Cisco Technology, Inc.

Nds Corporation

Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd.

Intel Corporation

Cp8 Technologies

Acano (uk) Limited

Aviad Kipnis

Eliphaz Hibshoosh

Itsik Mantin

Yaron Sella

Yaacov Belenky

Erez Waisbard

Michael Kara-Ivanov

Manoj R Sastry

Marcio Rogerio Juliato

Shabbir Ahmed

Christopher N Gutierrez

Vuk Lesi

Chaim Shen-Orr

Yair Fodor

Alon Shaltiel

Steve Epstein

Hillel Michael Solow

Yossi Tsuria

Avraham A Poupko

Stephanie Wald

Louis Goubin

Andrew Robert Sinton

Jacques Patarin

Aharon Grabovsky

Alexander Brill

Efraim Mangell

Nir Moshe

Tzachy Reinman

Victor Halperin

Avraham Poupko

Victor Halpern

Chaim D Shen-Orr

Anna Greenberg

A method for secure communication, the method includes (a) receiving, by a first entity executable by a first circuit, challenges of second entities, the second entities are executable by second circuits; (b) generating a pair of asymmetrical keys, the pair includes a new public key and a new private key; (c) generating a response message that includes a representation of the challenges of the second entities and the new public key, wherein the response message is signed by the first entity; (d) sending the response message to the second entities; (e) for each second entity (e.1) determining a unique symmetrical key associated with the second entity; wherein the determining is based on the new private key and a verified public key of the second entity; and (e.2) securely communicating with the second entity using the unique symmetrical key associated with the second entity.

Secure communication between a source to multiple targets

Techniques and screening messages based on tags in an automotive environment, such as, messages communicated via a communication bus, like the CAN bus. Messages can be tagged with either a binary or probabilistic tag indicating whether the message is fraudulent. ECUs coupled to the CAN bus can receive the messages and the message tags and can determine whether to fully consume the message based on the tag.

Security reporting via message tagging

A method for collecting data from a group of entitled members. The method may include receiving, by a collection unit, a message and a message signature; validating, by the collection unit, whether the message was received from any of the entitled members of the group, without identifying the entitled member that sent the message; wherein the validating comprises applying a second plurality of mathematical operations on a first group of secrets, a second group of secrets, and a first part of the message signature; and rejecting, by the collection unit, the message when validating that the message was not received from any entitled member of the group.

Anonymous collection of data from a group of entitled members

A method for collecting data from a group of entitled members. The method may include receiving, by a collection unit, a message and a message signature; validating, by the collection unit, whether the message was received from any of the entitled members of the group, without identifying the entitled member that sent the message; wherein the validating comprises applying a second plurality of mathematical operations on first group secrets, second group secrets and a first part of the message signature; and rejecting, by the collection unit, the message when validating that the message was not received from any entitled member of the group.

In one embodiment, a method for secure computation, includes receiving in a server, over a communication channel from a device external to the server a request to perform a modular exponentiation operation in which an exponent of the operation comprises a secret value, wherein the secret value is not provided to the server, and at least two parameters that encode the secret value in accordance with a polynomial or matrix homomorphic encryption of the secret value computed by the device, and performing in the server, in response to the request, a homomorphic exponentiation using the at least two parameters received from the device without decrypting the secret value in the server, so as to generate an output that is indicative of a result of the modular exponentiation operation.

Server-assisted secure exponentiation

In one embodiment, data for use by a processor is stored in a memory. A network interface communicates over a network with a second device. At a processor, a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) of a plurality of secret shares is generated. The SHE of the plurality of secret shares is sent to the second device. The following is performed in a loop: a first result of a homomorphic exclusive-or operation performed by the second device on the SHE is received, a SHE of the first result is performed, yielding a second result, a SHE of the second result is performed yielding a third result, the third result is transmitted to the second device, and a final SHE result is received from the second device. The received final SHE result is decrypted in order to produce a final Somewhat Homomorphically Decrypted (SHD) output. The final SHD output is then output. Related methods, systems, and apparatus are also described.

Computation using somewhat homomorphic encryption

In one embodiment, a first signature template is received, the first signature template being one of a signature template of a first message or a null template, the first signature template comprising at least the following fields: an aggregation depth field, a message identifier, one of the first message or a result of applying a one way hash function to the first message, a bit vector, an aggregated square random integer mod N, a signature of the first message. A second signature template is created based on the first signature template, the second signature template created as follows: increment the aggregation depth of the first signature template, determine a unique message identifier for a second message, determine a second bit vector, determine an second aggregated square random integer mod N, and calculate a new signature for the second message. Related methods, apparatus, and systems are also disclosed.

Signature method and system

In one embodiment, a method, system, and apparatus are described, the method, system, and apparatus including generating metadata to be associated with each block of a series of blocks, the generating including, except for an initial block, receiving: a first block, including a signed block, and a second block to be signed, retrieving a first value including a square of a random number, R'2, multiplying R&#x2032;2 by a nonce, r, and setting r&#xb7;R&#x2032;2 to be a square of a first random number, denoted R2, for the second block, retrieving a second value from the first block, the second value including K-bit vector, E&#x2032;, determining a bit string value of the second block, M, computing E=hash(R2&#x2225;M&#x2225;E&#x2032;), and determining a signature, Sig, for the second block by calculating Sig=r Sig&#x2032; SE-E&#x2032;. Related methods, systems, and apparatuses are also described.

