Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Alexander Nikolavich Moshchuk

Jiahe Helen Wang

David Alexander Molnar

Tadayoshi Kohno

Franziska Roesner

Helen Jiahe Wang

Eyal Ofek

Benjamin Livshits

Alan M Dunn

Douglas Christopher Burger

Yunxin Liu

Margus Veanes

Bryan Jeffrey Parno

Lior Shapira

Ran Gal

Timothy Scott Saponas

Loris D'Antoni

Blair MacIntyre

Suman Jana

Adrienne Porter Felt

John Vilk

The subject disclosure is directed towards securing a computing device using content-based isolation. When the computing device requests content data having different ownership, a monitor component identifies and groups trusted portions of the content data into one or more isolation containers such that only trusted programs are permitted access. Other programs are, therefore, untrusted and can be denied access in order to prevent malicious activity, unless access is approved by the content owner.

Content-based isolation for computing device security

Functionality is described herein for receiving events which characterize features in an environment, and for identifying at least one policy based on the events. The functionality consults a certificate, associated with the policy, to determine whether the policy is valid. If valid, the functionality uses the policy to govern the behavior of at least one application, such as by controlling the application's consumption of events. A trusted passport authority may be employed to generate the certificates. Each certificate may: (1) identify that it originated from the trusted passport authority; (2) contain context information which describes a context in which the policy is intended to be applied within an environment; and/or (3) contain machine-readable content that, when executed, carries out at least one aspect of the policy.

World-driven access control using trusted certificates

An 'AR Privacy API' provides an API that allows applications and web browsers to use various content rendering abstractions to protect user privacy in a wide range of web-based immersive augmented reality (AR) scenarios. The AR Privacy API extends the traditional concept of 'web pages' to immersive &#x201c;web rooms&#x201d; wherein any desired combination of existing or new 2D and 3D content is rendered within a user's room or other space. Advantageously, the AR Privacy API and associated rendering abstractions are useable by a wide variety of applications and web content for enhancing the user's room or other space with web-based immersive AR content. Further, the AR Privacy API is implemented using any existing or new web page coding platform, including, but not limited to HTML, XML, CSS, JavaScript, etc., thereby enabling existing web content and coding techniques to be smoothly integrated into a wide range of web room AR scenarios.

Protecting privacy in web-based immersive augmented reality

A shared renderer maintains shared state information to which two or more augmented reality application contribute. The shared renderer then provides a single output presentation based on the shared state information. Among other aspects, the shared renderer includes a permission mechanism by which applications can share information regarding object properties. The shared renderer may also include: a physics engine for simulating movement of at least one object that is represented by the shared state information; an annotation engine for managing a presentation of annotations produced by plural applications; and/or an occlusion engine for managing the behavior of the output presentation when two or more objects, produced by two or more applications, overlap within the output presentation.

Managing shared state information produced by applications

Functionality is described herein for managing the behavior of one or more applications, such as augmented reality applications and/or other environment-sensing applications. The functionality defines permission information in a world-driven manner, which means that the functionality uses a trusted mechanism to identify cues in the sensed environment, and then maps those cues to permission information. The functionality then uses the permission information to govern the operation of one or more applications.

World-driven access control

Functionality is described herein by which plural environment-sensing applications capture information from an environment in a fine-grained and least-privileged manner. By doing so, the functionality reduces the risk that private information that appears within the environment will be released to unauthorized parties. Among other aspects, the functionality provides an error correction mechanism for reducing the incidence of false positives in the detection of objects, an offloading technique for delegating computationally intensive recognition tasks to a remote computing framework, and a visualization module by which a user may inspect the access rights to be granted (or already granted) to each application.

Managing access by applications to perceptual information

An access system is described herein which allows an application module to access a user-owned resource based on an indication of a user's intent to interact with the user-owned resource. For example, the application module can provide an application user interface which embeds a gadget associated with a particular user-owned resource. The access system can interpret the user's interaction with the gadget as conferring implicit permission to the application module to access the user-owned resource associated with the gadget. In addition, or alternatively, the user may make a telltale gesture in the course of interacting with the application module. The access system can interpret this gesture as conferring implicit permission to the application module to access a user-owned resource that is associated with the gesture.

User-driven access control

Resource sharing in a multi-principal browser includes managing a resource for a web entity by determining how to divide the resource for sharing among two or more web entities based at least in part on a Document Object Model (DOM)-recursive resource allocation policy or an application-specified resource allocation policy. A web entity includes a principal instance contending for the resource. The process identifies resource allocation mechanisms from each resource type based at least in part on the DOM-recursive sharing policy or the application-specified resource allocation policy along with the resource type.

Resource sharing in multi-principal browser

Methods and systems for preventing permission re-delegation among applications are disclosed herein. The method includes accepting a message requesting access to a user-controlled resource from a requester application at a deputy application and reducing a first permissions list of the deputy application to a second permissions list. The second permissions list includes an overlap of permissions between the deputy application and the requester application. Moreover, the method also includes sending the message from the deputy application to a computing system via an application programming interface (API), wherein the computing system is configured to reject the message if the second permissions list of the deputy application does not permit access to the user-controlled resource.

Permission re-delegation prevention

Techniques for providing resource sharing in a multi-principal browser are described. Resource sharing includes managing a resource for web entity by determining how to divide the resource to share among two or more web entities based at least in part on a Document Object Model (DOM)-recursive resource allocation policy or an application-specified resource allocation policy. A web entity includes a principal instance contending for the resource. The process identifies resource allocation mechanisms from each resource type based at least in part on the DOM-recursive sharing policy or the application-specified resource allocation policy along with the resource type.

A principal operating system based-browser controls access to resources. The resources are represented semantically in a resource object model. A browser kernel of the browser mediates resources access calls from principals. In some implementations the principals are web entities and the resources are peripheral devices. The resource object model separates device semantics from physical device access. Resource access control policies are maintained by the browser kernel and separated from device access mechanisms.

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Kirkland, WA, United States of America

Alexander Nikolavich Moshchuk