Cisco Technology, Inc.

Akram Ismail Sheriff

Jerome Henry

Nagendra Kumar Nainar

Robert Edgar Barton

Santosh Ramrao Patil

Carlos M Pignataro

David John Zacks

Pascal Thubert

Gangadharan Byju Pularikkal

Thomas Szigeti

Rajesh Indira Viswambharan

Patrick Wetterwald

Eric Michel Levy-Abegnoli

Mark Grayson

Robert E Barton

Rajiv Asati

Vinay Saini

Huimin She

Chuanwei Li

Lele Zhang

Shankar Ramanathan

Matthew Aaron Silverman

Vishal Satyendra Desai

Pooya Monajemi

Walter Theodore Hulick, Jr

Jun Hui Liu

Li Zhao

Timothy David Keanini

Xiaoguang Jason Chen

Haibo Dong

Guy Keinan

Arvind Tiwari

Gonzalo A Salgueiro

Hendrikus G P Bosch

Sudhir Kumar Jain

John Matthew Swartz

M David Hanes

Hazim Hashim Dahir

Huaiyi Wang

Muhilan Natarajan

Wenjia Wu

Raghavaiah Avula

Ariel Shuper

Techniques for determining an optimal connection path by a NHNaaS are described. The techniques may include receiving a registration from an IPS that includes service ISP service parameters, and storing the registration in a NaaS database. A request to connect to a remote service from a user device, including user parameters required is received. ISPs having respective service parameters compatible with the user parameters are identified in the NaaS database. Multiple paths offered by the service providers between the user device and the remote service are determined. Network performance data for each path is received from a network monitoring service. Using the network performance data, an optimal path for establishing the connection is identified. A request to instantiate a tunnel between the user device and remote service is transmitted to the service providers along the optimal path and the tunnel information is transmitted to the user device.

End-to-end neutral host network-as-a-service

Methods are provided in which a domain name system (DNS) service obtains a lookup request for information about a source of a traffic flow being transmitted to a network resource external of a service cluster and performs, based on the lookup request, a lookup operation for a microservice that is the source of the traffic flow, among a plurality of microservices of the service cluster registered with the DNS service. The methods further include providing information about the microservice based on the lookup operation. The information includes at least a name of the microservice for visibility of the microservice external of the service cluster.

Microservice visibility and control

Runtime security threats are detected and analyzed for serverless functions developed for hybrid clouds or other cloud-based deployment environments. One or more serverless functions may be received and executed within a container instance executing in a controlled and monitored environment. The execution of the serverless functions is monitored, using a monitoring layer in the controlled environment to capture runtime data including container application context statistics, serverless function input and output data, and runtime parameter snapshots of the serverless functions. Execution data associated with the serverless functions may be analyzed and provided to various supervised and/or unsupervised machine-learning models configured to detect and analyze runtime security threats.

Runtime security analytics for serverless workloads

An example method for identifying and reporting a space or individual that has been exposed to an infectious disease includes identifying sensor data related to one or more individuals in a space; determining, based on the sensor data, that a particular individual among the one or more individuals is infected with an infectious disease; generating a report requesting that the space be disinfected; and outputting the report to a computing device.

Systems and methods for detecting and tracking infectious diseases using sensor data

In one embodiment, a method herein comprises: receiving, at a device, a registration request from a telemetry exporter that transmits telemetry data; generating, by the device, a telemetry configuration file for the telemetry exporter, the telemetry configuration file defining a policy for transmission of telemetry data from the telemetry exporter and an authentication token for the telemetry exporter; sharing, by the device, the policy with a security enforcer; and sending, by the device, the telemetry configuration file to the telemetry exporter, wherein the telemetry exporter is caused to connect with the security enforcer using the authentication token, send the telemetry configuration file to the security enforcer, and transmit collected telemetry data to the security enforcer, and wherein the security enforcer is caused to create a dynamic publish-subscribe stream for publishing the collected telemetry data received from the telemetry exporter based on the telemetry configuration file and the policy.

Secure access service edge function with configured metric collection intelligence

Techniques are described for classification-based data security management. The classification-based data security management can include utilizing device and/or data attributes to identify security modes for communication of data stored in a source device. The security modes can be identified based on a hybrid-encryption negotiation. The attributes can include a device resource availability value, an access trust score, a data confidentiality score, a geo-coordinates value, and/or a date/time value. The security modes can include a hybrid-encryption mode. The source device can utilize the hybrid-encryption mode to transmit the data, via one or more network nodes, such as an edge node, to one or more service nodes.