One embodiment of the invention includes a method, including performing, a symmetric homomorphic encryption of a secret Swith a cryptographic key H as input yielding a homomorphic encryption result S*, sending S* for mathematical combination by at least one device with at least one secret Syielding G*, the device A not having access to S, the at least one device not having access to Sand not having access to H, receiving G*, performing a symmetric homomorphic decryption of data based on G* with H as input yielding a first decrypted output, determining a symmetric cryptographic key KA based on the first decrypted output for secure communication with a first device which is operationally connected to, or includes, a tamper resistant security system including Sand Stherein, securing data using KA yielding secured data, and sending the secured data to the first device.

Homomorphically-created symmetric key

In one embodiment, a method for reducing information leakage in order to counter side channel attacks against a secure execution environment is described, the method including receiving at the secure execution environment a first input comprising a key comprising a sequence of k input elements in a commutative ring, CR, receiving at the secure execution environment a second input comprising a text comprising a sequence of p input elements in the commutative ring, CR, defining an input INP comprising a sequence of j input elements, wherein INP comprises either one or both of the first input or the second input, performing one of a matrix randomization operation or a polynomial randomization operation on the inputs, and producing a randomized output.

Method and system for homomorphicly randomizing an input

A method of distributing audio video content is described. The method includes: receiving configuration data for a plurality of devices; for each device in the plurality of devices, computing a set of bit rates based, at least in part, on the configuration data; encoding audio video content at each bit rate in each set of bit rates to produce a plurality of encoded audio video content streams; splitting each encoded audio video content stream in the plurality of encoded audio video content streams into chunks to produce a plurality of chunked encoded audio video content streams; for each device in the plurality of devices, creating a separate index file, each separate index file including references to at least one of the plurality of chunked encoded audio video content streams; publishing a locator for each separate index file in a catalogue; and transmitting the plurality of chunked encoded audio video content streams and each separate index file to a network. Related systems, apparatus, and methods are also described.

Distributing audio video content

A method, system and apparatus for deriving a secondary secret from a root secret are described, the method, system and apparatus including reserving a memory buffer included in an integrated circuit, the memory buffer being large enough to contain all of the bits which will include the secondary secret, receiving a plurality of bits from a root secret, the root secret being stored in a secure memory of the integrated circuit, inputting the plurality of bits from the root secret and at least one control bit into a permutation network, and thereby producing a multiplicity of output bits, the at least one control bit including one of one bit of a value g, and one bit an output of a function which receives g as an input, receiving the multiplicity of output bits from the permutation network, inputting the multiplicity of output bits from the permutation network into a plurality of logic gates, thereby combining the multiplicity of output bits, wherein a fixed number of bits is output from the logic gates, inputting the fixed number of bits output by the logic gates into an error correcting code module, the fixed number of bits output by the logic gates including a first group of intermediate output bits and a second group of intermediate output bits and receiving output bits from the error correcting code module, the output bits of the error correcting code module including the first group of intermediate output bits as changed by the error correcting code module, where the change depends on the second group of intermediate output bits, filling non-filled registers in the reserved memory buffer with the first group of intermediate output bits as changed by the error correcting code module, and repeating the steps of 'receiving a plurality of bits from a root secret' through 'filling non-filled registers in the reserved memory buffer' until the entire secondary secret is derived, wherein the steps of &#x201c;receiving a plurality of bits from a root secret&#x201d; through &#x201c;filling non-filled registers in the reserved memory buffer&#x201d; are performed in a single clock cycle of the integrated circuit. Related apparatus, methods and systems are also described.

Secrets renewability

A fully homomorphic method and system for randomizing an input, wherein all computations are over a commutative ring is described. Equivalent methods for performing the randomization using matrices and polynomials are detailed, as well as ways to mix the matrix and polynomial functions. Addition, multiplication, and division of the matrix and polynomial functions is further described. By performing computations of the functions modulo N over a ring Z, the functions are usable as encryption functions. The method and system can also be used for verifying that a returned result of a calculation performed by a third party is valid for any of the calculations described herein. Related methods, systems, and apparatus are also described.

A method and system for embedding a watermark in block encrypted content, including encoding a bit string, the bit string including n bits, denoted b-b, the encoding including translating each bit, b-b, into a block of data, according to the following rule if b=1, then translate binto a block of data of a first type, and if b=0, then translate binto a block of data of a second type, thereby translating the n bits into n blocks of data corresponding to each bit b-b, arranging a composite block of data including the n blocks of data, and at least one additional block indicating the presence of the n blocks of data, and inserting the composite block of data into a content item as a watermark, wherein the watermarked content item is encrypted using an ECB mode of encryption. Related methods and apparatus are also described.

Growing community of inventors

Efrat, Israel

Aviad Kipnis