeh Afghah

H Shelton Jacinto

H Ming Liaw

Stuart Rumley

Ian Burke

Julie B Heynssens

Sareh Assiri

Reuven Yehoshua

Donald A Telesca

Robert Bruce Davies

Neal Berger

Bernard Dieny

Mourad El Baraji

Ioan Lucian Prejbeanu

William C Dunn

Raymond Mervin Roop

Ljubisa Ristic

Lewis E Terry

Seyed Tabatabaei

Kenneth MacKay

Donald L Hughes, Jr

Mamoru Tomozane

Ryan Orson Behunin

Abolfazl Razi

Ines Montano

Vince Rodriguez

Taylor Begay

David Hely

Dennis D Booher

Juergen A Foerstner

Jian Wu

Lucien Lombard

David Kuan-Yu Liu

Thao Tran

Melissa E Grupen-Shemansky

James G Gilbert

Gregory L Hansell

Constantin Ciocanel

John Gibbs

Cindy Browder

Alyssa J Stenberg

Stefan W Nelson

Bahattin Yildiz

Dina Ghanaimiandoab

Bilal Habib

Raul Chipana Quispe

Bilal Babib

Brayden Cole David Villa

Mohammad Mohammadinodoushan

James D Palmer

Ted Stokes

Jordan A Wright

Anthony J Tether

Ashwija Korenda

Brit Riggs

Manuel Aguilar Rios

Raul Chipana

Jack Garrard

Michael Gowanlock

Kaitlyn Lee

Ken Macay

Doug Lee

Anthony John Tether

Arrangements and methods for a program-read-erase memory using ReRAM cells is disclosed. The memory includes an array of pristine ReRAM cells. A first digital symbol is encoded in the memory by partially forming cells, while the opposite digital value is encoded in pristine cells. As part of a read process, all cells are subject to partial formation voltage which erases all data as it is being read. ReRAM memories used in this manner are advantageously usable to store challenges for interrogating PUFs for recovery of PUF-generated encryption keys.

Program-read-erase schemes to protect PUF challenge-response-pairs with pre-formed ReRAMS

Methods and systems for managing access to encrypted digital files are proposed. A remote or client device including an array of physical unclonable function (PUF) devices is provided. A server device has an image of the PUF, with previously measured responses. The server device randomly selects a set of responses from a first list PUF devices in its image. The server device then generates masking data to select among the first list to generate response bitstream. The response bitstream is used to encrypt a file, which sent to the client for storage. The random number is also sent. Later, the server generates an encrypted message digest from which the client can retrieve the masking data, which is used with the random number to generate a response bitstream from the client PUF to decrypt the file.

Individual digital access with ternary states and one-way unclonable functions to protect digital files

Systems and methods for the generation and use of session keys supporting secure communications between a client and server device are disclosed. The client hashes each of a series of passwords a first number of times. The hashed passwords are sent to a server. The server applies the hashed password to an array of PUF devices, and receives an initial response bitstream which is stored. The client later hashes each of the series of passwords a second number of times, which is less than the first number, and these are sent to the server. The server continues to hash the second message digest, generate PUF responses, and compare the result to the initially stored responses. For each password, the number of hashes necessary to achieve a match is a partial session key. Latency is improved by an array of separately addressable PUFs, each producing a partial session key.

Associative PUF arrays to generate session keys with pseudo-homomorphic methods

An arrangement and method for detecting number splitting attacks in quantum key distribution systems is disclosed. According to the method, a receiver may detect the presence of an eavesdropper on a transmission channel by detecting an increase in the percent difference between the photon transmission rates of two signals of different wavelengths. The receiver may directly measure a percent difference in photon receive rates as between the two signals, and compare the measured difference with an expected difference. The expected difference may be known, or may be measured by the receiver on the basis of historical data. The expected difference may be computed from the percent difference between the means of the Poisson distributions of the transmitter's laser sources, which may be determined a priori and communicated to the transmitter.

Multi-wavelength quantum key distribution for enhanced security against a photon number splitting attack and higher data rates

The present invention provides a method for using a tamper-resistant physical unclonable functions (PUF) to generate temporary passwords, encrypt a password manager database for one-way encryption, and authenticate users. Resistive Random-Access Memory (ReRAM) can be exploited as PUFs. On the server side, a ReRAM PUF can be used to change the format of the password manager database. By comparing the resistance values extracted from the ReRAM PUF, a bitstream can be generated which can then be used as a challenge. Furthermore, by utilizing the hash function and the ReRAM PUF, the password manager database's content can be encrypted as a one-way encryption. The resistance values, which are the ReRAM PUF output, are converted to a bitstream and then replace the user ID and password hash in the database.

Password manager database encryption and generation of temporary code based on ReRAM physical unclonable functions

Systems and methods for providing authentication and secure cryptographic communication between a client and server are described. The client includes an addressable array of PUF devices. The client receives or generates a set of instructions usable to determine a range of PUF addresses. The client measures the PUF addresses and generates a first set of responses. The responses are used to encrypt a session key, which is stored, along with the instructions and a hash of the responses, at the client. Later, the client may recover the session key by using the instructions to measure the PUF again, resulting in a second set of responses. Using a response-based cryptography search engine, the client may then iteratively modify and hash the second set of responses until a response set is uncovered that matches the first response set. This modified response set may then be used to uncover the session key.

