Cryptography Research, Inc.

Fortanix, Inc.

Square, Inc.

Block, Inc.

Rambus Inc.

Andrew John Leiserson

Paul Carl Kocher

Mark Evan Marson

Megan Anneke Wachs

Jethro Gideon Beekman

Max Joseph Guise

Afshin Rezayee

Ambuj Kumar

Benjamin Che-Ming Jun

Michael Wells White

Dino Dai Zovi

Malcolm Smith

Todd A Aument

Sergei Mosends

Shane Hamilton

Anand Kashyap

Nehal Bandi

Benjamin Chen-Min Jun

Bruce Bell

Ralf M Schmitt

Christopher Gori

Daniel Robert Beitel

Joseph Inkenbrandt

Jeffrey Seyfried

Faisal Faruqui

Manas Agarwal

Ovidiu I Bota

Hai Lan

Lauren Gao

Ovidiu Bota

A wireless communication device such as a payment reader has a wireless communication interface and is able to establish wireless pairing with an interactive electronic device such as a merchant device running a point of sale application. In order to establish pairing, the wireless communication device accesses an identifier. The identifier is transmitted to the interactive electronic device via the wireless communication interface, and the interactive electronic device sends the identifier to a pairing server. The pairing server retrieves a passkey based on the identifier and sends the retrieved passkey to the interactive electronic device via a secure connection. The wireless communication device and the interactive electronic device establish wireless pairing based on the retrieved passkey.

Server-assisted pairing for wireless communications

A mechanism for providing secure feature and key management in integrated circuits is described. An example integrated circuit includes a secure memory to store a secret key, and a security manager core, coupled to the secure memory, to receive a digitally signed command, verify a signature associated with the command using the secret key, and configure operation of the integrated circuit using the command.

Secure feature and key management in integrated circuits

A payment terminal may include payment interfaces to receive payment information from payment devices. The payment interfaces can include an interface configured to receive a payment card. Monitoring components may monitor the payment interfaces. In addition, a detection signal can be provided while a payment card is communicatively coupled to its corresponding payment interface. The monitored information and the detection signal may be used by the payment terminal to determine whether a transaction is fraudulent or if a tamper attempt is ongoing, based on local test criteria. In addition, the monitored information and detection signal may be provided to a server, which may store the monitored information and detection signal, test for fraudulent transactions and tamper attempts based on server test criteria, and determine updates to the local test criteria.

Detecting for fraud and tampering at a payment terminal

A cryptographic accelerator (processor) retrieves data blocks for processing from a memory. These data blocks arrive and are stored in an input buffer in the order they were stored in memory (or other known order)—typically sequentially according to memory address (i.e., in-order.) The processor waits until a certain number of data blocks are available in the input buffer and then randomly selects blocks from the input buffer for processing. This randomizes the processing order of the data blocks. The processing order of data blocks may be randomized within sets of data blocks associated with a single read transaction, or across sets of data blocks associated with multiple read transactions.

Buffer access for side-channel attack resistance

A method of and system for gate-level masking of secret data during a cryptographic process is described. A mask share is determined, wherein a first portion of the mask share includes a first number of zero-values and a second number of one-values, and a second portion of the mask share includes the first number of one-values and the second number of zero-values. Masked data values and the first portion of the mask share are input into a first portion of masked gate logic, and the masked data values and the second portion of the mask share are input into a second portion of the masked gate logic. A first output from the first portion of the masked gate logic and a second output from the second portion of the masked gate logic are identified, wherein either the first output or the second output is a zero-value.

Masked gate logic for resistance to power analysis

The technology disclosed herein enables a method to receive an indication of a change to an operating mode of a device from a first operating mode to a second operating mode, and identify a cryptographic item stored at a memory of the device, wherein the cryptographic item corresponds to an identification of the device signed with a digital signature, and wherein the digital signature is based on a private key that is inaccessible to the device. On response to receiving the indication of the change to the operating mode of the device, the method can modify the cryptographic item stored at the memory, and operate the device in the second operating mode based on the modified cryptographic item. The indication of the change to the operating mode of the device can correspond to a detection of a change in a function of the device.

