F5 Networks, Inc.

Extrahop Networks, Inc.

Reel/frame: 043271/0705

Arindum Mukerji

Jesse Abraham Rothstein

Xue Jun Wu

Michael Kerber Krause Montague

David Dean Schmitt

Jeff James Costlow

Bhushan Prasad Khanal

Khurram Waheed

John Robert Hughes

Matthew Alexander Schurr

Jeffery Bradford Fry

Tao Liu

Jonathan Mini

Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic using network monitoring computers (NMCs). Two or more network segments coupled by a traffic forwarding device (TFD) may be monitored. External network addresses and internal network addresses may be determined based on encrypted network traffic exchanged between external endpoints and the TFD and internal network traffic exchanged between internal endpoints and the TFD. Metrics associated with the external network addresses or the internal network addresses may be determined based on the monitoring. Correlation scores may be provided for the external network addresses and the internal network addresses based on of a correlation model, the metrics, or the other metrics. If a correlation score associated with an external network address and an internal network address exceeds a threshold value, the external network address and the internal network address may be associated with each other based on the correlation score.

Correlating network traffic that crosses opaque endpoints

Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic using network monitoring computers (NMCs). Two or more network segments coupled by bridge devices may be monitored by NMCs. The bridge devices may modify network traffic passed from one network segment to another network segment. Flows in network segments may be determined based on monitored network traffic associated with the network segments. Other flows in other network segments may be determined based on other monitored network traffic associated with the other network segments. A correlation score for two or more flows in different network segments may be provided based on a correlation model. Two or more related flows may be determined based on a value of the correlation score of the two or more related flows located in different network segments. A report that includes information about the two or more related flows may be provided.

Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic over a network using one or more network monitoring computers. A monitoring engine may be instantiated to perform actions, including: monitoring network traffic to identify client requests provided by clients and server responses provided by servers in response to the client requests; determining request metrics associated with the client requests; and determining response metrics associated with the server responses. An analysis engine may be instantiated that performs actions, including: comparing the request metrics with the response metrics; determining atypical behavior associated with the clients based on the comparison such that the atypical behavior includes an absence of adaption by the clients to changes in the server responses; and providing alerts that may identify the clients be associated with the atypical behavior.

Detection of denial of service attacks

Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic in a network. A network monitoring engine may monitor networks to collect characteristics associated with network flows. The network monitoring engine may be arranged to identify entities on the network based on characteristics associated with the network flows. The network monitoring engine may provide entity profiles based on the identified entities and the characteristics. A configuration management engine may compare the entity profiles with configuration item (CI) entries in a database. The configuration management engine may provide discrepancy notices based on differences discovered during the comparison. Accordingly, the network monitoring engine may execute one or more policies to perform one or more additional actions based on the one or more discrepancies notices. Also, the configuration management engine may perform audits of an organization's information technology infrastructure to identify one or more violations of compliance policies.

Real-time configuration discovery and management

A method, apparatus, and system are directed toward managing network traffic over a plurality of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Level 2 switch ports. A network traffic is received over the plurality of OSI Level 2 switch ports. At least a part of the network traffic is categorized into a flow. The categorization may be based on a IP address, an OSI Level 4 port, a protocol type, a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) number, or the like, associated with the network traffic. One of the plurality of OSI Level 2 switch ports is selected based on a load-balancing metric. The load-balancing metric may be a priority of the flow, a congestion characteristic, a prediction of a load usage for the flow, a combination thereof, or the like. A frame associated with the flow is sent over the selected one of the plurality of OSI Level 2 switch ports.

Dynamic trunk distribution on egress

A method, system, and apparatus are directed towards enabling access to payload by a third -party sent over an SSL session. The third-party may be a proxy situated between a client and a server. SSL handshake messages are sent between the client and the server to establish the SSL connection. As the SSL handshake messages are routed through the proxy, the proxy may extract data. In addition, one of the client or the server may send another message within, or out-of-band to, the series of SSL handshake message directly to the proxy. The other SSL message may include secret data that the proxy may use to generate a session key the SSL connection. With the session key, the proxy may receive SSL messages over the SSL connection, modify and/or transpose the payload within the received SSL messages, and/or terminate the SSL connection at the proxy.

Accessing SSL connection data by a third-party

Embodiments are directed towards resynchronizing the processing of a monitored flow based on hole detection. A network monitoring device (NMD) may be employed to passively monitor flows of packets for a session between endpoints. The NMD may receive copies of the monitored flow and perform processes on the monitored flow. In some situations, some copies of packets may not be fully processed by the NMD, creating a hole in the processing. If a hole is detected in the monitored flow and the processing of the monitored flow is desynchronized, then the NMD may suspend processing until it is resynchronized or for a remainder of the session. If the processing is desynchronized, then the NMD may resynchronize the processing by resuming the processing of the monitored flow at a downstream position of the monitored flow based on the detected hole.

Resynchronization of passive monitoring of a flow based on hole detection

A system and method is directed to managing network communications and improving network security. In a communication protocol, an improved method of generating a value that encodes information received in an incoming message, and a corresponding way of validating an incoming message with an encoded value, improves network security. A technique for directing a network device to delay communications includes sending an instruction designating an initial window size of zero to the device. Another technique uses a TCP fast retransmit protocol. The techniques can be used to provide layer four switching, change to layer seven switching when desired, and then change back to layer four switching to improve security in a layer four switching device. Levels of trust can also be used to selectively perform aspects of the invention.

System and method for managing network communications

Embodiments are directed to monitoring communication over a network using a network monitoring device (NMD) to discover devices, roles, applications, and application dependencies present on the monitored networks. A NMD may monitor network packets that may be flowing on monitored networks. Using OSI L2-to-L3 data the NMD may determine the devices that may be on the monitored networks. Also, the NMD may determine the network protocols that may be in use on the monitored networks. Further, the NMD may reassemble monitored network packets into transactions based on knowledge regarding the network protocols are in use on the monitored networks. The NMD may perform various tests to determine the applications that may be running on the discovered devices. Some of the tests used by the NMD may examine OSI L4-L7 data that may be included in the transactions.

Automated passive discovery of applications

Embodiments are directed towards receiving packets communicated over at least one network, determining layer 3 header information for the received packets, normalizing the determined layer 3 header information for each received packet, employing a determined value based on the normalized layer 3 header information to detect each received packet that is a duplicate, disregarding duplicate packets, and enabling monitoring and analysis of at least selected flows that include packets that are determined to be non-duplicated. Also, if the determined layer 3 header information indicates that the received packet is fragmented, that packet is de-fragmented at least in accordance with a fragment offset. Additionally, normalization may include at least one of masking at least one value in the layer 3 header information, or rolling back changes in the layer 3 header information.

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Seattle, WA, United States of America

Arindum Mukerji