Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP

Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.p.

Adrian Shaw

Chris I Dalton

Ludovic Emmanuel Paul Noel Jacquin

Geoffrey Ndu

Dejan S Milojicic

Boris Balacheff

Pratyusa Kumar Manadhata

Adrian John Baldwin

Zhikui Wang

David Plaquin

Thomas M Laffey

Stuart Haber

Fraser John Dickin

Chandrasekar Venkatraman

Brian Quentin Monahan

Maugan Villatel

Thalia Laing

Christopher Ian Dalton

Christopher L Dalton

Simon Kai-Ying Shiu

Pierre Louis Robert Belgarric

A security verification system may acquire first authorization information, wherein the first authorization information defines an access right to store data in a trusted platform module (TPM) of the computing device. A system may generate an index of an allocated memory location of the TPM and second authorization information using the first authorization information, wherein the second authorization information defines an access right associated with the index. A system may receive a request from a hypervisor to initiate a virtual machine. A system may transmit the second authorization information to the hypervisor. A system may store an initial state of the virtual machine at the index using the second authorization information.

Measurements of virtual machines

In an example, a computing device is described. The computing device comprises a memory to store a set of states and a corresponding set of non-overlapping time intervals. The computing device further comprises a timing unit to indicate a time at which a signature is to be produced. The computing device further comprises a processor to: identify which time interval of the set of non-overlapping time intervals includes the indicated time; generate a signing key based on a state associated with the identified time interval; and produce a signature, under a stateful signature scheme, with the signing key.

Time intervals for stateful signature production

Examples relate to verifying network elements. In one example, a computing device may: receive, from a client device, a request for attestation of a back-end network, the request including back-end configuration requirements; obtain, from a network controller that controls the back-end network, a controller configuration that specifies each network element included in the back-end network; provide each network element included in the back-end network with a request for attestation of a network element configuration of the network element; receive, from each network element, response data that specifies the network element configuration of the network element; verify that the response data received from each network element meets the back-end configuration requirements included in the request for attestation of the back-end network; and provide the client device with data verifying that the back-end network meets the back-end configuration requirements.

Verifying network elements

Examples relate to Input/Output (I/O) data encryption and decryption. In an example, an encryption/decryption engine on an Integrated Circuit (IC) of a computing device obtains at least one plaintext data. Some examples determine, by the encryption/decryption engine, whether the at least one plaintext data is to be sent to a memory in the computing device or to an I/O device. Some examples apply, when the at least one plaintext data is to be sent to the I/O device and by the encryption/decryption engine, an encryption primitive of a block cipher encryption algorithm to the at least one plaintext data to create output encrypted data, wherein an initialization vector that comprises a random number is applied to the encryption primitive.

Input/output data encryption

Example implementations relate to non-volatile storage of management data. In example implementations, a system is disclosed, the system including a plurality of computing devices, a management device, and a non-volatile memory including a plurality of management spaces corresponding to the plurality of computing devices. In example implementations, at least one of the plurality of management spaces is to be accessible by the management device and by the corresponding computing device, be inaccessible by computing devices other than the corresponding computing device, and store management data associated with the corresponding computing device.

Non-volatile storage of management data

A computing device having instructions that when executed by a processor may: receive, from a verifier, a request for attestation of a current network configuration of the computing device; identify network configuration rules, each network configuration rule specifying an action to be taken by the computing device in response to receiving a particular type of network traffic; generate, for each network configuration rule, a rule abstraction that represents the network configuration rule; provide data representing each rule abstraction to a trusted component; receive, from the trusted component, response data comprising i) data representing each rule abstraction, and ii) a digital signature; and provide the response data to the verifier as attestation proof of the current network configuration of the computing device.

Verifying a network configuration

In one example in accordance with the present disclosure, a method may include retrieving, at a memory management unit (MMU), encrypted data from a memory via direct memory access and determining, at the MMU, a peripheral that is the intended recipient of the encrypted data. The method may also include accessing an application key used for transmission between an application and the peripheral, wherein the application key originates from the application and decrypting, at the MMU, the encrypted data using the application key and transmitting the decrypted data to the peripheral.

Direct memory access encryption with application provided keys

In one example in accordance with the present disclosure, a system comprises a first memory module and a first memory integrity monitoring processor, embedded to the first memory module, to receive a second hash corresponding to a second memory module. The second hash includes a second sequence number for reconstruction of a final hash value and the second hash is not sequentially a first number in a sequence for reconstruction of the final hash value. The first processor may receive a third hash corresponding to a third memory module. The third hash includes a third sequence number for reconstruction of the final hash value and the third hash is received after the second hash. The first processor may determine if the second hash can be combined with the third hash, combine the second hash and third hash into a partial hash reconstruct the final hash value using the partial hash.

Memory integrity monitoring

Examples described herein include a computing device with a processing resource to execute beginning booting instructions of the computing device. The beginning booting instructions may include a first booting instruction. The computing device also includes an access line to access the first booting instruction, a measuring engine to duplicate the first booting instruction and to generate a first integrity value associated with the first booting instruction, and a measurement register to store the first integrity value. The measuring engine may be operationally screened from the processing resource and the measurement register may be inaccessible to the processing resource.

Integrity values for beginning booting instructions

A data processing system supporting a secure domain and a non-secure domain comprises a hardware component, and a processor device having operating modes in the secure domain and non-secure domain, the processor device to execute a secure application in the secure domain. The hardware component has a property having a secure state. The property of the hardware component in the secure state may only be reconfigured responsive to instructions received from the secure domain. The secure application is operative to implement a configuration service to configure the property of the hardware component in the secure state, responsive to a request received from the non-secure domain according to an application programming interface associated with the secure application.

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Bristol, United Kingdom

Adrian Shaw