Systems and methods using search engines to generate cryptographic keys from erratic physical unclonable functions

Systems and methods of improving public key infrastructure using PUF arrays are disclosed. The systems and methods are usable to improve PKI based on Lattice and Code cryptography. In the disclosed system, a client device includes an enrolled PUF array, and a server device acting as a Certification Authority includes an image of the PUF array including previously measured responses data for the devices in the PUF array. The CA sends a set of addresses to the client device, which generates a public key from measuring the response of PUF devices with the addresses. The CA receives the generated public key, and determines that the enrolled PUF was used to generate the key.

PUF based key generation for lattice and code cryptography

Systems and methods for the generation and use of session keys supporting secure communications between a client and server device are disclosed. The client device has or receives a password, which it hashes a predetermined first number of times. The hashed password is sent as a message digest to a server. The server applies the hashed password to a an array of PUF devices, and receives a response bitstream which is stored. The client later hashes the password a second predetermined number of times, which is less than the first predetermined number, and this second message digest is sent to the server. The server continues to hash the second message digest, generate PUF responses, and compare the result to the initially stored responses. The number of hashes necessary to achieve a match is the session key.

PUF-protected pseudo-homomorphic methods to generate session keys

The performance of quantum key distribution by systems and methods that use wavelength division multiplexing and encode information using both wavelength and polarization of photons of two or more wavelengths. Multi-wavelength polarization state encoding schemes allow ternary-coded digits, quaternary-coded digits and higher-radix digits to be represented by single photons. Information expressed in a first radix can be encoded in a higher radix and combined with a string of key values to produce a datastream having all allowed digit values of that radix in a manner that allows eavesdropping to be detected without requiring the sender and receiver to exchange additional information after transmission of the information.

Secure multi-state quantum key distribution with wavelength division multiplexing

Systems and methods of correcting errors in encrypted communication between a server and client devices using keyless encryption schemes are disclosed. Client devices with arrays of physical-unclonable-function devices respond to challenges from a server. Characteristics of the arrays are stored by the server during a secure enrollment process. To send an encrypted message, the server generates a message digest, extracts data from the stored arrays on the basis of the message digest, applies error correction codes to the message, encrypts the message with the extracted data, and sends the message to a client. The server may receive a handshake containing all or part of the message digest, measures its PUF, and decrypts and decodes the message.

Error correcting schemes for keyless encryption

The present disclosure relates to implementations of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) for cryptographic and authentication purposes. Specifically, the disclosure describes implementations of systems using PUFs that may replace existing public key infrastructures (PKIs).

Encryption schemes with addressable elements

Systems and methods for symmetric encryption between a client and a server device include a client device having an array of physical unclonable function devices and a server device storing information sufficient to reconstruct responses of the devices to an applied stimulus such as varying levels of electrical current. The server shares a challenge with the client, which measures characteristics such as electrical resistances for a subset of the devices according to instructions extracted from the challenge. The client measures a corresponding reference device in the array for each device of the subset and assigns a value determined based on a comparison of each device with the corresponding reference device to generate a cryptographic key. The server calculates an expected response of the client to the challenge according to a model of the devices in the array, and uses the calculated response to generate the key independently.

Fast cryptographic key generation from memristor-based physical unclonable computed functions

Computing systems with dynamic architectures may be used to secure against code-injection attacks and other exploits. A system may generate multiple representations of instructions or other data associated with each of a set of configurations of the system. The system may periodically or randomly change configurations such that malicious code that is executable in one configuration cannot be executed in another configuration. A system may also detect malicious code by comparing code previously generated in one representation with different representations of the same code. If, during execution of a representation of a program code, the system determines that the representation specifies instructions that differ from other representations of the same program code, they system may stop executing the compromised program code, change its configuration, and continue to execute another representation of the program code that has not been compromised.

System and method for active cyberattack defense

Systems and methods for improving security in computer-based authentication systems by using physical unclonable functions are presented. A computing device used to provide authentication includes multiple arrays of physical unclonable function devices. Rather than storing user passwords or message digests of passwords, the computing device generates a message digest based on a user's credentials. A challenge response generated by measuring physical parameters of set of physical unclonable function devices specified by the message digest. The computing device can provide authentication without storing information which could be used by an attacker to compromise user credentials. Redundancy and robustness to varying loads are provided by the use of multiple PUF arrays which may be used as backups or to provide load balancing. Backdoor access may be provided to trusted parties without exposing user credentials.

Resilient password management system using an array of addressable physical unclonable functions

A system and method of secure communication between computing devices based on physical unclonable functions such as memories having dissolvable conductive paths is provided. The method involves enrolling a client device, the client device having a PUF such as a pristine ReRAM. The PUF is enrolled in a secure environment by reading and storing the resistances of the PUF's addressable memory cells. The cells are categorized into 'rugged' and 'vulnerable' categories on the basis of their resistance, the vulnerable cells being those more likely to be permanently altered during the generations of PUF responses. The rugged cells are used for the generation of PUF responses for cryptographic key generation, but the vulnerable cells may be inspected to detect unauthorized 3rd party access to the PUF.

Sensing scheme for low power reram-based physical unclonable functions

Growing community of inventors

Flagstaff, AZ, United States of America

Bertrand Francis Cambou