Vmware, Inc.

Tricipher, Inc.

Phoenix Technologies Ltd.

Kinglite Holdings Inc.

Andrew Paul Cottrell

Ravi Ganesan

Kyle Austin

Ravinderpal Sandhu

Brett Schoppert

Ravi Singh Sandhu

Mihir M Bellare

Timothy Scott Renshaw

A system for authenticating communication network users includes a user-associated user station communicatively coupled to an authenticating station via the communication network. The authenticating station is configured to authenticate the user and receive a first value, representing a first user credential, from the user station. A first key portion is generated based on the first value and a second value that is unknown to the user. The first key portion, along with a second key portion, is used for authenticating credentials of the user for a predefined period of time or for authenticating user credentials for a predefined number of times. The second key portion is generated based on the first key portion. A cookie that includes the second value or a value derived from the second value is generated and transmitted to the user station and then the second value is destroyed.

Augmented single factor split key asymmetric cryptography-key generation and distributor

Approaches that allow the context of an SMI task to be saved between SMIs. Upon entering an SMI handler for a task, a new task context stack is created. Thereafter, the SMI handler uses the task context, leaving the original stack unchanged. When the time limit for a single SMI is almost reached, the CPU is directed back to the original stack, and the task context stack persists in memory and retains the context of the task in hand. The soft SMI exits with an indication to signify that a new SMI should be invoked to continue processing. The entity that caused the first soft SMI then invokes another, passing in an indication to signify that this is a continuation of the prior task. On entering the SMI handler, the handler notes the request for continuation, switches to the saved task context stack and continues processing where it left off.

Approaches for meeting SMI duration limits by time slicing SMI handlers

To establish credentials, a user network station transmits a first value. An authenticating entity network station generates a first key portion based on the transmitted first value and a second value unknown to the user, splits one of a private key and a public key of a user asymmetric crypto-key into the first key portion and a second key portion, stores the second key portion of the one key so as to be accessible only to the authenticating entity network device, generates a cookie including the second value, transmits the generated cookie to the user network station, and destroys the transmitted first value, the second value, the one key, and the first key portion of the one key. The first value represents a first and the second value included in the transmitted cookie represents a second user credential useable to authenticate the user.

To authenticate a user of a communications network, credentials from the user are centrally receiving. An authentication sequence is retrieved from a plurality of retrievable authentication sequences, and the retrieved authentication sequence is performed to authenticate the user based on the received credentials.

Flexible and adjustable authentication in cyberspace

To authenticate a user having an associated asymmetric crypto-key having a private/public key pair (D,E) based on a one-time-password, the user partially signs a symmetric session key with the first portion Dof the private key D. The authenticating entity receives the partially signed symmetric session key via the network and completes the signature with the second private key portion Dto recover the symmetric session key. The user also encrypts a one-time-password with the symmetric session key. The authenticating entity also receives the encrypted one-time-password via the network, and decrypts the received encrypted one-time-password with the recovered symmetric session key to authenticate the user.

Protecting one-time-passwords against man-in-the-middle attacks

A user network station transmits a cookie that includes a user identifier and an augmenting factor transformed with one key of a first asymmetric crypto-key or with a symmetric crypto-key. An authenticating entity network station recovers the augmenting factor from the transformed augmenting factor included in the transmitted cookie, with the other key of the first asymmetric crypto-key or with the symmetric crypto-key, and transmits a customized login page corresponding to the user identifier. The user network station transmits a factor responsive to the transmitted customized login page. The authenticating entity network station generates a first key portion based on the transmitted factor and the recovered augmenting factor, and validates the generated first key portion based on a second key portion of one key of a second asymmetric crypto-key associated with the user and on the other key of the second asymmetric crypto-key, to thereby authenticate the user.

Secure login using augmented single factor split key asymmetric cryptography

A user network station transmits a cookie including a user identifier and an augmenting factor transformed with one key of a first asymmetric crypto-key or with a symmetric crypto-key. A authenticating entity network station recovers the augmenting factor from the transformed augmenting factor with the other key of the first asymmetric crypto-key or with the symmetric crypto-key, and transmits a customized login page corresponding to the user identifier included in the received cookie. The user network station transmits a factor responsive to the transmitted customized login page. The authenticating entity network station generates a first key portion based on the transmitted factor, and validates the generated first key portion based on a second key portion of one key of a second asymmetric crypto-key associated with the user and on the other key of the second asymmetric crypto-key, and the recovered augmenting factor, to thereby authenticate the user.

Secure login using single factor split key asymmetric cryptography and an augmenting factor

A method that allows the context of an SMI task to be saved between SMIs. Upon entering an SMI handler for a task that needs to be split up into shorter SMIs, a new task context stack is created in memory. From that point forward, the SMI handler uses the task context, leaving the original stack unchanged. When the time limit for a single SMI is about to be reached, the CPU is directed back to the original stack, and the task context stack persists in memory and retains the context of the task in hand. The soft SMI exits with a return code or other indication to signify that a new SMI should be invoked to continue processing. The driver or other software that caused the first soft SMI then invokes another, passing in a code or other indication to signify that this is a continuation of a previously started task. On entering the SMI handler for the second time, the handler notes the request for continuation, switches back to the saved task context stack and continues processing where it left off.

Growing community of inventors

San Jose, CA, United States of America

Andrew Paul Cottrell