Cryptography Research, Inc.

Fortanix, Inc.

Nvidia Corporation

Rambus Inc.

Ambuj Kumar

Benjamin Che-Ming Jun

William Craig Rawlings

Anand Kashyap

Mark Evan Marson

Daniel Robert Beitel

Paul Carl Kocher

Ronald Perez

Michael Alexander Hamburg

Jethro Gideon Beekman

Denis Alexandrovich Pochuev

Tony Yuhsiang Cheng

Sharath Raghava

Andrew John Leiserson

Megan Anneke Wachs

Philippe Alain Martineau

Venkata Ramana Malladi

Arunjit Sahni

Paul Lam

Faisal Faruqui

Roy Gideon Moss

Nehal Bandi

Brian K Langendorf

Mark Alan Overby

Helena Handschuh

Daniel O'Loughlin

Christopher Gori

Jeffrey Seyfried

Lauren Gao

Savvas Savvides

Richard Searle

A system disclosed herein may receive, from an application associated with a client identification, a request to perform a cryptographic operation with a specified application key, identify a gateway associated with the client identification, identify a respective characteristic of each self-encrypting key management service of a plurality of self-encrypting key management services that correspond to the gateway, identify a self-encrypting key management service with a characteristic satisfying a threshold criterion, and send the request to the identified self-encrypting key management service.

Self-encrypting key management system

A container corresponding to executable code may be received. In response to receiving the container, a container manager resident in a memory of a computation environment may be executed to verify the container. The container manager may be verified by a boot loader of the computation environment. Permissions of the container to access the resources of a computation environment may be determined after the verification of the container by the container manager. Access to one or more resources of the computation environment may be provided by transferring control to the one or more resources from the container manager to the container based on the permissions of the container for the resources of the computation environment.

Secure computation environment

A request to execute an application at a secure cryptographic environment of a server may be received. A tag that has been assigned to the application may be received. An attribute of the server may be identified. A determination may be made as to whether the attribute of the server satisfies the tag that has been assigned to the application. In response to determining that the attribute of the server satisfies the tag that has been assigned to the application, an indication may be provided to execute the application at the secure cryptographic environment of the server.

Geo-fencing of an application for a secure cryptographic environment

A container corresponding to executable code may be received. The container may be executed in a secure computation environment by performing one or more operations specified by the executable code of the container. An instruction to terminate the executing of the container may be received from a high level operating system (HLOS) that is external to the secure computation environment. A determination may be made as to whether the container is associated with a preemption privilege and the executing of the container may be terminated after receiving the instruction from the HLOS based on the determination of whether the container is associated with the preemption privilege.

Preemption of a container in a secure computation environment

A symmetric key that is stored at a device may be received. A public key from a remote entity may also be received at the device. Furthermore, a derived key may be generated based on a one way function between the symmetric key that is stored at the device and the public key that is received from the remote entity. The derived key may be encrypted with the public key and transmitted to the remote entity. The encryption of the derived key with the public key may provide secure transmission of the derived key to an authorized remote entity with a private key that may be used to decrypt the encrypted derived key.

Diversifying a base symmetric key based on a public key

A base key that is stored at a device may be received. A network identification may further be received. A device identification key may be generated based on a combination of the network identification and the base key. Furthermore, the device identification key may be used to authenticate the device with a network that corresponds to the network identification.

Generating a device identification key from a base key for authentication with a network

Values and a sequence of operations associated with generating a key may be received. A determination may be made as to whether the sequence of operations associated with the key matches an authorized sequence of operations. The key may be outputted when the received sequence of operations matches the authorized sequence of operations and the key may not be outputted when the received sequence of operations does not match the authorized sequence of operations.

Outputting a key based on an authorized sequence of operations

A request associated with one or more privileges assigned to a first entity may be received. Each of the one or more privileges may correspond to an operation of an integrated circuit. Information corresponding to the first entity and stored in a memory that is associated with the integrated circuit may be identified. Furthermore, the memory may be programmed to modify the information stored in the memory that is associated with the integrated circuit in response to the request associated with the one or more privileges assigned to the first entity.

Managing privileges of different entities for an integrated circuit

A first instruction to store an entity identification (ID) in a memory of a device may be received. The entity ID may be stored in the memory in response to receiving the first instruction. Furthermore, a second instruction to store a value based on a key in the memory of the device may be received. A determination may be made as to whether the value based on the key that is to be stored in the memory corresponds to the entity ID that is stored in the memory. The value based on the key may be stored in the memory of the device when the value based on the key corresponds to the entity ID.

Secure data provisioning

A first entity may provide a request to transmit data from the first entity to a second entity. The first entity may receive a session key from the second entity in response to the request where the session key is encrypted by a second key that is based on a combination of a public key and a location associated with the second entity. A location associated with the first entity may be identified. Furthermore, a first key may be generated based on a combination of the location associated with the first entity and a private key that corresponds to the public key. The first key may decrypt data encrypted by the second key when the location associated with the first entity corresponds to the location associated with the second entity.

Location aware cryptography

Encrypted first data and encrypted second data may be received, where each data is from different client servers. A request to perform an operation with the first data and the second data may be received. Whether the operation is authorized to be performed with the first data and the second data at an enclave may be verified. In response to verifying that the operation is authorized to be performed with the first data and the second data at the enclave, the encrypted first data and the encrypted second data may be decrypted to the first data and the second data, respectively. Furthermore, the operation may be performed with the first data and the second data at the enclave.

Secure computation of multiparty data

An encrypted search query may be received from a requesting client system at a secure enclave of a processing device. The encrypted search query may be decrypted to form a decrypted search query. One or more index entries of a metadata index that correspond to the decrypted search query may be identified, such that each identified index entry is associated with a content reference that identifies a content item located outside the secure enclave. The index entries that correspond to the decrypted search query may include one or more index entries having one or more associated index metadata items that correspond to the decrypted search query. One or more secure search results may be generated, such that each secure search result corresponds to one of the index entries and comprises the content reference associated with the corresponding index entry. The secure search results may be sent to the requesting client system.

Secure search service

A secret key value that is inaccessible to software is scrambled according to registers consisting of one-time programmable (OTP) bits. A first OTP register is used to change the scrambling of the secret key value whenever a lifecycle event occurs. A second OTP register is used to undo the change in the scrambling of the secret key. A third OTP register is used to affect a permanent change to the scrambling of the secret key. The scrambled values of the secret key (whether changed or unchanged) are used as seeds to produce keys for cryptographic operations by a device.

Cryptographic management of lifecycle states

A base key that is stored at a mobile device may be received. A first dynamic key that is based on the base key may be generated. First transaction data corresponding to a first transaction associated with the mobile device may be received. Furthermore, the first dynamic key may be updated to generate a second dynamic key based on a combination of the first dynamic key and the first transaction data corresponding to the first transaction. Authentication of a second transaction associated with the mobile device may be requested based on the second dynamic key.

Generating a cryptographic key based on transaction data of mobile payments

A method may include obtaining, by a processing device, a workflow object that includes a plurality of workflow entity objects and one or more data objects, and executing a workflow by identifying, from the application objects, an application object that corresponds to a first application, wherein the workflow associates the application with at least one of the data objects, determining, whether the first application has permission to access the data object according to a data policy associated with the data object, wherein the data policy specifies one or more data access criteria, wherein the first application has permission to access the data object in response to one or more of the workflow entity objects that are associated with the data object satisfying the data access criteria, and responsive to determining that the first application has permission to access the data object, executing the first application in a secure enclave.

Growing community of inventors

Sunnyvale, CA, United States of America

Ambuj Kumar