Emc IP Holding Company LLC

Dell Products Inc.

Amos Zamir

Kfir Wolfson

Jehuda Shemer

Oron Golan

Naor Radami

Aviram Fireberger

Stav Sapir

Ofir Ezrielev

Yevgeni Gehtman

Raul Shnier

Udi Shemer

Shoham Levy

Techniques are provided for inter-domain access using an identity provider. One method comprises receiving, by a first domain, a request from a device of a second domain, different than the first domain, that requires the first domain to perform an operation on the second domain; providing, by the first domain, in response to the received request, (i) an access identifier, (ii) a destination identifier of the first domain and (iii) a redirection instruction, wherein the redirection instruction redirects the device to an identity provider associated with the second domain to validate the device, and wherein the second domain, in response to the device being validated, generates an access token; receiving, by the first domain, from the second domain, using the destination identifier of the first domain, the access token and the access identifier; and performing, by the first domain, the operation on the second domain using the access token.

Inter-domain access using identity provider

Methods and systems for managing access to data stored in data storage systems are disclosed. To prevent malicious parties from gaining access to sensitive data stored in a data storage system, an access control system may be implemented. The access control system may include a registration process that assigns cryptographic key pairs to registered combinations of users and devices. The combinations may include an end device, a user of the end device, and an auxiliary device associated with the end device (e.g., a display device). When an end device requests sensitive data, the requesting device (e.g., end device), an associated user, and an associated display device may be authenticated using the key pairs generated during registration. The sensitive data may be encrypted pre-transit using device-specific encryption (e.g., using a public key of the display device) to protect sensitive data from malicious parties that may gain access to the end device.

System and method for data access management using auxiliary devices

Methods and systems for managing access to data stored in data storage systems are disclosed. An end device and/or user thereof may require access to sensitive data of varying sensitivity levels stored in a data storage system. To prevent malicious parties from gaining access to the sensitive data, an access control system may be implemented. The access control system may include a registration process that registers end device and user combinations and assigns cryptographic key pairs to each registered combination. The key pairs may be generated using information specific to the sensitivity level of the data and managed using a key tree structure. Before sensitive data may be accessed, a requesting device and its associated user may be authenticated using the key pairs generated during registration. The sensitive data may be encrypted using sensitivity level and device-specific encryption.

System and method for data access management using encryption based on data sensitivity levels

Presented herein are systems and methods for enabling and providing safe and secure last resort access to a computing system. Embodiments may leverage trusted platform modules that exists in information handling systems to provide a more convenient and more secure rescue account. In one or more embodiments, the last resort access may be based on federated approval from a vendor/provider and a customer. In one or more embodiments, part of the cryptographic information is stored/controlled by a provisioner (or vendor), and another part is stored/controlled by the customer. Since both parts are involved in the last resort access process in order to gain access, neither entity alone can gain access to the information handling system.

Last resort safe schema

Masking a data rate of transmitted data is disclosed. As data is transmitted from a production site to a secondary site, the data rate is masked. Masking the data rate can include transmitting at a fixed rate, a random rate, or an adaptive rate. Each mode of data transmission masks or obscures the actual data rate and thus prevents others from gaining information about the data or the data owner from the data transfer rate.

Zero-knowledge protection for side channels in data protection to the cloud

Systems and methods for protecting data including user data. A recommendation service is disclosed that receives verifiable claims from a user. A verifiable output is generated from the verifiable claims. The verifiable output can be provided to service providers and allows the service providers to personalize their services to the user. The user's data is protected and exposure of the user's data is controlled by the user.

Anonymous ranking service

One example method includes packaging a containerized application into at least two images. The first image may include the main application and the second image includes a decryptor. Sensitive information associated with the application is encrypted and included in the second image. The decryptor operates separately from the main application. After the decryptor successfully completes, the main application is run. The main application may include a copier layer to copy any data decrypted by the decryptor into the main application.

Optimizing container image encryption

One example method includes inserting a signal layer in an image, the signal layer indicating that a sensitive layer in the image is a candidate for encryption, creating a single layer archive file that includes the sensitive layer, encrypting the single layer archive file to create an encrypted layer, constructing a new image that includes the encrypted layer, inserting, in the new image, a decryptor layer that is operable to decrypt the encrypted layer, and designating the decryptor layer as an entry point of the new image.

Optimizing docker image encryption-tradeoff between performance and protection level

Optimizing docker image encryption&#x2014;tradeoff between performance and protection level

One example method includes bringing up a clone application in a validation environment, replaying recorded incoming network traffic to the clone application, obtaining a response of the clone application to the incoming network traffic, comparing the response of the clone application to recorded outgoing network traffic of the production application, and making a validation determination regarding the clone application, based on the comparison of the response of the clone application to recorded outgoing network traffic of the production application. When the clone application is not validated, the example method includes identifying and resolving a problem relating to the clone application.

Automatic copy validation using real-world application traffic

Embodiments for detecting malicious modification of data in a network, by: setting, by a first layer of network resources, a number of markers associated with input/output (I/O) operations of the network; saving the markers, location, and associated metadata in a marker database; reading, by a second layer of the network resources, the markers corresponding to relevant I/O operations; and verifying each scanned I/O operation against a corresponding marker to determine whether or not data for a scanned specific I/O operation has been improperly modified for the first and second layers and any intermediate layer resulting in a fault condition, and if so, taking remedial action to flag or abort the specific I/O operation.

Malicious data manipulation detection using markers and the data protection layer

Network level Moving Target Defense techniques are provided with substantially continuous access to protected applications. An exemplary method comprises identifying a first application listening to a first port or a first network address; notifying the first application to listen to a second port or a second network address; notifying at least one additional application that the first application is listening to the second port or the second network address; and notifying the first application to unlisten to the first port or the first network address, wherein the first application operates in a substantially continuous manner during a change from listening to one or more of the first port and the first network address and listening to one or more of the second port and the second network address. The first application can be a stateful application having persistent storage.

Moving target defense with network level changes providing substantially continuous access to applications

A plurality of containers related to one or more containerized applications are managed by monitoring an execution of the one or more containers; determining that a given one of the one or more containers exhibits anomalous behavior; and in response to the determining, adjusting a retention time of the given container, wherein the retention time of the given container determines when the given container is one or more of terminated and changes role to a honeypot container. The anomalous behavior comprises, for example, the given container exhibiting behavior that is different than a learned baseline model of the given container or including program code consistent with malicious activity. An alert notification of the anomalous behavior is optionally generated. The retention time of the given container can be adjusted for example, to an interval between deployment of the given container and the time the anomalous behavior is detected.

Container life cycle management with retention rate adjustment based on detected anomalies

A tracing mechanism is provided for analyzing session-based attacks. An exemplary method comprises: detecting a potential attack associated with a session from a potential attacker based on predefined anomaly detection criteria; adding a tracing flag identifier to a response packet; sending a notification to a cloud provider of the potential attack, wherein the notification comprises the tracing flag identifier; and sending the response packet to the potential attacker, wherein, in response to receiving the response packet with the tracing flag identifier, the cloud provider: determines a source of the potential attack based on a destination of the response packet; forwards the response packet to the potential attacker based on the destination of the response packet; and monitors the determined source to evaluate the potential attack. The response packet is optionally delayed by a predefined time duration and/or until the cloud provider has acknowledged receipt of the notification.

Growing community of inventors

Beer Sheva, Israel

Amos Zamir