Classification-based data privacy and security management

In one embodiment, a method comprises: receiving, by a process, an executed function flow of a daisy chained serverless function-as-a-service (FaaS) function, the executed function flow having been injected with a particular trace identifier in response to an initial event trigger and span identifiers having been injected by each service that was executed; generating, by the process, a serverless flow graph associated with the particular trace identifier based on linking a path of serverless functions according to correlation of the span identifiers between the serverless functions; performing, by the process, a trace-based analysis of the serverless flow graph through comparison to a baseline of expectation; detecting, by the process, one or more anomalies in the serverless flow graph according to the trace-based analysis; and mitigating, by the process, the one or more anomalies in the serverless flow graph.

Mitigating security threats in daisy chained serverless FaaS functions

Techniques for policy-based failure handling of data that is received for processing by failed edge services are described herein. The techniques may include receiving, at an edge node of a network, a data handling policy for a service hosted on the edge node. The service may be configured to process traffic on behalf of an application hosted by a cloud-based platform. In some examples, the data handling policy may be stored in a memory that is accessible to the edge node. The techniques may also include receiving traffic at the edge node that is to be processed at least partially by the service. At least partially responsive to detecting an error associated with the service, the edge node may cause the traffic to be handled according to the data handling policy while the service is experiencing the error.

Policy-based failure handling for edge services

Techniques for access point (AP) based location computation are disclosed. A target wireless AP, communicatively coupled to a wireless station (STA), is identified. One or more location buddy APs, relating to the target AP, are identified based on the physical locations of the location buddy APs and the target AP. It is determined that a first location buddy AP, of the one or more location buddy APs, is communicatively coupled to the STA, and in response a location of the STA is determined using the target AP.

Access point based location system for high density WiFi deployments

This disclosure describes using a dynamic proxy for securing communications between a source within a cloud environment and an application container. The techniques include intercepting traffic directed to an application container, analyzing the traffic and traffic patterns, and allowing or preventing the traffic from being delivered to the application container based on the analysis. A traffic analysis engine may determine whether the traffic is considered safe and is to be allowed to be delivered to the application container, or whether the traffic is considered unsafe and is to be prevented from being delivered to the application container, According to some configurations, the address(es) to the network interfaces (e.g., WIFI or Eth0) are abstracted to help ensure security of the application containers.

Dynamic proxy response from application container

Providing for time sensitive networking (TSN) traffic in high density deployments is described. An access point (AP) is a high density deployment receives a message identifying another AP as a TSN neighbor and also detects a TSN device within an area covered by the APs. This arrangement may cause traffic interruptions for the TSN traffic between the TSN device and the APs. In order to prevent disruption in TSN traffic, a TSN time slot and a resource unit (RU) is determined for each of the APs, and the TSN traffic is communicated between the various devices in network according to the determined TSN time slot and RU.

Time-sensitive networking in high density networks

Presented herein are techniques to facilitate infrastructure and policy orchestration in a shared workspace network environment. In one example, a method may include obtaining, by a service broker, a reservation request from a consumer network for a consumer, wherein the reservation request seeks a reservation to reserve, at least in part, at least one workspace device for the consumer for a workspace for a particular day and a particular time period; based on determining that the at least one workspace device is available, providing a response to the consumer network that includes a first indicator for identifying the reservation of the workspace and at least one second indicator identifying the at least one workspace device; and upon receiving a session request from the consumer network that includes the second indicator, establishing a management tunnel to interconnect the consumer network and the at least one workspace device via the service broker.

Infrastructure and policy orchestration for shared workspaces

Techniques for distributed sub-controller permission for control of data-traffic flow within software-defined networking (SDN) mesh networks to limit control plane traffic of the network are described herein. A technique described herein includes a network node of a data-traffic path of an SDN mesh network obtaining SDN sub-controller permission from a border controller of the SDN mesh network. Further, the technique includes suppression of data traffic from sibling and children nodes of data-traffic path allied nodes to the data-traffic path allied nodes. The data-traffic path allied nodes include network nodes that are part of the data-traffic path of the SDN mesh network. Further still, the technique includes the transmission of data across the data-traffic path.

Distributed sub-controller permission for control of data-traffic flow within software-defined networking (SDN) mesh network

Techniques and mechanisms for providing integrity verified paths using only integrity validated pods of nodes. A network service mesh (NSM) associated with a first pod may locally generate a nonce and provide the nonce to the first pod, where the request includes a request for an attestation token. Using the nonce, the first pod may generate the attestation token and reply back to the NSM. The NSM may generate a second request for an attestation token and forward it to a NSE pod, where the request includes a second locally generated nonce generated by the NSM. The NSE pod may generate the second attestation token using the second nonce and reply back to the NSM. The NSM may then have the attestation tokens verified or validated by a certificate authority (CA) server. The NSM may thus instantiate an integrity verified path between the first pod and the NSE pod.

Integrity verified paths between entities in a container-orchestration system

Growing community of inventors

San Jose, CA, United States of America

Akram Ismail Sheriff