Mcafee, Inc.

Andrew A Furtak

Yuriy Bulygin

Igor G Muttik

Alex Nayshtut

Oleksandr Bazhaniuk

Joel Robert Spurlock

Carl D Woodward

Cedric Cochin

Craig D Schmugar

Roman Dementiev

Christiaan Beek

Yury Bulygin

Oleksander Bazhaniuk

Ronald Gallella

Gregory Michael Heitzmann

Adam James Carrivick

John J Loucaides

Ravi L Sahita

Gideon Gerzon

Ofer Levy

Hisham Shafi

Sameer Desai

Mikhail V Gorobets

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to allow for the mitigation of ransomware. For example, the system can determine that an application begins to execute, determine that the application attempts to modify a file, determine a file type for the file, and create a security event if the application is not authorized to modify the file type. In another example, the system determines an entropy value between the file and the attempted modification of the file, and create a security event if the entropy value satisfies a threshold or determine a system entropy value that includes a rate at which other files on the system are being modified by the application, and create a security event if the system entropy value satisfies a threshold.

Mitigation of ransomware

Methods, apparatus, systems, and articles of manufacture are disclosed for dynamic re-distribution of detection content and algorithms for exploit detection. An example apparatus includes at least one processor, and memory including instructions that, when executed, cause the at least one processor to deploy respective ones of a plurality of standard detection algorithms and content (SDACs) to respective ones of a first endpoint and a second endpoint, deploy a first set of enhanced detection algorithms and content (EDACs) to the first endpoint, deploy a second set of the EDACs to the second endpoint, the second set of EDACs different from the first set of EDACs, and in response to obtaining a notification indicative of an exploit attack from the first endpoint, distribute the first set of EDACs to the second endpoint to facilitate detection of the exploit attack at the second endpoint.

Dynamic re-distribution of detection content and algorithms for exploit detection

In an embodiment, a processor for Return Oriented Programming (ROP) detection includes at least one execution unit; a plurality of event counters, each event counter associated with a unique type of a plurality of types of control transfer events; and a ROP detection unit. The ROP detection unit may be to: adjust a first event counter in response to detection of a first type of control transfer events; in response to a determination that the first event counter exceeds a first threshold, access a first configuration register associated with the first event counter to read configuration data; identify a set of ROP heuristic checks based on the configuration data read from the first configuration register; and perform each ROP heuristic check of the identified set of ROP heuristic checks. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Detection of return oriented programming attacks in a processor

A predetermined standard set of detection algorithms and content and a selected set of enhanced detection algorithms and content provide an improved technique for detecting security exploits. The detection algorithms and content are executed on a Platform Exploit Detection Module. Standard detection algorithms and content are deployed across all endpoints. Enhanced detection algorithms and content are selected from an available set of enhanced detection algorithms and content to improve detection capability without the performance impacts of deploying every enhanced detection algorithm and content on every endpoint. A network of endpoints may deploy an entire set of detection algorithms and content across all endpoints, with individual endpoints configured to with different subsets of the enhanced detection algorithms and content.

A technique allows for memory bounds checking for dynamically generated code by using transactional memory support in a processor. The memory bounds checking includes creating output code, identifying read-only memory regions in the output code and creating a map that is provided to a security monitoring thread. The security monitoring thread executes as a transaction and determines if a transactional conflict occurs to the read-only memory region during parallel execution of a monitored thread in the output code.

Real-time code and data protection via CPU transactional memory suppport

Real-time code and data protection via CPU transactional memory support

Growing community of inventors

Beaverton, OR, United States of America

Andrew A Furtak