International Business Machines Corporation

Allen Leonid Roginsky

Nevenko Zunic

Mohammad Peyravian

Stephen Michael Matyas, Jr

Vijay Srinivasan

Gerald Arnold Marin

Raif O Onvural

Charles Steven Lingafelt

Per Erwin Jonas

Clark Debs Jeffries

Claude R Galand

Jeffrey Haskell Derby

Norman Clark Strole

Jeffrey Scott Bardsley

Kevin David Himberger

John E Drake, Jr

Kenneth J Christensen

Levent Gun

Nathaniel Wook Kim

Theodore E Tedijanto

Steven Eric Polge

Phillip Singleton

An improved methodology and implementing computer system are provided in which sensitive information is selectively masked in order to enable such information to be relatively securely and efficiently transmitted over networks without disclosure of such sensitive information at a transmitting or receiving terminal, or at points along the data transmission network.

Hiding sensitive information

Method, system, and program product for port based authentication protocols where addresses are dynamically assigned within a network environment, and more particularly to port based authentication in the network environment, where connection information is captured and stored. This facilitates administrator access to information created as a result of protocol exchanges involved in dynamic address assignment, authentication, and connection.

Control of port based authentication protocols and process to support transfer of connection information

A system to exchange and authenticate public cryptographic keys between parties that share a common but secret password, using a pair of random numbers, a pair of Diffie-Hellman public keys computed from the random numbers and the password, a Diffie-Hellman symmetric secret key computed from the Diffie-Hellman public keys and the random numbers, and hashed values of arguments that depend upon these elements.

Distribution and authentication of public keys using random numbers and diffie-hellman public keys

A method to distribute and authenticate public encryption keys. A client concatenates its ID, its public key, and a secret password known to the client and a server, and hashes the result. The client forms an extended concatenation including the ID, the public key, and the hashed value, and sends the extended concatenation to the server. The server reads the ID and public key, and re-computes the hashed value based on its own knowledge of the password. If the received and the computed hashed values are the same, the server concludes that the client's public key is authentic. An analogous process enables the server to distribute its public key, and enables the client to authenticate the server's distributed public key.

Method for distributing and authenticating public keys using hashed password protection

A method, apparatus, and computer instructions for providing a current and complete security compliance view of an enterprise system. The present invention provides the ability to gain a real-time security posture and security compliance view of an enterprise and to assess the risk impact of known threats and attacks to continued business operations at various levels is provided. Responsive to a change to an enterprise environment, a request, or an external threat, an administrator loads or updates at least one of a Critical Application Operations database, a Historical database, an Access Control database, a Connectivity database, and a Threat database. Based on a comparison of information in the databases against similar security data elements from company or external policies, the administrator may generate a Security Compliance view of the enterprise. A Security Posture view may also be generated by comparing the Security Compliance view against data in the Threat database.

Method of assuring enterprise security standards compliance

A method to exchange and authenticate public cryptographic keys between parties that share a common but secret password. The parties exchange public keys, where the public keys are accompanied by hashed values based on the keys, the password, and random numbers. Each party then encrypts its random number using the public key of the other party, and the encryptions are exchanged. Based on the received encryptions and the known password, each party then re-computes the hashed value received from the other party, and compares the re-computed hashed value with the received hashed value. If the two are the same, the public key that accompanied the hashed value is judged authentic.

Method for distributing and authenticating public keys using time ordered exchanges

A method for protecting data for access by a plurality of users. A server encrypts data using a master key and a symmetric encryption algorithm. For each authorized user, a key encryption key (KEK) is derived from a passphrase, and the master key is encrypted using the KEK. The server posts the encrypted data and an ancillary file that includes, for each user, a user identifier and the master key encrypted according to the user's KEK. To access the data, a user enters the passphrase into a client, which re-derives the user's KEK, and finds, in the ancillary file, the master key encrypted using the user's KEK. The client decrypts the master key and then decrypts the data. A KEK may be derived from a natural language passphrase by hashing the passphrase, concatenating the result and a predetermined text, hashing the concatenation, and truncating.

Encrypting data for access by multiple users

A method, system and apparatus are described for ensuring a uniform random distribution of keys generated for cryptography. These generated keys, are depicted utilizing a trusted third party, or Certification Authority (CA) in the generation of a reliable seed to be used in the generation of prime numbers used in public key cryptography. The inclusion of the trusted third party allows for an independent third party to police against first party attacks on the security of the system without increasing the overhead of the system significantly.

Method, system and apparatus for ensuring a uniform distribution in key generation

A method for time stamping a digital document employs a two-part time stamp receipt. The first part of the time stamp receipt includes identifying data associated with a document and a nonce. The second part of the time stamp receipt includes a time indication and the nonce. The nonce serves as a link between the first and second parts.

Time stamping method employing multiple receipts linked by a nonce

A method for time stamping a digital document is disclosed. The document originator creates a time stamp receipt using the document and the current time. The time stamp receipt is submitted to a time stamping authority having a trusted clock. The time stamping authority validates the time stamp receipt by comparing the time value specified in the time stamp receipt to the current time. If the time value specified in the time stamp receipt is within a predetermined time window, the time stamping authority cryptographically binds the time value and document, or the time value and some representation of the document, e.g., by signing the time stamp receipt with its private signature key.

Time stamping method employing user specified time

A time stamping protocol has two stages referred to as the ticketing stage and the certification stage. During the ticketing stage, the document or other identifying data is sent to the TSA. The TSA generates a 'ticket' based on the document or other identifying data and a time indication derived from a trusted clock. The ticket, which serves as an unsigned time stamp receipt, is transmitted back to the document originator. During the certification stage, the holder of the ticket requests a certified time stamp receipt by presenting the ticket to the TSA. The TSA verifies the ticket and generates a signed time stamp receipt, called the ticket stub, which is then transmitted back to the document originator. The ticket stub serves as a 'universal time-stamp' that the holder of the ticket stub can use to prove the date of the document.

Time stamping method employing a separate ticket and stub

A method to exchange and authenticate public cryptographic keys between parties that share a common but secret password, using a pair of random numbers, a pair of Diffie-Hellman public keys computed from the random numbers and the password, a Diffie-Hellman symmetric secret key computed from the Diffie-Hellman public keys and the random numbers, and hashed values of arguments that depend upon these elements.

Method for distributing and authenticating public keys using random numbers and Diffie-Hellman public keys

Methods, systems and computer program products are provide for controlling access to software is provided by the software to be controlled being divided into a first encrypted portion and a second unencrypted portion. The second unencrypted portion has access to, and may even incorporate, a first secret value and a software identification associated with a copy of the software. The first encrypted portion is encrypted with a first key value which is based on the first secret value and a second secret value. The second secret value is obtained and the first key value generated from the obtained second secret value and the first secret value. The first encrypted portion of the software may then be decrypted with the first key value. The software may be installed on a data processing system utilizing the decrypted first encrypted portion of the software.

Growing community of inventors

Durham, NC, United States of America

Allen Leonid Roginsky