Novatel Inc.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, As Represented by the Minister of National Defence

Other

Uti Limited Partnership

Ali Broumandan

Gerard Lachapelle

John Nielsen

Gérard Lachapelle

James T Curran

Thomas Taylor

A system and method for detecting spoofing of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) system using a plurality of antennas. Signals received by at least two of the plurality of antennas are authentication by use of one or more of a carrier phase authentication procedure, a signal power authentication procedure, and/or a channel distortion authentication procedure.

System and method for detecting spoofing of global navigation satellite system signals using a plurality of antennas

A system and method for detecting spoofing of a navigation system (NS) using a plurality of antennas. Carrier phase and CNmeasurements are obtains of a plurality of signals. The measurements are then double differenced and compared to predefined thresholds to determine whether a signal is authentic or not. Once sufficient authentic signals are identified, position and time is determined using the authenticated signals. Residuals are estimated for all signals. An average value of the residuals or the authenticated signals is calculated and is then removed from the residuals of the unauthenticated signals. Should the remainder exceed a predefined threshold, the signal is deemed to be spoofed. Otherwise, the signal is deemed to be authentic.

System and method for navigation system spoofing detection using a plurality of antennas

A system and method for detecting spoofing of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals using a single antenna is provided.

System and method for detecting spoofing of global navigation satellite system signals using a single antenna

Techniques are provided for GNSS carrier phase multipath mitigation using a blanked correlator in conjunction with a full correlator. A tracking loop may track a carrier of the GNSS signal utilizing the full correlator. A chip-edge accumulation (CEA) unit of the tracking loop may accumulate chip edges of a ranging code to generate CEA output. A blanked correlator may receive the CEA output to generate blanked correlator values. A running-sum filter may utilize the blanked correlator values to generate a running-sum value. A phase estimate may utilize the running-sum value to generate phase estimator output. In an exemplary embodiment, the blanked correlator operates as a monitoring correlator and the phases estimator output is the estimated carrier phase multipath error. In an exemplary embodiment, the blanked correlator provides input to the tracking loop and discriminator output is subtracted from the phase estimator output to generate the estimated carrier phase multipath error.

Systems and methods for GNSS carrier phase multipath mitigation using a blanked correlator in conjunction with a full correlator

Structures and techniques are disclosed that can be used to reduce or remove code multipath error in GNSS receivers by implementing one or more monitoring correlators in a multipath-error estimation and correction (MEC) module. The MEC module detects and provides for correction of correlation peak distortion. In exemplary embodiments, a code tracking loop integrates all-chip-edges of a PRN, and a narrow-correlator is used to update the tracking loop rate while a multipath estimation module implements a blanked correlator to estimate and remove the multipath bias from the code tracking loop measurements.

GNSS correlation distortion detection and mitigation

Systems and methods for detecting spoofed or illegitimate GNSS signals. A processor receives GNSS data and processes this data to extract acceleration, angular velocity, and height or altitude variation data. For the same time period, sensor data from IMU (inertial measurement unit) sensors and from a barometer are received by the processor. From the sensor data, the processor extracts similar acceleration, angular velocity, and height variation data. These two sets of data are then correlated and correlation coefficients are calculated. These correlation coefficients are then used to calculate a decision statistic. The decision statistic is compared with a predetermined value and, if the decision statistic is below a predetermined value, then the GNSS data is considered to be illegitimate or spoofed.

Detection of spoofed GNSS signals using IMU and barometer sensors

Systems and methods related to the detection of incoming wireless signals. An antenna array is synthesized by having a single antenna, coupled to a receiver, spatially translated along an arbitrary trajectory. As the antenna is being spatially translated, a data processing means samples the incoming signal based on a clock signal provided by a system clock. By sampling the incoming signal at different times at different spatial locations on the arbitrary trajectory, the system acts as a synthetic antenna array. The different samplings of the incoming signal at different times and positions provide signal diversity gain as well as different readings which can be used to detect an incoming signal. The invention is applicable to detecting a wireless communications signal or a GNSS signal under various conditions. The system may include at least one sensor which can provide data for use in calculating data related to the arbitrary trajectory.

Signal detection in fading environments

A system for estimating parameters of an incoming signal is provided. At least one antenna is coupled to at least one suitable receiver. The antenna(s) are spatially translated in an arbitrary trajectory. As the antenna(s) is being spatially translated, a data processing means samples the incoming signal at set intervals based on a clock signal provided by a system clock. By sampling the incoming signal at different times at different spatial locations on the arbitrary trajectory, the system acts as a synthetic antenna array. The different samplings of the incoming signal at different times and positions provide signal diversity gain as well as different readings which can be used to estimate and/or calculate various parameters of the incoming signal. The different samplings can be used to detect the incoming signal, estimate its angle of arrival, estimate its time of arrival, as well as other parameters.

Handheld synthetic antenna array

Methods and systems for detecting GNSS signals originating from an inauthentic source. A synthetic array using a receiver antenna which is randomly spatially translated may be used to gather alleged GNSS signals. The signals are then processed to determine the spatial correlation between them. A high spatial correlation between the signals indicates a probable inauthentic source for the GNSS signals.

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Calgary, Canada

Ali Broumandan