Juniper Networks, Inc.

Ashish Suresh Ghule

Jagadish Narasimha Grandhi

Pankaj Malviya

Swamy Sadashivaiah Renu Kananda

Alex Baban

Pratik Pradip Vyas

A network device may receive IPv6 fragments of a flow. Source and/or destination port information may be encoded into an upper sixteen bits of an identification number of an IPv6 fragment header of each of the IPv6 fragments. The network device may extract the source and/or destination port information from the IPv6 fragments, and may perform a spoof check of the IPv6 fragments. The network device may drop any of the IPv6 fragments that fail the spoof check, to generate remaining IPv6 fragments, and may translate the remaining IPv6 fragments into IPv4 fragments based on the source and/or destination port information. The network device may forward the IPv4 fragments toward an IPv4 cloud network.

Internet protocol (IP) version 6 fragmentation and reassembly optimization for port-aware IP translators

An example network device receives an encapsulated network packet via a network tunnel; extracts IPv6 header information from the encapsulated network packet; extracts IPv4 header information from the encapsulated network packet; determines that the encapsulated network packet is a spoofed network packet based on the IPv6 header information and the IPv4 header information; and in response to detecting the spoofed network packet, transmits a message to a Tunnel Entry Point (TEP) device, the message including data representing the IPv6 header information and IPv4 header information. A tunnel entry point (TEP) device may receive the message and use the message to detect spoofed IPv6 traffic, e.g., when an IPv6 header and an IPv4 header of an encapsulated packet matches the IPv6 header and the IPv4 header specified in the message. In this manner, the TEP device may block, rate limit, or redirect spoofed network traffic.

Dynamic security actions for network tunnels against spoofing

A network device may forward fragments of an IPv4 network packet encapsulated in IPv6 network packets from an IPv6 network to an IPv4 network without reassembling the IPv4 network packet. The network device may receive and buffer the one or more fragments of a fragment flow associated with the IPv4 network packet until it receives a fragment of the fragment flow that includes an indication of the source port of the IPv4 network packet. When the network device receives the fragment that includes the indication of the source port of the IPv4 network packet, the network device may dispatch each fragment of the fragment flow that it has received to the IPv4 network.

Packet fragment forwarding without reassembly

A network device may receive, from a first network, a network packet of a first network packet type that encapsulates a fragment of a second network packet of a second network packet type, where the network packet includes an extension header that indicates a source port and a destination port for the second network packet. The network device may perform an anti-spoof check on the fragment of the second network packet based at least in part on at least one of: the source port or the destination port for the second network packet that is indicated by the extension header. The network device may, based on the fragment passing the anti-spoof check, forward the fragment of the second network packet to a second network.

IPv6 extension header for stateless handling of fragments in IPv6

A network device may receive, from a first network, one or more fragments of a first network packet of a first network packet type, where the first network packet encapsulates a second network packet of a second network packet type. The network device may buffer the one or more fragments in. The network device may, upon receiving a fragment of the first network packet that includes an indication of a source network address and a source port for the second network packet, perform an anti-spoof check of the fragment flow without assembling the first network packet. The network device may, based on the fragment flow passing the anti-spoof check, in response to receiving all fragments of the first network packet: assemble the first network packet, decapsulate the second network packet from the assembled first network packet, and forward, to a second network, the second network packet.

Anti-spoof check of IPv4-in-IPv6 fragments without reassembly

A network device may receive, from a first network, a network packet of a first network packet type that encapsulates a fragment of a second network packet of a second network packet type, where the network packet is part of a flow of a plurality of network packets of the first network packet type that encapsulates fragments of the second network packet, and where the network packet includes a flow label that indicates a source port for the second network packet. The network device may perform an anti-spoof check on the fragment of the second network packet based at least in part on the source port for the second network packet that is indicated by the flow label of the network packet. The network device may, based on the fragment passing the anti-spoof check, forward the fragment of the second network packet to a second network.

IPV6 flow label for stateless handling of IPV4-fragments-in-IPV6

A network device may forward fragments of an IPv4 network packet to an IPv6 network without reassembling the IPv4 network packet. The network device may receive and buffer one or more fragments of a fragment flow associated with the IPv4 network packet until it receives a fragment of the fragment flow that includes an indication of the destination port of the IPv4 network packet. When the network device receives the fragment that includes the indication of the destination port of the IPv4 network packet, the network device may encapsulate each fragment of the fragment flow that it has received into respective IPv6 network packets to the IPv6 network.

This disclosure describes techniques to generate information of the operational characteristics of a border relay device. For example, a host device transmits a loop-back packet that travels through a forwarding path of the border relay device, rather than a control path, and back to the host device. Based on the host device receiving the loop-back packet, the host device may generate information indicative of operational characteristics of the border relay device.

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Bengaluru, India

Ashish Suresh Ghule