Nec Corporation

Carnegie Mellon University

Robert Boschgmbh

Adrian Perrig

Takayuki Sasaki

Daniele Enrico Asoni

Jonathan McCarrell McCune

Ning Qu

Claudio Soriente

Bryan Jeffrey Parno

Srdjan Capkun

Toshiki Kobayashi

Virgil Dorin Gligor

Amit Vasudevan

Cynthia Kuo

Anupam Datta

Astha Jada

Jason Lee

Ramya Jayaram Masti

Arvind Seshadri

Mark Luk

Jorge Guajardo Merchan

Leendert Van Doorn

James Duran Newsome, Jr

Yanlin Li

Emmanuel Kwame Owusu

Evan Davis Gaustad

James Newsome

Pradeep Khosla

Jorge Merchan

Jonathan Mccune

Emmanuel Owusu

A semiconductor device () includes: a determination unit () configured to determine whether an avoidance condition of inspection of control flow integrity is satisfied (e.g., a degree of similarity with a previous input value is in a predetermined range) based on determination auxiliary information, which is at least an input value in a target code block to be executed among a plurality of code blocks in a predetermined program, and an inspection unit () configured to avoid inspection of control flow integrity in the target code block when it is determined that the avoidance condition is satisfied.

Semiconductor device, control flow inspection method, non-transitory computer readable medium, and electronic device

A semiconductor device () includes: first storage means () storing, in advance, a plurality of pieces of execution order inspection information () used for inspection of an execution order of a plurality of code blocks in a predetermined program, second storage means (), which is a cache for the first storage means, and prediction means () for predicting a storage area of the execution order inspection information based on prediction auxiliary information in a first code block of the plurality of code blocks and a control flow graph of the program, the storage area being a prefetch target to be prefetched from the first storage means to the second storage means.

A communication apparatus comprises a rollback control unit to create a second process to roll back a currently working first process thereto; a storage to store states shared by the first and the second processes, the second process taking over a state(s) stored in the storage unit; a buffer; and a timing control unit that controls of timing of rollback. The rollback control unit starts event buffering to store in the buffer all of an event(s) received during when the first process is processing and destined to the first process, and upon completion of the processing of the event by the first process, the rollback control unit performs switching of a working process from the first process to the second process, sends the event(s) stored therein from start of the event buffering to the second process and stop event buffering.

Communication apparatus, system, rollback method, and non-transitory medium

A communication apparatus comprises a rollback control unit that rolls back a first process to a second process; and a storage unit to store one or more network states shared by the first process and the second process, the second process enabled to take over or more network states from the first process; wherein the rollback control unit includes a network state control unit that controls to provide delayed updating of at least one of the one or more network states taken over by the second process.

A monitoring unit verifies authentication information of a packet received and a rule verification unit verifies authentication information of a rule that matches the packet. The monitoring unit generates authentication information for a packet to be forwarded according to the rule having authentication information verified.

Communication apparatus, system, method, and non-transitory medium

A communication apparatus comprising: a plurality of communication processes, each performing communication process on a flow associated thereto; a plurality of network interfaces, each of the network interfaces adapted to be connected to a network; a dispatcher that receives a packet from the network interface and dispatches the packet to an associated communication process, based on a dispatch rule that defines association of a flow to a communication process to which the flow is dispatched; and a control unit that performs control to roll back each of the communication processes using saved image thereof.

A communication apparatus comprising a plurality of communication processes, each of the communication processes configured to be executed in an environment allocated thereto and isolated from each of one or more environments arranged for remaining one or more processes, each of the communication processes performing communication processing on a flow associated thereto, a network interface connected to a network; a dispatcher that dispatches a packet to the communication process based on a dispatch rule that defines association of a flow with a communication process.

