Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Ajith Kumar

Adrian Mihail Marinescu

Anil Francis Thomas

Marc E Seinfeld

Jonathan Mark Keller

Joseph Leo Faulhaber

Jack Wilson Stokes, Iii

Sterling M Reasor

Joseph Edwin Johnson, Jr

Michael Jarrett

Catalin Daniel Sandu

Alvin Loh

Vishal Kapoor

Santanu Chakraborty

Nitin Sood

Ronald L Thompson

Joseph J Johnson

Ahmed S Hussain

William Pfeifer

Omer Ben Bassat

Timothy Jon Fraser

The subject disclosure is directed towards detecting malware or possible malware in an input file by allowing the input file to be opened, and by monitoring for one or more behaviors corresponding to the open file that likely indicate malware. Only certain executable files and/or file types opened thereby may be monitored, with various collected event data used for antimalware purposes when improper behavior is observed. Example behaviors include writing of a file to storage, generation of network traffic, injection of a process, running of script, and/or writing system registry data. Telemetry data and/or a sample of the file may be sent to an antimalware service, and malware remediation may be performed. Data (e.g., the collected events) may be distributed to other nodes for use in antimalware detection, e.g., to block execution of a similar file.

Discovering malicious input files and performing automatic and distributed remediation

Methods, systems, and computer-readable media are disclosed for identifying telemetry data. A particular method scans a file and compares the file to at least one attribute to be used for telemetry collection. When the file is identified as a telemetry candidate, an offer to submit a sample of the file is sent to a server. A response to the offer is received from the server. If the response to the offer indicates an acceptance, a sample of the file is sent to the server.

Identification of telemetry data

Techniques are described herein that are capable of selectively scanning objects for infection by malware (i.e., to determine whether one or more of the objects are infected by malware). For instance, metadata that is associated with the objects may be reviewed to determine whether update(s) have been made with regard to the objects since a determination was made that the objects were not infected by malware. An update may involve increasing a number of the objects, modifying one of the objects, etc. Objects that have been updated (e.g., added and/or modified) since the determination may be scanned. Objects that have not been updated since the determination need not necessarily be scanned. For instance, an allowance may be made to perform operations with respect to the objects that have not been updated since the determination without first scanning the objects for infection by malware.

Selectively scanning objects for infection by malware

The subject disclosure is directed towards a technology by which antimalware detection logic is maintained and operated at a backend service, with which a customer frontend machine communicates (queries) for purposes of malware detection. In this way, some antimalware techniques are maintained at the backend service rather than revealed to antimalware authors. The backend antimalware detection logic may be based upon feature selection, and may be updated rapidly, in a manner that is faster than malware authors can track. Noise may be added to the results to make it difficult for malware authors to deduce the logic behind the results. The backend may return results indicating malware or not malware, or return inconclusive results. The backend service may also detect probing-related queries that are part of an attempt to deduce the unrevealed antimalware detection logic, with noisy results returned in response and/or other actions taken to foil the attempt.

Applying antimalware logic without revealing the antimalware logic to adversaries

The trust reputation of the combination of an installation package and installer, as a pair, and the combination of a file and an installer, as a pair, is used to store the identity of a file in a persistent cache. An entry in the persistent cache indicates the trust worthiness of a file that does not contain malware thereby avoiding a scan of the file for malware. The trust worthiness of a file may be determined from known trust reputations of the installation package, installer, and file from a network of computing resources. By relying on the known trust reputation of the combination of the installation package and installer and the combination of the file and installer, the identity of the file may be stored in persistent cache quickly.

Trusted installation of a software application

Growing community of inventors

Seattle, WA, United States of America

Ajith Kumar