Erasing a cryptographic hem in a memory of a device in response to a change of an operating mode of the device

An application may perform operations within a first secure enclave of a processing device. The application may provide secure monitoring data, such as secure heartbeat information. The monitoring data and an application identity may be verified at a second secure enclave of the processing device using local attestation operations. A remote attestation signature may be generated at the second secure enclave based on the monitoring data, the application identity, and a node private key. A monitoring message signature may be generated at the first secure enclave based on an application private key and a message payload that includes the monitoring data, the application identity, and the remote attestation signature. A monitoring message that includes the payload and monitoring message signature may be sent from the first secure enclave to a monitoring system, which may verify the message to detect unauthorized changes to the monitoring data or the application identity.

Secure heartbeat monitoring

In some examples, a system and method for pairing a payment object reader with a point-of-sale (POS) terminal is described herein. The payment object reader includes one or more light indicators configured to display information in an optical pattern of one or more colors, brightness, lightness, and intensities, wherein the light indicators display a first optical pattern representative of an operational status of the payment object reader in a first mode, and a second optical pattern representative of a pairing code in a second mode. A display control component, executed by a processor, is configured to control the light indicators in accordance with the pairing code to generate the second optical pattern, the second optical pattern when shared with the POS terminal enables pairing between the payment object reader and the POS terminal. When paired, the payment object reader allows the POS terminal to accept payments from a customer.

Pairing a payment object reader with a point-of-sale terminal

A payment terminal may include payment interfaces to receive payment information from payment devices such as chip cards and NFC payment devices. Monitoring components may monitor these payment interfaces. In addition, test requests may be transmitted to a payment device in order to elicit responses. The monitored information and the responses may be used by the payment terminal to determine whether a transaction is fraudulent or if a tamper attempt is ongoing, based on local test criteria. In addition, the monitored information and responses may be provided to a server, which may store the monitored information and responses, test for fraudulent transactions and tamper attempts based on server test criteria, and determine updates to the local test criteria.

Physical and logical detections for fraud and tampering

An encrypted file system key associated with a first secure enclave may be received. A request from a second secure enclave to access a file system associated with the encrypted file system key may be received. In response to receiving the request, the encrypted file system key may be decrypted with a cryptographic key associated with an enclave manager to obtain a file system key. The file system key may be encrypted based on another cryptographic key associated with the second secure enclave to generate a re-encrypted file system key. Furthermore, the re-encrypted file system key may be provided to the second secure enclave.

Encrypted data key management

A request to provide an application at a secure enclave of a server may be received. A hash value of the application may be generated. Application data that is to be used with the application at the secure enclave of the server may be identified. Another hash value of the application data that is to be used with the application at the secure enclave of the server may be generated. The hash value of the application and the other hash value of the application data may be signed where the signed hash value and other hash are being used to execute the application with the application data at the secure enclave of the server.

Securing data integrity for an application

A network service may be identified. One or more attributes of the network service may be determined. An attribute manifest for the network service may be generated based on the determined one or more attributes of the network service. Furthermore, the attribute manifest may be transmitted based on the determined one or more attributes to the network service.

Providing attributes of a network service

A wireless communication device such as a payment reader has a wireless communication interface and is able to establish wireless pairing with an interactive electronic device such as a merchant device running a point of sale application. In order to establish pairing, the wireless communication device accesses a passkey and encrypts the passkey. The encrypted passkey is transmitted to the interactive electronic device via the wireless communication interface, and the interactive electronic device sends the encrypted passkey to a pairing server. The pairing server decrypts the encrypted passkey and sends the decrypted passkey back to the interactive electronic device via a secure connection. The wireless communication device and the interactive electronic device establish wireless pairing based on the passkey and the decrypted passkey.

Growing community of inventors

San Francisco, CA, United States of America

Andrew John Leiserson