Communication apparatus, system, method, and non-transitory medium for securing network communication

A method for operating a computing system with a trusted processor include generating a secret cryptographic key based on a physically unclonable function in at least one hardware component in the trusted processor, generating a first public key and first private key using first secret cryptographic key, and executing instruction code corresponding to a first software program. The method further includes generating output data with the trusted processor during execution of the first software program, generating encrypted data corresponding to the output data using the first public key for at least a portion of the encryption, generating a signature of the encrypted data, and transmitting with an input/output (I/O) interface operatively connected to the trusted processor the encrypted data and the signature for storage in an untrusted memory.

Systems and methods for maintaining integrity and secrecy in untrusted computing platforms

A method, system, and apparatus for verifying integrity and execution state of an untrusted computer. In one embodiment, the method includes placing a verification function in memory on the untrusted computer; invoking the verification function from a trusted computer; determining a checksum value over memory containing both the verification function and the execution state of a processor and hardware on the untrusted computer; sending the checksum value to the trusted computer; determining at the trusted computer whether the checksum value is correct; and determining at the trusted computer whether the checksum value is received within an expected time period.

Verifying integrity and guaranteeing execution of code on untrusted computer platform

An apparatus and method for establishing a trusted path between a user interface and a trusted executable, wherein the trusted path includes a hypervisor and a driver shim. The method includes measuring an identity of the hypervisor; comparing the measurement of the identity of the hypervisor with a policy for the hypervisor; measuring an identity of the driver shim; comparing the measurement of the identity of the driver shim with a policy for the driver shim; measuring an identity of the user interface; comparing the measurement of the identity of the user interface with a policy for the user interface; and providing a human-perceptible indication of whether the identity of the hypervisor, the identity of the driver shim, and the identity of the user interface correspond with the policy for the hypervisor, the policy for the driver shim, and the policy for the user interface, respectively.

Methods and apparatuses for user-verifiable trusted path in the presence of malware

A computer including a processor and a verification device. The processor in the computer performs the steps of authenticating a secure connection between a hypervisor and the verification device, measuring the identity of at least a portion of a select guest before the select guest executes any instruction, and sending a measurement of the identity of the select guest to the verification device. The verification device compares the policy stored in the verification device with the measurement of the select guest received by the verification device. The steps of authenticating, measuring, sending, and comparing are performed after receiving a signal indicative of a request to execute the select guest and without rebooting the computer.

Methods and apparatuses for user-verifiable execution of security-sensitive code

Systems and methods are provided for preventing unauthorized modification of an operating system. The system includes an operating system comprised of kernel code for controlling access to operation of a processing unit. The system further includes an enforcement agent executing at a higher privilege than the kernel code such that any changes to the kernel code are approved by the enforcement agent prior to execution.

Systems and methods for preventing unauthorized modification of an operating system

Phishing attacks succeed by exploiting a user's inability to distinguish legitimate websites from spoofed websites. Most prior work focuses on assisting the user in making this distinction; however, users must make the right security decision every time. Unfortunately, humans are ill-suited for performing the security checks necessary for secure site identification, and a single mistake may result in a total compromise of the user's online account. Fundamentally, users should be authenticated using information that they cannot readily reveal to malicious parties. Placing less reliance on the user during the authentication process enhances security and eliminates many forms of fraud. We disclose using a trusted device to perform mutual authentication that eliminates reliance on perfect user behavior, thwarts Man-in-the-Middle attacks after setup, and protects a user's account even in the presence of keyloggers and most forms of spyware.

Method and apparatus for secure online transactions

A method of securely deploying information to a device includes placing a device into a shielded structure and exchanging timing messages between a keying device located inside the shielded structure and a beacon located outside of the shielded structure. The shielded structure is closed. The exchange of timing messages is terminated, and upon termination, the keying device transfers the information via one or more shielded messages to the device, and the beacon jams the frequency at which the shielded messages are transferred. The shielded structure is opened, and the keying device and beacon exchange messages to verify the secure deployment of the information.

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Zurich, Switzerland

Adrian Perrig